Winter 1976
Volume 22 no 1 (98)
£1.50 $4.00

SURVEY

a journal of East & West studies

International Scene
Leopold Labedz

"Socialist Internationalism"
Teresa Rakowska-Harmstone Jacob Walkin

Communism and Africa
Roger Kanet O. Igho Natufe

Soviet Union
Nationalities: Jews Ukrainians
Crime: Thieves as a Social Phenomenon

Robert Conquest: Purges in Retrospect
Michael Heller: Gulag III

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Editor: Leopold Labedz

International Advisory Board

Enzo Bettiza ..... *Il Giornale, Milan*
François Bourricaud ..... *University of Paris*
Zbigniew Brzezinski ..... *Columbia University*
Luciano Cafagna ..... *University of Pisa*
Melvin Croan ..... *University of Wisconsin*
Colin Crouch ..... *London School of Economics*
François Duchêne ..... *University of Sussex*
Giorgio Galli ..... *Critica Sociale, Turin*
Pierre Hassner .... *Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques, Paris*
Masamichi Inoki ..... *Kyoto University*
Karl Kaiser ..... *University of Cologne*
Ivo Lederer ..... *Ford Foundation*
John Wilson Lewis ..... *Stanford University*
Richard Löwenthal ..... *Free University of Berlin*
Alasdair MacIntyre ..... *Boston University*
Mark Mancall ..... *Stanford University*
Ali Mazrui ..... *University of Michigan*
Leonard Schapiro ..... *London School of Economics*
Soedjatmoko ..... *Djakarta, Indonesia*
Theo Sommer ..... *Die Zeit, Hamburg*

Assistant Editor

Rosalind Floyd

Editorial Office

Ilford House, 133 Oxford Street, London W1R 1TD (Tel. 01–734–0592)

Subscription Office

Oxford University Press, Subscription Department, Press Road, Neasden, London NW10 (Tel. 01–450–8080)

Subscription Rates

£6 or US $16.00. Student Rates £3 or US $8.00. Single copies £1.50 or US $4. Special arrangements for airmail.

Manuscripts

Articles should be submitted in duplicate to the editorial office. They should be typed in double-spacing and, preferably, conform to the house-style of *Survey*.

Copyright © *Survey* 1975

ISSN 0039-6192

Survey is published under the auspices of the International Association for Cultural Freedom and Stanford University by

OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Winter 1976
Volume 22
no 1 (98)

SURVEY

a journal of East & West studies

International Scene

USA & the World Today .. .. .. *Leopold Labedz* 1

Communist States

Socialist Internationalism .. *Teresa Rakowska-Harmstone* 38

Yugoslavia after the 10th Party Congress .. .. *Jacob Walkin* 55

Africa

Communist Parties in Africa .. .. .. *Roger Kanet* 74

Soviet Policy Towards African Regimes .. *O. Igho Natufe* 93

Nationalities in the USSR

Jewish Emigration and Soviet Policy Models .. *William Korey* 112

Valentyn Moroz—Individualist in Jeopardy *Harvey Fireside* 132

Camps & Prisons

Thieves as a Social Phenomenon .. .. .. *Yuri Glazov* 141

Historiography of the Great Purges .. .. *Robert Conquest* 157

Gulag III .. .. *Michael Heller* 165

Acrostic .. .. *William Petersen* 178

Our Contributors 181

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Our Contributors

ROBERT CONQUEST, historian and poet, is the author of *The Great Terror, Russia after Khrushchev, Power and Policy in the USSR* and *The Nation Killers.* At present he is a Fellow of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars in Washington.

HARVEY FIRESIDE is Chairman of the Politics Department, Ithaca College, N.Y. in the United States, and an associate of the Russian Research Center at Harvard University. He is the author of *Icon and Swastika: The Russian Orthodox Church Under Nazi and Soviet Control,* and several articles on Soviet dissidents.

YURI GLAZOV, born in Moscow, received his Ph.D. in 1962 from the Moscow Academy of Sciences. For signing a " petition of twelve " in early 1968 he was expelled from the Academy of Sciences and banned from teaching at Moscow University. After four years he obtained permission to leave Russia, and in 1973–75 he taught in Boston College. Since 1975 he has been Professor and Chairman of the Russian Department in Dalhousie University, Nova Scotia, Canada.

MICHAEL HELLER is Maître-Assistant at the Sorbonne. He is the author of *Le Monde Concentrationnaire et la Litterature Soviétique.*

ROGER E. KANET is Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign. Among his most recent publications are *Soviet and East European Foreign Policy: A Bibliography of English- and Russian-Language Publications, 1967–71* and *The Soviet Union and the Developing Nations* (1974) for which he is author and contributor.

WILLIAM KOREY is the Director of B'Nai B'Rith United Nations Office in New York. He is the author of *The Soviet Cage* and numerous articles on human rights and Soviet affairs.

O. IGHO NATUFE obtained his M.A. from Friendship University, Moscow, USSR, and his Ph.D. from McGill University, Montreal, Canada. He is shortly taking up an appointment in the Department of History at the University of Ibadan, Nigeria.

WILLIAM PETERSEN is Robert Lazarus Professor of Social Demography at Ohio State University, USA. He is the author of *Population* (2nd ed., 1969) and other works.

TERESA RAKOWSKA-HARMSTONE is Professor of Political Science at Carleton University, Ottawa, the author of *Russia and Nationalism in Central Asia: the Case of Tadzhikistan* and co-editor (with A. Bromke) of *Communist States in Disarray.*

JACOB WALKIN is Associate Professor of Political Science at Auburn University, Alabama, USA. He is the author of a book, *The Rise of Democracy in Pre-Revolutionary Russia* as well as several articles.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

USA and the World Today: Kissinger and After *

Leopold Labedz

THE pre-electoral period was not the only reason why foreign policy issues were raised in the United States. They are going to be with us, whatever the outcome of the election. Dr Henry Kissinger's "containment" speech at San Francisco and President Ford's abandonment of the word *détente* have put on the agenda the question of the reassessment of *détente* policy itself. The growing disenchantment with its results is only too obvious. For those of us who for a long time were critical of the policy which has been sold to the American and Western public under this brand-name, it is almost embarrassing to read some of the things which suddenly present themselves as conventional wisdom.

When three years ago Mr Brezhnev visited Washington, *Newsweek* (3 July 1973) wrote that "though they are still rivals, the United States and Russia have bound themselves so closely in a network of common interest that cooperation has become as natural today as confrontation was in the past." Today the same *Newsweek* (19 January 1976) writes that "belatedly, Americans are beginning to perceive the pitfalls of *détente*."

The *Washington Post* declares that through *détente,* the United States learnt once again that "all our smiles and favors won't melt the iceberg," and that "the lessons of the past should have put our leaders on guard against stimulating euphoria."

The *New York Times* announces that the United States should not ignore the Soviet-sponsored aggression and subversion because "appeasement rarely appeases." One of its columnists proclaimed (29 December 1975) that "*détente* is dead." The same *New York Times,* which in the past presented Henry Kissinger as a species of diplomatic superman, has pointed out (25 January 1976) that nowadays he uses a language which "sounds much like that of his critics," and that "the policy of *détente* is shaky and its backers are on the defensive."

The London *Economist* (7 February 1976) asserted that "the minority of voices which have long been arguing that the kernel of truth in *détente* has been lost under layers of dangerous illusion have started to become a majority."

Où sont les neiges d'antan, where are the snows of yesteryear? Where is the vaunted "structure of peace," after Angola? How are the famous "linkages" reflected in Lebanon? Have the past five years been a witness to the "intermeshing" of US and Soviet interests leading to a "constructive interdependence?"

* This paper was presented at The Freedom House Consultation, 20–22 February 1976 and subsequently updated.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

SINCE the Nixon proclamation that "the era of confrontation has ended," there has been sufficient evidence to leave no doubt about the answers to those questions. The Paris agreement led to the fall of Vietnam. The "incentive" payments to the Soviet Union, the grain exports, the technology transfers, the legitimization of the Soviet conquests in Eastern Europe, the recognition of Eastern Germany—all were one side of the *détente*. The Vietnam *débâcle*, the Middle East war, the Soviet encouragement of the oil offensive against the West, the Soviet bases in Somalia, the various Mediterranean perils, Portugal, Angola, Lebanon, and last but not least, the Soviet drive towards military superiority—all these were the other side of the *détente*. Its balance sheet, from the point of view of the West, is hardly impressive. The effects of this policy are there for all to see.[1] The United States faces a situation in which its credibility is undermined, its political prestige is lower than ever, its alliances are shaken, its influence in Asia and Africa is waning, its friends in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe feel betrayed, and its own public is thoroughly confused.

This is not just the result of some "objective process." The policy was from the beginning based on a monumental piece of fatuous misjudgment. It is difficult to imagine how anyone could take seriously the premise of its two fundamental documents—the Declaration of Basic Principles of Relations Between the US and the USSR, signed in Moscow in May 1972, and a similar document signed in Washington in June 1973—which solemnly proclaimed that neither of the two powers would try "to obtain unilateral advantage at the expense of the other." To present such surrealistic hopes about Soviet foreign policy behaviour as any kind of *Realpolitik* was a unique feat, indeed worthy to be included in the Guinness Book of Records.

When Henry Kissinger became the Secretary of State he stated (*The New York Times Magazine*, 28 October 1973):

> We have an unusual opportunity to crystallize a new structure of peace. The leadership of China will change in the next few years. The leadership of Russia will also change in the next few years. Meanwhile, Europe and Japan are acquiring a new sense of their own identity. I would like to preserve with each of these powers harmonious relations, so that when we leave office we can hand over to our successors a going system.[2]

[1] But of course not all want to see them. For instance, the International Institute for Strategic Studies, in its annual *Strategic Survey*, points out the Soviet lack of success in the Middle East, Portugal and Japan as balancing the picture. But this is hardly the case. The balance of power shifts in favour of the Soviet Union even when it achieves only partial successes. To present *some* Soviet failures as a proof that the West is, generally, holding its own only distorts the perspective.

[2] Dr Kissinger has of course a readymade *apologia pro domo sua*: "In preparing his end game, Kissinger has at least one eye on history. As he sees it, he has charted a new course with China and has made *détente* with Russia a policy that will endure. What is left now is a series of secondary, but important issues. 'He wants to show that he dealt with *all* the problems,' says one confidant. 'We need a conception of the world towards which we are heading,' Kissinger himself told *Newsweek*. 'It is my duty to

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

That, needless to say, is one hope which is not very likely to be fulfilled; and it is not difficult to see why. There are many illustrations of why such hopes were not fulfilled in the past.

While negotiating the Paris agreement, Dr Kissinger complained: "I am uniting Vietnam, and both halves are screaming at me." Like Metternich, he thought that he knew what he wanted: "When I am talking to Le Duc Tho, I know how to behave with Le Duc Tho, and when I am with a girl I know how to behave with a girl ..." Unlike Dr Kissinger, Le Duc Tho refused to accept the Nobel Peace Prize and did not proclaim that the Paris agreement opened the way "to a new possibility for reconciliation" in Vietnam. He accepted his real prize in Saigon. Three years later, Dr Kissinger argued (*US News and World Report*, 23 June 1975) that the collapse of Indo-China "has nothing to do with the architecture of our foreign policy."

At his press conference on 25 June 1973, Dr Kissinger declared that he expected "to see a further evolution of the US-Soviet relationship which will be increasingly free of confrontations." He added that "it is safe to say that the Soviet Union and the USA agree on the evolution of the Middle East and how it should be resolved."

When, a few months later, he appeared at a *Pacem in Terris* conference, it happened to coincide with the Yom Kippur war. That did not prevent him from claiming that he had "succeeded in transforming US-Soviet relations in many important ways," but he warned that "*détente* cannot survive irresponsibility in any area, including the Middle East," and he added: "We will react if any relaxation of tensions is used as a cover to exacerbate conflicts in international trouble spots." Ever since, like a grand opera singer who intones "We are marching, we are marching" without ever moving a leg, Dr Kissinger has gone on repeating this plea, and without much effect.

He asserted that American "allies have regained strength and self-confidence," at the moment when European countries were collapsing politically in the face of the oil embargo. He still thinks that his foreign policy is both "effective and strong" (*US News and World Report*, 23 June 1975). However, he admitted in his testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in September 1974, that certain Soviet actions may necessitate a reversal of his policy:

> If the Soviet Union uses *détente* to strengthen its military capacity in all fields; if in crises it acts to sharpen tension; if it does not contribute to progress towards stability; if it seeks to undermine our alliances; if it is deaf to the urgent needs of the least developed countries and the emergent issues of interdependence, then it in turn tempts a return to the tensions and conflicts we have made such efforts to overcome.

try to articulate that conception.'" (*Newsweek*, 24 May 1976.) Thus we may have yet another "conceptual breakthrough," but now Dr. Kissinger can only use his considerable resources of sophistry to rationalize his failures.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

It is almost superfluous to point out that this is exactly what the Soviet Union was doing all along. *Détente* was supposed to preclude such Soviet actions; but when they occurred, the West tended to acquiesce in order to save "*détente.*" In his address to the World Affairs Council at Los Angeles (4 April 1975), Eugene V. Rostow illustrated this with reference to the Yom Kippur war:

> In order to preserve the illusion of "*détente*" Nixon and Kissinger covered up the Soviet role in the October 1973 war, both by what they said and by what they did not say. Mr Kissinger has told us that Soviet behaviour before, during, and after the October war was "not unreasonable," and "less obstructive than in 1967" and that our "*détente*" relations with the Soviet Union contributed to an agreed settlement.

In his *Commentary* (February 1976) article Theodore Draper has demonstrated that "appeasement was built into *détente*" from the very beginning. At the 25th congress of the CPSU Mr Brezhnev explained how this policy was faced by the Soviet side at an early stage with an eye on the eventual pay-off:

> In May 1972 the plenary session discussed problems which we faced at that very crucial time—it is possible to say that it was a turning-point—in the struggle for the relaxation of tension. You will remember, comrades, that the US President was to visit our country for the first time then. However, the Vietnam war was at its height. The situation was complex. But as the whole subsequent period has shown, the decisions of the plenary session were principled and realistic and they determined the correct course.

Indeed, it is now obvious that it was the Soviet Union and not the West who benefited in the end.

There was no dearth of warnings about this policy. In particular, such public figures as Senator Henry Jackson, George Meany, Eugene V. Rostow, Admiral Zumwalt, James Schlesinger and Paul H. Nitze became associated in the public mind with a critical attitude towards it. The writings and testimonies[3] of, among others, Richard Pipes, Robert Conquest, Albert Wohlstetter, Theodore Draper, Walter Laqueur, Leonard Schapiro, and myself provided such criticism early enough; but it only began to spread when Soviet actions themselves induced increased scepticism by providing a "demonstration effect" to the general public.

More recently, the policy which was originally launched with the

[3] cf. in particular: Walter Laqueur, *Hearings Before the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigation of the Committee on Government Operations.* US Senate, 17 April 1973; Leopold Labedz, ibid. 12 July 1973. Also: Leopold Labedz, "Shadow over Helsinki," *Encounter*, June 1973 and "The Soviet Union and Western Europe," *Survey*, Summer 1973; Richard Pipes, "America, Russia and Europe in the Light of the Nixon Doctrine," ibid.; Albert Wohlstetter, "Threats and Promises of Peace," *Orbis*, Winter 1974; Theodore Draper, "Détente," *Commentary*, June 1974; Robert Conquest et al., "Détente: An Evaluation," *Survey*, Spring/Summer 1974; G. R. Urban (ed.), *Détente*, London and New York, 1976.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

premise that the Soviet Union has become a *status quo* power, began to be justified by its proponents that it is necessary because the Soviet Union has entered the phase of imperial expansion.[4] But although Dr. Kissinger continued to justify his old policy, he increasingly felt the need to shift his ground. At his 23 December 1975 press conference, he stressed with new emphasis that "the United States will not accept Soviet military expansion of any kind." Like Chamberlain after Hitler's occupation of Czechoslovakia in March 1939, faced with a bankruptcy of his policy, the architect of *détente* is at present calling for a policy of resistance to Soviet expansionism. Is he now ready to abandon appeasement? The irony is that, unlike Chamberlain, Dr Kissinger, before he became the policy-maker, warned against the very policies which he later so assiduously implemented. In *The Necessity for Choice* (1961) he wrote:

> The United States cannot afford another decline like that which has characterized the past decade and a half. Fifteen more years of deterioration of our position in the world such as we have experienced since World War II would find us reduced to Fortress America in a world which had become largely irrelevant.

Dr Kissinger was aware then that "Soviet leadership has been able to blackmail the West from both its strength and its weakness." He referred to Summitry as "a parody of diplomacy," which may be "suicidal for the West." He predicted that "the traditional Western balance of power diplomacy will reappear, manipulated by the Kremlin." He was clear about the consequences: "The Soviet leaders will be able to overcome their difficulties with the assistance of the West and without settling any of the outstanding issues."

WHY has Secretary of State Kissinger pursued a policy which Professor Kissinger had denounced in advance? [5] He has offered no explanation; but whatever the reasons, he is facing a situation which, like a sorcerer's apprentice, he himself has conjured up and which he cannot control.

Like Chamberlain, who had to abandon his "peace in our time" line when the Nazis marched into Prague, Dr Kissinger can no longer use the "a generation of peace" approach, after the massive Soviet-Cuban intervention in Angola. *Hae tibi erunt artes.* In his 3 February 1976 speech he said that "the challenge (to the US) is unending." But if, as he again asserted, "America enters its third century with a sound foreign policy," why has the "stark reality" to which he referred been uncovered only now? Was it not obvious earlier? The magician seems to have run out of rabbits. There is little left but "stark reality"—and an empty top hat. The "philosophical" underpinnings of his approach to politics and history, the *tiefere Bedeutung* of the anti-realistic *Realpolitik*,

[4] cf. an interview with Dr Kissinger in *The New York Times* (21 Dec. 1975).
[5] cf. G. Warren Nutter, *Kissinger's Grand Design* (Washn., D.C., 1975).

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

sound strangely incongruous in the context of his San Francisco speech. Here is the old theory:

> The overemphasis on "realism" and the definition of "reality" as being outside the observer may produce a certain passivity and a tendency to adapt to circumstance rather than to master it. It may also produce a gross underestimation of the ability to change, indeed to create, reality. To recapture the ability and the willingness to build our own reality is perhaps our ultimate challenge.[6]

We are at a point when the situation is too grave to contemplate the future in terms of a mixture of undigested Kant with over-masticated Spengler. We know "*Wie sich der kleine Moritz die Weltgeschichte vorstellt.*"[7] The serious task of the defence of the West cannot be approached through misleading analogies with the problems faced by Metternich or Bismarck. A recognition of "stark reality" cannot be based on a sophomoric philosophy of history or on the combination of political illusions with public relations illusionism.

A clarification would have been preferable to exercises in ambiguity and obfuscation. One would like to have a specific answer to the question of how the new approach differs from the old one. How does Dr Kissinger's declaration that the United States must "contain Soviet power without global war" differ from George F. Kennan's "containment"? Surely not with respect to the desire to avoid global war. How is it, then, related to Dr Kissinger's previous Grand Design? How is his own "containment" related to his policy of *détente* as actually practised in the last half-decade? Or is it perhaps simply another bit of sophistry, combining assurances of resistance with the old habits of appeasement, a "Churchillian" alibi for history after years of Chamberlainite policy?

Pravda (5 February 1976) was quick to contrast Dr Kissinger's two positions:

> In his San Francisco speech two lines are clearly discernible. On the one hand it is a realistic recognition of the necessity of *détente* . . . On the other—it is an attempt to distort the foreign policy of the Soviet Union . . . Mr Kissinger spoke about an alleged Soviet expansion, attributing to the Soviet Union aggressive designs, etc. In particular he tried to justify American intervention in Angola by unfounded assertions that it was allegedly provoked by Soviet intervention . . . In short, the Secretary of State attempted in this part of his speech to shift the blame onto someone else.

Dr Kissinger is, of course, quite right in saying that an "ominous precedent" has been set in Angola. He is also right in blaming the Congress

[6] *The Necessity for Choice*, p. 357.

[7] In an interview with *The New York Times* (14 October 1974), Dr Kissinger said: "The historian has to live with a sense of the inevitability of tragedy, the statesman has to act on the assumption that problems could and must be solved." Apparently the statesman has *carte blanche* to raise overoptimistic expectations. When they inevitably fail, the historian can always attribute them to "the fatedness of historical events."

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

for refusing to face the situation; but just as the defeat in Vietnam was predictable after the proclamation of the Guam doctrine, so the voting of the Congress on Angola was predictable in advance. Dr Kissinger claims that his policy vis-à-vis the Soviet Union " has been to combine incentives and penalties." It is difficult to discern the latter; but in any case, neither has worked and in the process the chances of using penalties have eroded still further. Just as in the 1930s in Great Britain the possibility of the policy of resistance to the dictators fell victim to the fatal interaction between the Labour Party opposition to rearmament and the Conservatives' appeasement policy, so now the cause of containment of Soviet expansionism falls between pseudo-*détente* and the populist and/or isolationist attitude of those Congressmen who use the wrong end of the stick in their criticism of Dr Kissinger. Neither the Labourites nor the Conservatives have any reason to be proud of their pre-war positions; only Churchill and his few supporters had known better. Churchill's after-Munich speech of 5 October 1938 is not without relevance to the present situation:

> It is the most grievous consequence of what we have done and what we have left undone in the last five years—five years of futile good intentions, five years of eager search for the line of least resistance, five years of uninterrupted retreat of British power.

Few people in America are ready to take this line about the shrinking of American power. Instead of George Lansbury's pilgrimage to Berlin we see George McGovern's pilgrimage to Hanoi. Instead of the Oxford Resolutions and Peace Pledge Unions we have to contend with " the Vietnam complex." The appeasement mentality is conspicuously present in all Western countries, but on top of that the orgy of self-flagellation in contemporary America has reached the point when editorialists abroad are moved to ask: " Is America Going Mad?" [8] One does not hear these days in the USA the Churchillian question about the dictators: " What sort of people do they think we are?"!

YET perhaps there is some hope that a countervailing force may eventually appear on the American scene after a long masochistic interval. The popularity of Ambassador Moynihan's performance at the UN and the disenchantment with the results of the *détente* policy are pointers in this direction. It could be that the Americans may finally get tired of being kicked around.

Another indication is the concern shown recently in the Soviet and East European press about these—from their point of view unwelcome—signs. The number of such items is already considerable. They began with the attacks on Western disillusionment with the non-effects of

[8] cf. *The Daily Telegraph* (London, 3 Jan. 1976): " We all know about the ' trauma ' of Vietnam and Watergate, but it's getting a bit boring. How long has the rest of the free world got to put up with these tender-minded people recovering from their trauma '? . . . The self-criticism and self-destructive tendencies [in America] are running mad, with no countervailing force in sight."

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Helsinki and reached a crescendo in the series of articles on "American scepticism" about the results of *détente*. Thus Warsaw *Polityka* (24 January 1976):

> There is no doubt that the opponents of *détente* are today more vocal than before the Helsinki conference. . . . What are the reasons for this? In recent months there was a further weakening of Western influences, particularly in the most conservative states. The revolution in Portugal which undermined its position in NATO; further weakening of the south-eastern flank of NATO in Greece and Turkey; a complete *débâcle* of the American position in Indo-China, not only in Vietnam but also in Laos and in Cambodia and its decline in Thailand; unexpectedly strong leftist tendencies in African countries more than half of which are for the recognition of the progressive government of Agostinho Neto in Angola; the end of isolation of Cuba and the increased isolation of Chile; the amazing diplomatic successes of the Palestinians; the swing towards the left in Italy—all these are like a nightmare for the conservative. He is inclined to blame them on the agreements with the East and to lament that "we have been outwitted again."

Moscow's *Pravda* (2 February 1976) is somewhat less explicit:

> The attacks on the improvements in the Soviet-American relations have intensified in recent months. They use openly provocative gambits, and some hot-heads who lost commonsense in the face of the objective social-economic and political processes are reaching absurd conclusions.

The objective (Marxist) processes are of course to be facilitated by subjective (Leninist) policies. History, as usual, must be given a push. But the prospects are bright, for, as Mr. Gromyko put it in the *Kommunist* (September 1975): "The forces of peace and progress" have "a visibly increased preponderance" over their "imperialist" opponents and may soon be able to "lay down the direction of international politics."

Angola is only the most recent illustration of what the Soviet foreign minister may well have in mind. *Izvestiya* (29 January 1976) made it clear: "The Soviet position in the Angolan question was and is consistent and principled. The support of national-liberation movements is one of the most important tasks of Soviet foreign policy." In his speech at the 25th CPSU Congress, Mr Brezhnev reiterated that the Soviet Union "will continue to support people fighting for their freedom," as it did in Vietnam and Angola.

This not only indicates the present Soviet assessment of the low threshold of risks involved in the Angola-type of operation—unfortunately, a realistic assessment—but gives a foretaste of the increased Soviet self-confidence on any other such occasion in the future. . . . After the occupation of Austria in 1938, Churchill said in the House of Commons:

> Let me give a warning drawn from our recent experiences. Very likely this immediate crisis will pass, will dissipate itself and calm down . . . It was so after the Rhineland was forcibly occupied . . .

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

> Now, after Austria has been struck down, we are disturbed and alarmed but in a little while there may be another pause. There may not—we cannot tell. But if there is a pause, then people will be saying, "See how the alarmists have been confuted!" . . . *The Times* will write a leading article to say how silly those people look who on the morrow of the Austrian incorporation raised a clamour for exceptional action in foreign policy and home defence . . .

We will no doubt be told by our contemporary *détentniks* that there is no analogy here, that the parallel with the policy which led to Munich is invalid, and—who knows?—perhaps they may be right. But it must *be made* invalid, and if we listen to them and forget the lessons of history the tragic analogy will hold.

The two fundamental differences between the situation in the 1930s and the one in the 1970s are the existence of nuclear arms and the fact that, unlike Nazi Germany, the Soviet Union is less feckless in taking military risks. But it is much more effective in political warfare and indirect aggression, and it is ready to adopt a patient strategy of gradual expansion of its political influence. It is easy to point out several other interesting differences; but whatever they are, the main point still is that *the political will to resist an expanding power is a pre-condition of stopping its expansion.* Such a will is at present lacking in the West. This is largely due to the beguiling effect of the policy of *détente,* an effect which the Soviet leaders (whose appetite grows with the eating) may themselves help to dissipate through their threatening actions.

It is certainly not our leaders and opinion-makers who are clearing the air of confusion. The voices of appeasement always find arguments to rationalize their cowardice. At the time of Yalta (a conference that reaffirmed "the common desire of the three States concerned to see established a strong, free, independent and democratic Poland") they justified Stalin's gobbling of Eastern Europe by his "security needs." At that time a constantly repeated argument was: "Has not Eastern Europe been historically a corridor for the invasions of Russia?" Now it is no longer an argument about Soviet "security" in Eastern Europe, but of the Soviet "rights" as the super-power. But whatever sophistries may be used by the faint-hearted and the "progressives," it is the reality of the process of Soviet expansion and of Western decline which is what counts. Soviet-Cuban action in Angola brought it home. In 1962 the placement of Soviet missiles in Cuba resulted in an American naval "quarantine." In 1975 such a thing was not even contemplated when Cuban troops were sent to Africa. Would the line be drawn before they are sent on some other occasion, to (say) Latin America?

DR Kissinger rightly said: "if the pattern is not broken now," the US "will face harder choices and higher costs in the future." [9]

[9] However, in his speech to the NATO Oslo meeting (on 20 May 1976) Dr Kissinger decried "certain alarmist reactions" to the recent growth in Russian military spending and said that "the Soviet Union's strength was something which the West would have to live with." He "did not believe the Russians were bent on world domination, al-

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Winston Churchill said something similar on an earlier occasion (26 March 1936) after the Nazi reoccupation of the Rhineland:

> What is the real problem, the real peril? It is not the re-occupation of the Rhineland, but this enormous process of the rearmament of Germany. There is the peril . . . The Rhineland episode is but a step, a stage, an incident in this process.

The Soviet military build-up began in the wake of the 1962 Cuban missile crisis. It has now reached a point where the change of the relative strengths (which is also due to a Western "run-down" of production of military hardware) can be summarized by John Erickson, one of the foremost Western military specialists, in these terms:

> The near frantic rate of Soviet military production as well as naval building suggests something akin to a war tempo. Averaged over the past five years, Soviet tank production is six times that of the US (2,400 to 450 as an annual rate): Soviet artillery production is almost nine times that of the US (1,400 guns to 156) and the Soviet Union is producing annually almost twice the number of tactical aircraft. The most staggering statistic, however, relates to surface warships, with the Soviet Union producing 36 as compared to a mere half dozen for the US.[10]

The balance in missiles and aircraft has not been improved by SALT I, and is not likely to be positively affected by SALT II. The Soviet drive for a military superiority has recently been described by Paul H. Nitze (in the January 1976 issue of *Foreign Affairs*), and he reached a very sobering conclusion:

> I believe the record shows that neither negotiations nor unilateral self-restraint have operated to dissuade Soviet leaders from seeking a nuclear-war-winning capability—or from the view that with such a capability they could effectively use pressure tactics to get their way in crisis situations.

It is interesting to recall in this context a historic remark made during the British House of Commons debate after Munich (6 December 1938):

though they might from time to time be tempted to exploit their strength to their own advantage." (*The Times*, 21 May 1976.) The two faces of Dr. Kissinger make an interesting juxtaposition.

[10] John Erickson, "Soviet Arms: the Grim Truth," *The Sunday Times*, 8 Feb. 1976. For a detailed discussion on the relative decline in American military strength, see in particular the articles by Albert Wohlstetter in *Foreign Policy* (Nos. 15, 16 & 20); the interview with James Schlesinger in *U.S. News and World Report* (22 Dec. 1975), as well as his article, "A Testing Time for America," *Fortune* (Feb. 1976). cf. also Jeffrey Record, *Sizing Up the Soviets*, The Brookings Institution, Washington, D.C. and the recent German Defence White Paper, *Weissbuch 1975–1976. Zur Sicherheit der Bundesrepublik Deutchland und zur Entwicklung der Bundeswehr*, Bonn, 1976 (*White Paper 1975–76. The Security of the Federal Republic of Germany and the Development of the Federal Armed Forces.* Bonn,1976) as well as: "*Allocation of Resources in the Soviet Union and China—1975*," Hearings before the Subcommittee on Priorities and Economy in Government of the Joint Economic Committee, Congress of the United States, 94th Congress, Executive Sessions, 18 June & 21 July 1975, Pt. I, Washington, DC, 1975.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

> Our past experience has shown us only too clearly that weakness in armed strength means weakness in diplomacy . . . that diplomacy cannot be effective unless the consciousness exists, not here alone but elsewhere, that behind diplomacy is the strength to give effect to it.

It was not Churchill who said this; it was Chamberlain.

The Soviet leaders are obviously not unaware of the relationship between military strength and political influence. The political commentator of *Izvestiya,* V. Matveev, recently wrote (2 February 1976):

> The might of our country can anger only those who have dark intentions against sovereignty and independence of other countries . . . Yes, our country is concerned with the strengthening of our power of defence. And how else? Don't we have to take into account real facts which call for constant vigilance?

How defensive is "defensive"? Matveev has implicitly admitted the Soviet intention to achieve military superiority:

> The American journal *Christian Science Monitor* of 12 December 1975 wrote that "one must not juxtapose Soviet and American defense requirements" because, according to the journal, the geographic situation of the two countries is different and the Soviet Union must take into account factors which are not relevant for the USA.

Matveev made no mention of China; but he managed to suggest that the point about Soviet defence needs being greater than those of the USA was made by the *Monitor,* whereas in fact it was only reporting the unofficial Soviet arguments on this problem.[11]

We have not yet reached the point when the Soviet Union would try openly to legitimize its goal of military superiority over the United States. But *détente* was always presented as a consequence of the shift in the "correlation of forces" in favour of the Soviet Union. Only because of this were the "imperialists" compelled to accept it. If this shift goes further, military superiority will no doubt be claimed by the Soviet Union as a self-evident right. The anaesthetic of *détente* will then be replaced by world political pressures increasingly based on military intimidation. It is not, however, in the Soviet interest to help to wake the Western public from its *détente* slumber; this would only facilitate the chances of counteraction. Therefore, while the Soviet Union is en-

[11] I recently spent a week with Mr Matveev in Amsterdam at a conference on the problems of *détente* after Helsinki. His performance conformed to the old Soviet quip that there is no News (Izvestia) in *Pravda* and no Truth (*Pravda*) in *Izvestia.* In his paper he stressed that *détente* between states must be based on their "sovereign equality, refraining from the threat of use of force, inviolability of frontiers, territorial integrity of states, peaceful settlement of disputes, non-intervention in internal affairs, equal rights and self-determination of people, respect for human rights." But in his talks on the Moscow radio (cf. 21 March 1976), he focused on "*détente* in organic relation with the task of the struggle for the cause of social progress and national liberation." The euphemistic use of the word "organic" is not a monopoly of Helmut Sonnenfeldt.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

gaged in the biggest rearmament drive in its history, unlike Nazi Germany, it does not boast about it.

One thing is characteristic: how eagerly the communist propagandists seize on any remark by an American politician which may diminish the chances of such counteraction. Senator Hubert Humphrey's remark, for instance, that "international tension increases in the Pentagon every year when its budget is to be confirmed" has been avidly quoted in the Soviet and satellite press (e.g. *Trybuna Ludu*, 6 February 1976); discreet silence, of course, covers the subject of the Soviet military build-up.

However, the Soviet Union does not conceal its intention to support what it chooses to call "national liberation movements." The brutal Soviet note sent to the United States during the Yom Kippur War and the recent Soviet action in Angola have given us a foretaste of things to come if the present drift is not arrested.

SOME few voices in the West which point out that it is already a question of the survival of Western civilization itself are treated, as were Churchill's warnings in the thirties, as alarmist.[12] In a recent article,[13] James Schlesinger underlined that "at no point since the 1930s has the Western world faced so formidable a threat to its survival," and that "without enduring American strength, Western civilization will not survive."

The Western *malaise*—the loss of vision and of political will, of which the last decade offers such striking testimony both in Europe and America—induces two contrary reactions.

On the one hand, there is a tendency to *wishful thinking* which leads directly to an unrealistic optimism (which, in turn, may well be based on subconscious fears). Instead of creating political and military defences, the West contrives psychological defence mechanisms.

On the other hand, there is the *resignation* (or masochism) of those who see Western decline as leading inevitably to a final consummation. These two contrary, but related, manifestations of Western political neuroses prevent necessary actions from being taken because their need is not seen or, alternatively, they paralyse the political will which is the precondition of any decision being taken.

Political apathy and complacency is reinforced by fatalistic feelings, by a sense of the inevitability of decline. Dr Kissinger, who once presented Richard Nixon with a copy of Oswald Spengler's book, himself oscillates between the euphoria of *détente* and the mood of doom.

Denis de Rougemont once wrote that decadence begins when people no longer ask: "What are we going to do?" but rather "What is going to happen to us?" That is, increasingly, a tendency in Europe; and it is also, although to a lesser extent, discernible in the United States.

[12] Cf. Walter Laqueur and Leopold Labedz, "A Question of Survival," *Harper's* (July 1975).
[13] "A Testing Time for America," *Fortune* (February 1976).

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

American foreign policy reflects this, as do the domestic developments which condition it. They underlie the internal political disarray and Congress's opposition to some of the necessary policies being belatedly proposed by the chastened Secretary of State. In the past Congress often supported him for the wrong reasons; and now it is opposing him for the wrong reasons. The fact that he brought it upon himself does not mitigate the wrong-headedness of his present detractors. (Nor does it provide a retrospective absolution for his past contribution to complacency through *détente*-euphoria. When he goes, however, the Soviet commentators, who have an infallible instinct on such matters, will point out that he had become a "cold warrior").

TO diagnose our present ills is easier than to propose a therapy for them. It is clear that it must be based on a return to reality, and it will depend on the overcoming of escapist tendencies. A way out, or forward, must be specific about the curative strategy, about the methods necessary to restore political will in the West, for this is a precondition of arresting its decline; and considering that American political will is obviously a *sine qua non* of any such process, about the perspective and steps needed for its recovery. Assuming that the gradual process of rehabilitation is possible, what can be done to begin the cure?

The first thing is to realize that there are objective and subjective factors which may facilitate or hinder it. Objectively, there is undoubtedly a decline of the Western position; but there remain elements of strength in Western societies which can be reinforced, and grave weaknesses and growing problems inside the Communist countries which can be exploited. I once jocularly referred to East-West rivalry as "competitive decadence." At present we are, unfortunately, in the lead; but we can recover from it.

The issues which the Soviet leadership has to face—apart from the "peaceful coexistence," always combined with "ideological struggle," with the West—make Mr Brezhnev less triumphant than he would like to be. He has his problems, although he has better reason to disregard criticisms than Dr Kissinger (who asserted in San Francisco that it is "defeatist rhetoric" to imply that "Soviet policy is masterful while American policy is bumbling, uncertain, and weak"). Soviet policy is not masterful, but it is certainly more effective than the American one, considering the difficulties it is facing—internally: agricultural disasters, slowing of the economic growth rate, continuing technological backwardness; externally: the permanent "second front" with China, lack of success with Japan, the failure of the prospect of the Soviet-sponsored world conference of communist parties. Added to this is the fact that the Soviet effort to achieve military superiority comes out of a GNP which is less than 60 per cent of the American one.

The objective factor is not, in the short run, encouraging. In the present international situation there is very little margin of manoeuvre

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

now for any American Secretary of State. The best that can reasonably be hoped for is that it will not deteriorate still further, and that a new attitude in foreign policy will begin the long road back to recovery.

The situation, in the meantime, will probably become even more difficult. European countries are not making progress towards unification, and those bordering on the Mediterranean are threatening NATO with disintegration through the proposed participation of the communist parties in their governments. The fact that some of these communist parties are " revisionist " does not make much difference in this respect. In spite of certain doctrinal quarrels with Moscow, their political successes would contribute to a further shift in the international " correlation of forces " against the West. There is no parallel here with the Sino-Soviet split. The factors of national power and national character have to be taken into account. If the Italian Communist Party comes into power it will not be resisting the Soviet pressures any more than the Fascists resisted Nazi influence when Germany was in the ascendance. It will simply apply the old tradition of *combinazione* and *doppiogiochismo* to the international situation. It will not consistently maintain NATO's defence front vis-à-vis the Soviet bloc, nor will it present the Russians with a national-communist type of confrontation.[14] One must realize that even the independence of Tito's Yugoslavia is predicated on the balance of power in Europe, and this will be fundamentally affected if NATO is undermined.

This, *a fortiori*, is also relevant to the question of the putative positions of the French and Spanish Communist Parties. Those who hope that the eventual result would be a unified West European communism taking a stand against Moscow, presenting the Soviet Union (as the Chinese did) with another type of schismatic challenge, do not realize that each of these parties in government would be playing a game of national East-West " compromise," and that would hardly be helpful to American foreign policy. It must not be assumed that the internal softening of the Communist Party is a necessary indication of its future foreign policy stand. The PCF, or even the PCI, is *less* likely to be " anti-Soviet " than hard-line Communist Rumania.

This is one point which Henry Kissinger understands well; and that is why he is criticized by the " progressive " commentators as reviving the spirit of John Foster Dulles.

There is, thus, little room for the prospect that the European situation will improve either through the progress of European unification or through a greater European defence effort (the Gaullist ex-foreign

[14] The conclusion of Columbia University's Research Institute on International Change in its study, *Global Political Assessment, Oct. 1975–March 1976* that Communist participation in an Italian coalition government after the June election would pose no threat to Italy's membership of NATO, suffers from the same type of Panglossian complacency as the IISS study (cf. footnote 1 above). At the lowest the success of the PCI would give a fillip to Italian neutralism and in due course to European neutralism. It is only the possible Soviet " re-acquisition " of Yugoslavia after Tito's death that may scare the Italian communists sufficiently to seek an American and/or Chinese connexion.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

minister Michel Jobert referred to the Europeans as having "the mentality of a kept woman") or through the evolution of the West European Communist Parties. Those who hope that the paralysis of American foreign policy and the growing Soviet threat would jolt the West Europeans into political cooperation have been indulging in wishful thinking. A blast of cold wind may sober the West Europeans a bit, but continuing American failures or a withdrawal into increasing isolationism would only produce European neutralism, a series of national "accommodations" with the Soviet Union, and eventually the so-called Finlandization of Western Europe.

Therefore, from the non-isolationist point of view, American interests require the holding of the NATO line in Europe, because otherwise it will be lost.[15]

Europe would be weak even without the American crisis of power. But European weaknesses are compounded by the American weaknesses: the post-Vietnam-post-Watergate confusion, the political vacuum at the centre induced by the struggle between Congress and the Administration which has crippled American foreign policy. This is reinforced by the familiar effect of "lame duck" tentativeness in an election year, which increases European uncertainties, adds even more to the irresolution of the European politicians and predisposes them to play a waiting game. Should this situation persist after the election, with no prospect of the recovery of the American political will, there is not much likelihood that the Europeans will rally to their own defence. In fact, without American leadership and initiative, there is little chance of European recovery, only a prospect of a further drift toward neutralism.

IN Eastern Europe the effect of increased Western lack of interest in this part of the world projects itself onto the psychological despondency induced by the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 and the

[15] American isolationism matches in obtuseness America's "liberal" progressivism. One indulges in "know-nothing" narcissism, the other in self-flagellating masochism. A line of ignorant misjudgement of the foreign situation by isolationists goes from Senator William E. Borah before the war to Senator Mike Mansfield after the war.

In his speech on 2 October 1939 Senator Borah said: "Our task was upon the Western continent, to maintain liberty, freedom and free institutions there. By doing so we could render a greater service to humanity than by joining in their wars and taking part in their everlasting imperial contests . . . I look upon the present war in Europe as nothing more than another chapter in the bloody volume of European power politics." (*Congressional Record*, 76th Congress, 2nd Session, LXXXV, p. 65.)

In his report to the Committee on Foreign Relations of the US Senate (23 July 1973), Senator Mansfield said that "there is a powerful confluence of national interests" between the Soviet Union and the United States:

> "President Nixon and Chairman (sic!) Brezhnev seem to have changed the climate of the bilateral relationship in a fundamental way. It would appear that what they have done is to put an end to the Cold War of a quarter of a century . . . The United States can ill afford to be deflected from the course of *détente* by the anxieties of Western Europeans or, indeed, Americans who, out of long association with West European policies tend to share these anxieties."

Dr Kissinger can now reflect what kind of support he generated for his *détente* policy. *Non c'e maggior dolore che ricordare i tempi felici nella miseria.* (To recall happy times in misery—there is no greater pain.)

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Helsinki "Final Act." The resulting apathy is only disturbed by the realization that the Helsinki "agreement" may spell a new phase in the process of formal incorporation of Eastern Europe into the Soviet Empire. The economic integration through *Comecon* has not so far been conspicuously successful, but the goal has not been abandoned, a new "Complex Plan" to achieve it has been elaborated, and a new political dimension has been added to it. The esoteric doctrinal discussion in the Communist theoretical organs, mainly the Soviet ones, has been for some time concentrating on the need to establish new relations between socialist nations. The relations between nationalities in the Soviet Union are offered as a model of the future. Brezhnev's doctrine is now being institutionalized in Eastern Europe. The Soviet-East German treaty and the new Polish constitution, both of which "legalize" the limitation of the sovereignty of the two countries vis-à-vis the Soviet Union, may be pointers to the eventual absorption of the satellites in the future, however distant, through the process of further aligning their institutions with the Soviet ones and by establishing constitutional (on top of the factual) dependence on the Soviet Union. This creates new national fears (which were manifested in the widespread protests by Polish intellectuals and the Church hierarchy) and a mode of resistance which found its expression in the workers' strikes (on 25 June 1976) against price increases, which led to the government's capitulation on the issue.

It is not difficult to see that the fact that the West washed its hands in Helsinki and would have nothing more to do with the fate of Eastern Europe would not be quite as irrelevant to the balance of power in Europe as the Western participants in the European security conference imagined. Czechoslovakia may look even more remote than Angola (which is also a far-away place about which we know next to nothing), but its fate counts in the over-all balance, whatever the *Realpolitiker* may think and however obvious the proposition that "nothing can be done about it."

THE difficulty in perceiving the relevance of such processes for American foreign policy arises from a lack of understanding of the global interdependence of contemporary politics. It is because of this that events in many an obscure place impinge on the overall balance of power even when the strategic factor is not very important. But they may well be a test of political resolution and can demonstrate the strength or absence of political will. Their symbolic effect may go far beyond the strategic one. (That is why the "domino theory" was so widely misunderstood and so misinterpreted. It was not simply a question of small states in South-East Asia "falling down like dominoes" under communist control as a result of the Vietminh victory, but of the psychological repercussions everywhere on the political morale and stamina of forces resisting communist expansion. The effect of the American *débâcle* in Vietnam was of course particularly striking in Asia; but it was felt everywhere, including Europe and the Middle East.)

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Some commentators regard the present position of the United States in South-East Asia as one of " relative stability." In an article in *Foreign Policy* (No. 20, Fall 1975) Professor Edwin O. Reischauer called it a " Back to Normalcy " situation, and he argued that " there is little danger of the sort of hegemonic domination against which we thought we were fighting in Vietnam. The reason for this is the spirit of nationalism, which runs strong in each South-East Asian nation." He concludes that " there is no reason to view the post-Vietnam situation of the United States with apprehension."

This is, I am convinced, a complete misreading of the situation. The present " relative stability " in South-East Asia is not the result of the " spirit of nationalism " among small states there, but of the Sino-Soviet conflict which prevented the full unfolding of the possible consequences of the American defeat in Vietnam. But for the Sino-Soviet rivalry, the vacuum of power created by defeat would have been filled by one or both communist giants. As it is, China is trying to prevent the Soviet Union from filling it and is ready to tolerate American presence wherever it can act as a countervailing power against the Soviet encroachment. There is no " Oriental mystery " about it. The advice which the Chinese communists gave to Japan and the Philippines to retain their American connexion and to the Asian nations " not to let the [Soviet] wolf through the back door " is based on the hard rock of self-interest and a realistic concern with their own security.

That does not apply to *all* the countries on the periphery of China. This is particularly true in Korea where Sino-Soviet rivalry for the allegiance of Kim Il Sung produces a different effect. Nor does the present Chinese support for neutralism (which provides a shield for the Chinese against the Soviet Asian security plan) imply necessarily long-term stability, not to mention the question of Taiwan.

In any case it is highly doubtful whether one can confidently assert, as Professor Reischauer (who was formerly US Ambassador to Japan) does, that " there is no reason for Americans to feel that their vital interests are more menaced than before or for others to fear that the world's stability is more threatened." This seems to me dangerously complacent. I was struck, during my recent visit in the Far East, by how profound the psychological impact there was of the American withdrawal from Vietnam. It would be difficult to exaggerate. It has undermined American credibility to an extent which, in my view, will be sufficient in itself to limit in many ways the effectiveness of the American policy in Asia (particularly in South-East Asia and the Far East). It has transformed the overall perspective of the region. The reactions one encounters in serious discussions vary from anxiety to scorn, sometimes a mixture of the two. The perception of the situation by politicians, leaders and opinion-makers in the area is precisely opposite to Professor Reischauer's: they see it as uncertain, menacing and anything but " back to normal."

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

It may be heart-lifting for an American not to see the consequences of an historic defeat, but it won't make the aftermath go away even if the exorcist exercise is attempted by such a distinguished specialist on the Far East as Edwin O. Reischauer. But he tries hard and suggests a policy to deal with one of the sensitive problems arising from his "back to normalcy" process: [16]

> We should be working toward a four-power understanding between the United States, Japan, the Soviet Union and China in which all four will recognize both Korean regimes and will not allow developments there to involve them in conflict with one another. In this way Korea would be neutralized and foreign pressure withdrawn, allowing the Koreans, on their own, to seek the reunification they all so ardently desire.

This borders on pure fantasy. The former American ambassador in Tokyo apparently does not realize that the Sino-Soviet conflict by itself renders such a proposition utterly unrealistic. But in case his proposal does not work, he reflects that if Korea were to be unified under Communist leadership it would not be "a hegemonic extension of either Chinese or Soviet power but rather a Korea more able to resist both."

This may or may not be the case, but it is more like the "domino" than "back to normal" perspective. After the Russo-Japanese war in 1905, the United States mitigated the consequences of the defeat to the Russians by influencing the Treaty of Portsmouth. It is unlikely that the Russians will now reciprocate for the services rendered to them in 1905. What is more likely is the prospect that a unified communist Korea would become an object of fierce competition between the Soviet Union and China.

This may not be bothersome to the US, quite the contrary. But it would certainly raise the question of Japanese nuclear rearmament. Already the American withdrawal from Vietnam has led to the public discussion in Japan of this subject, "taboo" for psychological reasons ever since Hiroshima. The respectable Tokyo periodical, *Bungei Shunju* (July 1975) advocated the need to build nuclear weapons by Japan in a closely reasoned article, "Paradise Lost, The Need for a Reappraisal of Japan's Non-Military Situation":

> If the abandonment of South Vietnam is a piece to be fitted in the jigsaw puzzle of history, it is highly doubtful that Japan can rely on the United States for its defense for the next thirty years as it has done in the past thirty years. The American shield for Japanese security is growing thinner, and no one knows when it will become too flimsy for its purpose. To put in bluntly, we can no longer trust the United States.

One can imagine the Japanese reaction to the reunification of Korea

[16] A similar suggestion is made by Maynard Parker who is somewhat less complacent in his attempt to escape from reality in his analysis of the problems America faces in the region. Cf. "One of Four," *Foreign Policy* (No. 20, Fall 1975).

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

under communist leadership. Professor Reischauer may have to offer them special editorial aid by reassuring them with yet another "Back to Normal" article. As it happens, it is not a four-power agreement that is on the cards in the Far East but rather a complicated game between them in which three powers may eventually come to collaborate in halting Soviet ambitions in Asia. The Japanese have already abandoned their policy of "equidistance" vis-à-vis China and the Soviet Union. Much to Gromyko's chagrin they agreed to sign "the anti-hegemony clause" in their treaty with Peking. This, according to Gromyko, may cause "a reconsideration of Soviet relations with Japan," a rather empty warning in view of the fact that he was not ready in any case to return to Japan the four Kurile islands (seized by the Soviet Union after the war).

It is, to be sure, in the Soviet interest to prevent Sino-Japanese-American collaboration; but it has been Soviet greed and intransigence which has increasingly demonstrated to the three powers a need to combine in order to stop the expansion of Soviet influence in Asia. They may do it grudgingly, as each of them has its own political motives and special national interests; but the logic of the situation points in that direction.

IN my own conversations with the Foreign Ministry officials in Tokyo and in Peking the question of the "Pacific Doctrine" was repeatedly raised. The Russians have seen in it a danger of a closer cooperation between the three powers, thus frustrating Mr Brezhnev's Asian "Security Plan." But the other two powers, as well as a host of smaller countries in South East Asia, are simply puzzled about its significance. It contains a phrase about the "opposition to any form of hegemony in Asia" (and elsewhere), but this is not matched either by clarity about specific problems or by a new resolution which would provide a contrast with the Guam Doctrine.

The officials of the Foreign Ministry in Peking were particularly scornful about it. When one of them asked me about it, I jocularly replied that "it is pacific, but it is not a doctrine." This induced approving laughter among those present and, indeed, this rather innocuous remark was later quoted back to me by one of the Chinese leaders in my conversation with him. I explained that I only meant by this the fact that it is unlikely that a fundamental clarification of American policy would take place before the Presidential election, and perhaps not even then. This did not satisfy my interlocutor. He proceeded to give me a long list of Soviet iniquities, from Czechoslovakia to Angola. He declared Brezhnev to be more dangerous than Khrushchev ever was, and he then contrasted the behaviour of the Czechoslovaks and the Yugoslavs in 1968. The Czechs announced in advance that they were not going to fight, the Yugoslavs said the opposite. There was, therefore, no political risk involved in the Soviet decision to invade Czechoslovakia.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

"They know that we are going to fight," said my Chinese host, "but are the West Europeans?" I asked him to explain the constant Chinese assertions about the inevitability of war. It was a question to which I had only received a conventional Party-line answer during my previous (and rather outspoken) conversations with his colleagues. He gave me a straightforward reply: he did not reiterate the official dogma, but offered a more sophisticated explanation. It is not nuclear war that is inevitable, he stated, but the use of Soviet conventional military superiority, under the nuclear umbrella, when the Soviet Union achieves nuclear superiority. "The danger then will be for Europe," said the Chinese leader, "and it's not just our propaganda." He then gave me a somewhat surprising interpretation of US foreign policy. Just as Chamberlain tried to deflect Nazi Germany against the Soviet Union, so Kissinger is trying to deflect the Soviet Union against China. "That was the purpose of appeasement then—and of *détente* now."

I pointed out that neither Chamberlain nor Kissinger were so purposeful: "The guarantee to Poland and Rumania was hardly a way to unleash Hitler against the Soviet Union. Today, in the nuclear age, such a policy would hardly be practical. Besides, it was not Kissinger who created the Sino-Soviet conflict . . ." But my host was not convinced.

Clearly, the shadow of a species of Soviet-Nazi Pact as a counter to the Machiavellian perfidy of Western foreign policy would be a logical inference from such Chinese reasoning (or, at least, the psychological background to it). When soon afterwards Mr Yu Chen, Deputy Foreign Minister, who was handling the case of the Soviet helicopter, released its crew, he issued a communiqué that their original story was "credible," although at first he maintained that they were "on a spying mission." The Western press promptly started its perennial speculation about the possible "Sino-Soviet reconciliation."

In this it was, as usual, profoundly mistaken, as the subsequent intensification (if it can still be so called) of Sino-Soviet polemics clearly indicated. The reason why so many Western commentators are so often off-course about this regularly recurring "possibility" is that they do not ask themselves the question whether such a "reconciliation" is truly possible, nor whether it would be in the Chinese interest.

CHINESE foreign policy, in spite of its occasional successes (such as the forthcoming treaty with Japan), suffers from acute frustrations. It has Great Power ambitions, but not Great Power strength. It always wanted "to sit on the top of the mountain, while the two tigers fight each other," i.e. it would ideally be the *tertius gaudens* in the Soviet-American confrontation. When it was still in the Soviet camp, it attempted to push the Russians towards a more "adventurist" policy vis-à-vis the United States, arguing that "the East wind prevails over the West wind." It was a manoeuvre which the Russians say through and resisted not because they have anything against "prevailing," but

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

simply because a Soviet "forward" strategy in a situation of adverse "correlation of forces" would have only been in the interests of the Chinese. After the Sino-Chinese split, the Chinese concentrated on ideological attacks "from the left" on Soviet "revisionism." This phase ended when the ideological dispute turned to military clashes. Security needs required the abandonment of the exclusively ideological focus and its replacement by a clear-cut *raison d'état* priority. Hence the "ping-pong diplomacy" initiative to achieve a countervailing power against the Soviet Union through *rapprochement* with America. This was successful as far as it went; but it did not achieve the goal of American abandonment of Taiwan; and, more than that, it led to two kinds of Chinese frustrations.

One was the growing divergence between considerations of ideology and *Realpolitik,* between *raisons de parti* and *raisons d'état.*

In a communist state there is always this duality. Ideology cannot be simply abandoned, because it provides the ruling Party with its legitimacy, but it can and is often pushed temporarily aside. The special difficulty was that, in the Chinese case, the combination of the two in foreign policy became more and more troublesome. The radical revolutionary internal policy and the ultra-revolutionary appeal abroad simply could not be easily fused with (1) the normalization of relations with the "capitalist states," (2) the countering of Soviet political strategy by collaboration with such states on the basis of mutual interest in stopping Soviet expansion, or even (3) the support of the elements which are most consistently "anti-Soviet" or at least provide the best chance of being effective and not just ideological allies. Richard Nixon's first visit to Peking certainly led to the alienation of many Maoists abroad. (His last visit—paradoxically—may have a negative effect on a broader American public.) The ambiguity inherent in the double stance could not be effectively maintained, and it imposed hard Chinese choices in Europe (Portugal), Latin America (Chile), and Africa (Angola) which were promptly exploited politically by the Soviet Union (the present situation is not comparable to that faced by Stalin at the time of his pact with Hitler when he had no "polycentric" competitors).

Nor is this all. The strategy of using America as a countervailing power against the Soviet Union has also run into difficulties. Instead of providing the Chinese with some room for manoeuvre, it became increasingly clear that Dr Kissinger was using Peking as a stepping-stone (or a flight-stop) to Moscow. The US-USSR *détente* policy was naturally seen from Peking as contrary to the Chinese interests. Moreover, the American tiger increasingly appeared as a paper tiger, unable to provide an effective counterbalance to the Soviet Union. Hence the frustrating Chinese paradox. The weaker the American stance vis-à-vis the Soviet Union, the smaller the chance for the Chinese to play the role of the *tertius gaudens* (or even some lesser, yet important role). In short, Peking found itself in an old, familiar frustration. The Chinese had

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

shifted from the Sino-Soviet alliance to the American connexion, but still were not able to promote their own ambitions rather than feeling that they were being used.

It is in fact a doubly frustrating paradox for the Chinese communists. The weaker the American stance vis-à-vis the Soviet Union, the smaller their present incentive for a Sino-Soviet "reconciliation." What would Peking gain from such an initiative? Even if it was taken in spite of all historical and psychological factors inhibiting such a decision, it could surely only be of benefit to Moscow, not to Peking.

Of course, China, like the Soviet Union, is quite capable of switching its foreign policy. But those who are fascinated by the memory of the Hitler-Stalin Pact and the *renversement des alliances* policy disregard certain fundamental differences between the two situations.

By switching back to the Soviet connexion, China would not only exchange present frustrations for bigger—and known—ones, but would jeopardize its internal political legitimacy. After Mao, those among its leaders who were involved in anti-Soviet policies in the past (i.e. the whole Maoist establishment) might well find their careers negatively affected. This applies both to the followers of the defeated "moderate" Teng Hsia-ping and to the "radical" protegés of Mao's wife, Chiang Ching, using Mao's authority to consolidate their power after Chou En-lai's death. But whoever eventually emerges victorious in the struggle for Mao's succession, it is clear that the independent position of the Chinese leadership would not be easy to maintain in view of Moscow's well-known imperial Caesaro-Papist habits. Confidence cannot conceivably be established between the two communist powers. Some form of "closer embrace" can only be regarded as a temporary arrangement. But what would it arrange?

The Soviet-Nazi Pact was an initiative by means of which Stalin unleashed Hitler in the West in order to remain on the sidelines in the ensuing hostilities. He thought that they would be prolonged and indecisive, that the two sides would get weaker, while he would get stronger so that eventually he would be able to play a decisive role in the outcome of the military conflict. He miscalculated the strength of France in 1939, and as a consequence Nazi armies almost reached Moscow in 1941. Any parallel policy today by the Chinese leaders would be self-defeating for the following reasons:

1: A Sino-Soviet Pact would not unleash a war in the West. It would only provide a green light for the Soviet Union gradually to absorb Western Europe. And this is the very thing which China fears, for it would deprive the Soviet Union of the "second front" and would leave China facing the colossus from the North alone.

2: It would also be strengthening the force which is getting stronger in the balance of power, and this is the very same defect which China finds itself suffering from the connexion with American policy.

3: It would be doing it at the time when a Stalin-type of 1939 mis-

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

calculation of the "correlation of military forces" is not really conceivable. Western Europe is much weaker today in relation to the Soviet Union than France and Britain were vis-à-vis Germany in 1939.

4: On top of all this one must remember that massed Soviet troops are rather nearer to Peking than the German troops were to Moscow in 1939 (and, unlike the latter, they have nuclear weapons).

And what would be the *quid pro quo* for China in such a deal? The support for her nuclear development which the Soviet Union refused to give her in 1959? Economic support providing the most advanced Soviet technology? Or, perhaps, agricultural exports? A free hand for China in South East Asia to establish there a Greater Co-Poverty Sphere? The Chinese have had instructive experience in the past on all these points, and they are hardly likely to commit themselves again to a similar situation. In present-day China, the reference (I heard it many times) to the Soviet technicians suddenly leaving and taking with them all the blueprints for unfinished factories has become a contemporary equivalent of the pre-revolutionary national humiliation by "the imperialists." Those "Soviet blueprints" have in effect become a psychological reference point, like the notorious "*Chinese and Dogs Not Allowed*" which was supposed to have been displayed on the foreign concessions in pre-revolutionary Shanghai, a myth which in the past powerfully fertilized national and revolutionary sentiments.

Today it is the Russians who find themselves the butt of Chinese emotions, and this is an element which can only reinforce political calculations in the matter of a putative deal with Moscow.

When I asked one of the Chinese leaders about some of these calculations, he became distinctly unhappy and quickly changed the subject. It is obvious that even though the Chinese have no real option in the matter, it would strengthen their hand if the American public and the American policy-makers believed that the Sino-Soviet reconciliation is a realistic possibility

Hence, in my view, the release of the Soviet helicopter. There might be other similar gambits in the future; none of them can be very convincing or important in view of the continuing display of Sino-Soviet hostility. The Russians help to inspire the Western commentators and public with the fear of a Sino-Soviet war, the Chinese with the fear of a Sino-Soviet reconciliation. Neither is likely; the probability is that "neither peace, nor war" will continue. The realistic options for the Chinese foreign policy, in view of their present situation and their long-term ambitions, are not a pro-American or a pro-Soviet policy, but a reluctant continuation of the selective "ping-pong policy" based on an American connexion or a return to a "go-it-alone" policy, without a return to the isolation of the Cultural Revolution period. The latter is only precluded by the risks perceived in the Sino-Soviet conflict.

So, perhaps present American policy could be in fact based on realistic assumptions, and could it be just avoiding the pitfalls which

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

" self-serving " Chinese foreign policy (as the official American assessment of President Ford's visit to Peking called it) is preparing for it? The answer depends on what American foreign policy is trying to achieve. If it is the " containment " of the Soviet Union it is going the wrong way about it. Contrary to some misleading opinions,[17] American-Chinese relations *have* deteriorated, as I could detect for myself in Peking.

THERE is of course no reason why American foreign policy should provide therapies for all the Chinese frustrations. On the contrary, for historical and geopolitical reasons the United States is the only power in the triangle Peking-Moscow-Washington which should be able to play the *tertius gaudens*. However, it cannot be done by favouring Moscow, as Dr Kissinger's policy of *détente* has done. Nor can it be done now by applying the principle of equidistance. The balance has shifted too much in Soviet favour. Such an American policy of " equidistance " vis-à-vis Russia and China will certainly be never possible if Western Europe is absorbed by the Soviet bloc. Unfortunately, democracies have a tendency to let things slip and deteriorate to the point at which they need a Beelzebub to chase Satan away. This happened in the Stalin-Hitler epoch; in the present situation it is very easy to imagine how it can develop without the Chinese playing a positive role in the balance. That does not mean that there is a need to replace Sino-American collaboration by an alliance. Only a war situation and/or Western Europe going under may bring about the need for such an alliance. Nor does it mean any obtusely sentimental display of self-willed bonhomie, like the " Good Uncle Joe " propaganda during the second world war. It means tilting the balance of policy on the basis of a sober recognition of common interest between the United States and China in stopping Soviet expansionism before it is too late (especially for Western Europe).[18]

Angola provides a good illustration of the problem. When a Chinese diplomat in London told me that they were withdrawing from Angola I expressed an opinion that they would regret it, that not only Western positions in Southern Africa, but also Chinese investment in the Tan-Zam railway and political influence would be jeopardized. As it happened, the Soviet Union not only mounted a formidable Cuban expeditionary force, but also managed to exploit the South African issue in order to create the well-known Pavlovian reflex all through Black

[17] For instance: Robert Guillain, the French specialist on the Far East, wrote in *Le Monde* (11 February 1976): " The American-Chinese relations are very good as the visit of President Ford to Peking and his Honolulu speech on the new Pacific doctrine have demonstrated."

[18] *The Indian Express* (22 December 1975) already sees it as a fact: " There is no doubt that China can today get from the United States and Western Europe what it wants."

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Africa. Dr Kissinger's African trip can hardly make up for the Soviet successes in Angola and Mozambique.[19]

I was in Peking at the time of the Senate vote on Angola. It is difficult to convey the anger of the Chinese when they realized how badly they had miscalculated: they were really hopping mad. I resisted the easy satisfaction of saying: "I told you so" and only mused aloud how much better prevention is than cure. If prudent arrangements had been effected on the basis of Sino-American collaboration in Angola with an informal distribution of roles—not an unthinkable proposition—the story of the Soviet African adventure might have taken a different turn. In the muddied waters of Africa, the Chinese "Marxist" involvement, instead of the South African one, would have certainly affected the "colouring" of the conflict and enhanced the FLN-Unita position internationally.

HOWEVER, no such initiative materialized and now it is a question of looking the other way, of sedulously avoiding seeing the possible consequences of Angola, as previously there was a tendency to try sedulously to avoid seeing the possible consequences of Vietnam because of the visceral fear of yet another painful involvement. But it is obvious that the cry "No more Vietnams" can only lead to a situation where no stand can be taken against any aggression, no line of resistance can be drawn anywhere, even on a politically more favourable ground. Such an attitude can hardly be a basis of a policy of a great power which wishes to survive. As the events between the two great wars testify, the unreflective fear of war helps to bring about in a sharp form the dilemma of war or capitulation. In order to avoid it, it is not enough to search for a new policy—although that, too, is necessary—but also for *a new attitude* towards foreign policy. Such an attitude can only emerge if the American political class recovers its political will.

Dr Kissinger may well blame Congress for preventing him from acting in Angola or the whole US public for its apathy and indifference. But one can only say: *Tu l'a voulu, Georges Dandin*! It was he who, instead of warning public opinion about the perils it must face and preparing it for that task, disarmed it psychologically and confused it intellectually. Now this has boomeranged against him, paradoxically enough at the very moment when he finally, at long last, wants to clarify the issues, or at least some of them.

But he was confusing them for so long that he must not be surprised if he is being criticized for diametrically opposed reasons. One must not confuse the problem of the survival of Western civilization with that of

[19] Prof. William Griffith wrote in 1973 that "the Soviets and the Chinese continue to support and contend for influence within the various liberation movements, but the rising power of South Africa has made them more holding operations than ones with prospects of rapid success ... Africa remains unlikely to play any important role in Sino-Soviet-American relations." ("Peking, Moscow and Beyond, *The Washington Papers*, No. 6, 1973, p. 56.)

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the survival of a Secretary of State. It was always on the cards that the high expectations he generated by his shuttle diplomacy, his management of press relations and other gimmicks, would eventually turn against him. He is now reduced to complaining that he is being criticized too harshly, just as he was praised exaggeratedly earlier. He did not protest then or call for prudent responses. He imagined himself, in his famous image, to be a lonely cowboy on the lonesome range whom the American public had always admired. He was simply an unprecedented creation of the volatile enthusiasm of the mass-media, an affecting figure who thought that he could be an American Metternich or Bismarck, and only succeeded—rhetorically—in blurring the difference between a Churchill and a Chamberlain. But the basic problem of a new orientation in and towards foreign policy obviously transcends the problem of Dr Kissinger's personality.

THERE are always analogies and differences in various historical situations. The lesson of the appeasement culminating in the Munich agreement is not rooted in a particular situation of the 1930s, but in certain general historical truths, manifested in the records of mankind's experience, that non-resistance is not necessarily the best method for preventing rape, that submission to blackmail is not a way to avoid repeated demands, and that a cool lack of morality is not by itself a guarantee of foreign policy successes. These lessons were relevant in European history long before Munich, and are still relevant now in a different historical context.

It is, of course, perfectly true, as every schoolboy since de Tocqueville knows, that democracies face peculiarly difficult problems in conducting foreign affairs. It is hard to generate popular support for harsh measures and to offer "blood, sweat and tears" in a period regarded by the public as peaceful. It is particularly true for Americans, as witnessed by their public reaction to their Mexican, Korean, and Vietnam wars, and by the strength of isolationism before the first and the second world wars. But this should not be an excuse in the search for an effective foreign policy support any more than the ailments of weak health should be a reason for not looking for appropriate medication.

One type of excuse is not available to the populist opportunists of the American political elite. Isolationism, clearly, is now much weaker than it was before the second world war,[20] and the so-called "grass roots" elements in America evince a more hard-headed attitude about problems facing America than one could expect in a country dominated by the sensationalism of the mass media and the corrosive self-doubt, if not the actual self-hatred, of the intelligensia. It is amazing when one looks in retrospect how many of the leading American intellectuals

[20] As is shown by the comparison of the current polls with the pre-war ones. For the latter see Le Roy N. Rieselbach, *The Roots of Isolationism*, The Bobbs-Merril Co., 1966, p. 193.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

managed to be wildly wrong and even persistently so, in their attitudes to international issues. How many were wrong about "the Soviet experiment" and the Moscow Trials! How many were wrong about appeasement and the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact! How many were wrong about Stalin and Yalta! How many were wrong about the New Left in the 1960s and about *détente* in the 1970s! These types always find arguments to rationalize each successive perversion of intellectual honesty. They appear to be engaged in a permanent *trahison de clercs.* It is they who contribute most to the present St Vitus's dance which may preclude *any* foreign policy, good, bad, or indifferent. Nor is it only the "progressive intelligentsia" which manifested distorted perceptions of international affairs and of the American role in them. One of the sources of such distortion was the widespread idea of the "American empire." It was unreflectively mouthed together with the cliché about America as "the most powerful country in the world" at the time when American power was already waning. Ronald Steel wrote [21] that "the American Empire came into being as a result of the second world war." In the same year (1967) Professor Robert E. Osgood gave the following diagnosis of the American position in the world in his foreword to the book *Imperial America* by George Liska [22]:

> American foreign policy in the first two decades of the Cold War has been a striking success, judged by normal standards of national security and power. . . . The United States is now clearly the most powerful state in the world by any criterion; it is the only truly global power.

But only a few years later the same Professor Osgood in *Retreat from Empire* [23] had to explain away his "empire" theory. To save his old argument he tried to rationalize it by referring to another "imperial" parallel:

> The history of great states and empires shows that they try to hold on to extensive power and influence under much greater adversity than the United States has experienced.

Whom the gods want to destroy . . . In fact, there never was an American empire. America lacked the imperial will to establish it. It preferred to think that its business is business and never developed the imperial ethos and imperial institutions which go with it. It was reluctant to get into foreign engagements and not always ready to pursue them consistently. In the historical perspective the claim of the proponents of the "American empire" concept was just ridiculous. The Egyptian and Hellenistic empires lasted 300 years; the Roman empire, 500 years; the Persian empire, 425 years; the Byzantine empire, 1,100 years; the British

[21] *Pax Americana*, 1967, p. 21.
[22] *Imperial America, The International Politics of Primacy*, The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1967.
[23] Robert E. Osgood et al., *Retreat from Empire*, The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1973, p. 76.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

empire, 300 years; and the American "empire," according to this curious usage of the word, barely 20 years.

THE semantic alliance in this more-than-lexicographical affair between the critics and the supporters of American foreign policy concealed their basic differences. "The progressives" used the word to damn the Republic, its advocates, to reassure themselves about its strength (which only goes to show that both soft-headed and hard-headed people can be muddle-headed and wrong-headed). Both exaggerated the strength of the American political will. The proponents of the "empire" thesis certainly overestimated the actual (as against the potential) strength of "the most powerful nation on earth."

Between the cliché about the American might and the snare of *détente*, the distinction between the potential and the actual strength of the Republic has somehow been lost. There is only one step between the sublime and the ridiculous: from the illusion of American omnipotence to the exaggerated feeling of American impotence today. Dr Kissinger said that "power is the best aphrodisiac," but what is the use of aphrodisiacs to the politically impotent?

A new attitude towards foreign policy requires a straight perception of the actual American position in the world today and a willingness to tell the American people "how it really is" without "progressive" illusions of the modish intelligentsia and without self-deceptions based on the stereotype of "the most powerful nation on earth" (which is no longer a source of self-confidence but of complacency).

Another fallacy is also to be avoided. Dr Kissinger's policy contributed to a dangerous widening of the discrepancy between the American libertarian tradition and American foreign policy.

The tension between the ideal and the real is of course always present in human affairs and so is the gap between the internal value aspirations and the needs of foreign policy, as even students who have read Max Weber's *Politics as a Vocation* know. But under Dr Kissinger's *Realpolitik* this gap has become dangerously open. It is ironical to see the Chinese communists promoting their *raison d'état* policy without becoming ideologically crippled, while the recent American foreign policy managed only to sacrifice its real sources of strength in the American historical tradition for the sake of illusory advantages of Dr Kissinger's version of *Realpolitik*. Internally the result seems to be a curious compound of old *naïveté* with new cynicism, a combination which passes for political sophistication among its manipulators rationalizing their own weaknesses of character and intellect.

Dean Acheson once remarked that the British have lost their empire but have not found a role in the post-war world. If this observation cannot be applied to the Americans it is only because, as I argued, they never had an empire. But they became confused about their role and

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

this is somehow connected with the abandonment of the libertarian perspective in the American foreign policy.

Détente divorced the idea of freedom from the US stance in international affairs. This has been done shamefacedly, with all kinds of statements to the contrary by Dr Kissinger, but the effect of the operation was unmistakable. As the internal concomitant of this reorientation, the traditional vocabulary of liberty has become intellectually unfashionable in America. The intellectuals would blush when the word "freedom" was pronounced, like the Victorians when sex was mentioned. It was considered a manifestation of American "moralism" applied to international affairs where it is strictly inapplicable.

But a little knowledge is a dangerous thing, and so is the pocket Machiavellianism of the practitioners of "instant history." That foreign policy requires prudence and involves unpleasant choices is not exactly a piece of wisdom discovered by Dr Kissinger in *The World Restored.* The point however is not to lose the right perspective in which to make such choices, and that is a distinct danger for some "realists," even if they do not confuse moralism with morality. It has been said, no doubt by nasty-thinking people, that when the empire had gone, the British lost their pride but retained their arrogance. Are the Americans losing their *naïveté* but retaining a pseudo-sophistication which can only undermine their international position? Are they aware that *détente* policy (and not only Watergate) had a debilitating effect on their traditional values?

The popular reaction to the performance of Ambassador Moynihan at the United Nations and the furor over Dr Kissinger's advice on the question of the Solzhenitsyn invitation to the White House seem to suggest that the instincts of the American people in these matters remain sound, that they are rather more like the British than the French in 1940. Ex-Senator Fulbright was not a representative of American tradition when he said at the *Pacem in Terris* conference (8 October 1973) in support of Dr Kissinger that one should not "meddle" in "other people's domestic affairs":

> The Russian people have lived under dictatorship throughout their history; it is not for us, at this late date, to try to change that by external pressure.

This attitude, like that of Dr Kissinger himself, seems to be based on the view, which was realistic in the eighteenth century, that foreign policy is essentially a matter of diplomatic relations carried on between chancelleries or wars waged between professional armies. But the nineteenth and twentieth centuries have become so imbued with mass politics that foreign policy can no longer be reduced to the question of agreements between governments if at the same time the nature of these governments and the relationship between their domestic and foreign affairs are disregarded.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

THE special issue of *The Public Interest* (No. 41, Fall 1975), devoted to the Bicentenary of the Republic, presents a melancholy picture. This has been noted by the correspondent of *Pravda* in the United States, Melor Sturua, who gloated about it, referring particularly to the last article in the issue written by Daniel Bell who asserts that recent events have irreparably shattered "the myth of American exceptionalism." What Mr Sturua has not mentioned was that Bell still considers America exceptional in one respect, that of its tradition of constitutional liberty.

I am not quite convinced that this is so, but in any case American attachment to liberty remains one of the proudest embodiments of the Western tradition in history. It can be the only basis for the recovery of the American political will and the only hope that this tradition will survive.

"Empty moralism" is indeed a bad thing, but freedom is not just a word to be put ironically in quotation marks by the "liberal" *literati* (who are often political illiterates) while in the real world it is visibly shrinking. It is a permanent aspiration of real people, sometimes weaker and sometimes stronger than the tyrannies that oppress them. It can be lost and it can be regained, but it is usually only those who have lost it (as did most recently the Indians) who know its real value. As a subject of after-dinner speeches and Sunday sermons it may suffer from overuse, but the aspirations for it are a perfectly real political force in human history, a force which will continue to move people from time to time, threaten the sleep of the dictators and upset the expectations of the "realists."

Those who survived Hitler and Stalin should be particularly aware of the permanency of libertarian aspirations in human history. The events in Eastern Europe, from the Polish October and the Hungarian revolution in 1956 to the Prague Spring in 1968, testify to it and so does the emergence of dissidents in the Soviet Union after the long night of Stalin's tyranny. Not only hope, but also desire for liberty springs eternal and it is unrealistic to disregard in foreign policy this historical fact, even though it is not always possible to help the victims.

But surely wisdom does not consist of forgetfulness. The anguished cries of today echo those of yesterday. In his speech to the League of Nations after Mussolini's conquest of Abyssinia, Haile Selassie warned the Western powers about their own future. There have been many other anguished cries since then. Today it is Angola, who will it be tomorrow? If there is such a thing as "collective subconscious" it surely exists in Israel: it manifests itself in the universal fear about the possibility of Munich in the Middle East.

It is not just a question of the melancholy advice which is the only wisdom the potential victims can offer: *Hodie mihi, cras tibi* (What happens to me today will happen to you tomorrow), but of the probability that if the American people were to give up the idea of freedom as a fundamental perspective in their foreign policy, however many

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

compromises may be required in practice, they would not just betray others, they would betray themselves. They would undermine the legitimacy of their state founded 200 years ago. In the long run, to separate the constitutional tradition which provided its continuity from its foreign policy invites a failure of both. Sooner or later the abandonment in foreign affairs of the perspective based on this tradition must of necessity have its effect in internal affairs, and as the internal strength is in turn reflected in foreign policy, we have here a dual feedback from which there would be no escape unless the process is arrested in time.

It is the recovery of political will which alone can stop it.

ALL serious thinkers who have studied the phenomenon of decadence —Ibn Khaldun, Montesquieu, Gibbon, Max Weber—have realized that its sources are mainly internal, however much external factors may reinforce them. It is therefore necessary to concentrate on the internal roots of the present American weaknesses. But this does not mean that nothing can be done prior to the overcoming of domestic weaknesses to make foreign policy more effective.

This is no place to discuss what might replace the Kissinger-Nixon Grand Design.[24] As it is in ruins a different policy would have to be adopted, otherwise the United States may slide downwards even further. Whatever the outcome of the American election, the general mood of the American public and the realization of the onesidedness of the results of *détente* is likely to stiffen American foreign policy and raise the demands for reciprocity in US-USSR relations. Whether the evolution of the US attitudes will lead to the realization that it cannot be achieved without facing squarely up to the harsh international reality remains to be seen. But after the election, the new President, whatever his party allegiance and personal characteristics, will have to dissociate himself from the 1972–73 euphoria if the Soviet advances are to be stopped, even if the cooling of the *détente* will inevitably bring the charges of "a return to the cold war." The new policy would have to start by correcting the most obvious mistakes of the previous one, just as happened on two previous occasions when the appeasement drift had been stopped: after Munich and after Yalta. It is clear that if the illusions of pseudo-*détente* are to be abandoned, it will be necessary to make greater use of the Chinese connexion and to establish stricter politico-strategic priorities, because the American and Western position is relatively weaker than it was on previous occasions and their publics perhaps even more demoralized. One way to jolt them out of the *détente* slumber would be to divest America of its involvement in the United Nations. It is unlikely that any new American representatives will repeat the performance of Ambassador Moynihan in reasserting

[24] It was particularly silly of Mr Ronald Reagan to praise in his Michigan speech (on 14 May) the "solid foreign policy" of Richard Nixon, architect of *détente* with the Soviet Union, while damning the co-architect of this policy, Henry Kissinger.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the American libertarian tradition in this, to use his metaphor, "theatre of the absurd." He has demonstrated to the American public and to the world at large that it is not necessary to take the absurdities lying down. But it is the institution itself that is now a drag on American foreign policy.

Like its predecessor, the League of Nations, it has failed to fulfil the expectations of its creators.[25] This could easily have been predicted, but the conventional pieties made it into a "holy cow" institution. It is largely discredited in Western countries and there is no reason why they should stick to their mealy-mouthed platitudes about it, particularly as it is clear that it confers a kind of spurious legitimacy on its undemocratic majority and that this majority is not going to be changed.[26] There is really no need to provide such a semblance of legitimacy any longer and to accept the ritualistic constraints involved in this. It does not have to be, of course, an outright withdrawal, only a gradual reduction of US and Western support which would deflate the UN as an international factor.

IN spite of his "new look," Henry Kissinger continues to base American foreign policy on his old assumptions and premises. His "warnings" to the Soviet Union against "adventurist" policy are as empty as all his previous "warnings." They are accompanied by assurances that although "what has happened in Angola is clearly a major disturbance in American foreign relations, it is not a major breach in US-Soviet policy." He just expresses his "displeasure" and repeats his old proposition that "we must create the maximum incentives for a moderate Soviet course," notwithstanding all the evidence that his "incentives" only whetted the Soviet appetite for expansion and lowered the risks for the Soviet Union to indulge in "adventurism."

Dr Kissinger has a ready-made alibi for his failures[27]:

> A great deal of what has gone wrong is not the result of *détente* or of Soviet policy.

It is only the Congress which is to blame:

[25] Here is what President Truman said at the San Francisco Conference (*The Times*, London, 27 June 1945): "The Charter of the United Nations which you have just signed is a solid structure upon which we can build a better world . . . With this Charter the world can begin to look forward to the time when all worthy human beings may be permitted to live decently as free people."

[26] The Polish *Trybuna Ludu* (21 Jan. 1976) summed this up thus: "A confluence of action by the countries of the socialist commonwealth and of the non-aligned countries vis-à-vis most of the problems on the agenda of the recent session of the UNO has created a decisive majority on the one hand and a conservative minority opposition of the imperialist bloc on the other."

[27] This and the following remarks were made by Dr Kissinger and his adviser, Helmut Sonnenfeldt at a meeting of American ambassadors in London in December 1975. Twenty years earlier (on 17 Feb. 1957), the late Isaac Deutscher wrote in similar vein: "The decisive question now is whether Soviet diplomacy under Gromyko will succeed in 'saving *détente*' or whether it will have to revert to the Cold War." *Russia, China and the West*, ed. Fred Halliday, London 1970, p. 102.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

> Even Angola represents as much a judgment by the Soviets of the domestic situation in the US—as much a reaction to our intelligence investigations—as it does a long-term policy.

His conclusion is as logically startling as it is consistent in clinging to the premises of his by now blatantly unsuccessful policy:

> To sum up, *détente* is not an amelioration of tone. *Détente* is the improvement of the long-term relations with an emerging superpower.

Instead of making his expectations more realistic, Dr Kissinger continues his abstract fantasies based on wishful thinking. Instead of looking for the pragmatic correctives for his policy, he is seeking "theoretical" rationalizations for its failures. One manifestation of this is the "doctrine" enunciated by his assistant, Helmut Sonnenfeldt, who drew yet another conclusion from Dr Kissinger's post-1815 Congress of Vienna parallels, asserting that the US policy must "strive for an evolution that makes the relationship between Eastern Europeans and the Soviet Union an organic one." In other words, the US must not only acquiesce in Soviet imperial domination over the 100 millions of unwilling East Europeans (as it did in Yalta and confirmed it in Helsinki), but it must actively help the Soviet Union "to establish roots" in the region; its failure to do so until now is, according to Sonnenfeldt, "doubly tragic."

It is not clear whether the extension of such KGB practices as for instance "psychiatric prisons" would make the situation of East Europeans less tragic. But what was meant here is obviously an euphemistic offer of political support to the Soviet Union for its efforts to overcome its "unnatural relationship" with Eastern Europe and make it "organic" through its further subordination to the Soviet Union. This would be indeed natural for the Soviets, but it was the first time that this has been pronounced "natural," even though euphemistically, by a responsible American official, evidently voicing Dr Kissinger's own ideas. It is, according to him, a necessary step to prevent World War III. It is, indeed, a standard argument by now: the spectre of nuclear holocaust is regularly invoked as the only alternative to capitulation by instalments. Of it may even be a prophylactic surrender. Yugoslavia was warned by Sonnenfeldt that it "should be less obnoxious," because Washington cannot give it a "free ride" ticket to defend its independence.

The subsequent dropping of the word "organic" by Helmut Sonnenfeldt and the denials by Henry Kissinger that he was ready to support further Soviet initiatives in Eastern Europe can only be taken with a pinch of salt. After all, in a political discourse the significance of words derives from their context. In this case the context is provided on the one hand by the premises of Dr Kissinger's *détente* policy itself and on the other by the Soviet goal of the eventual integration of Eastern Europe in its "socialist commonwealth." In his report to the twenty-fifth CPSU congress, Brezhnev made this point explicitly:

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

> This process of the gradual drawing together (*sblizhenie*) of the socialist countries is now operating quite definitely as an objective law (*zakonomernost*).

In Soviet perspective "drawing together" (*sblizhenie*) is to be followed by "merger" (*sliyanie*) a process which was previously said to have taken place among Soviet nationalities, and is now notionally applied to the East European nations. It is described as "socialist internationalism," a concept derived from "proletarian internationalism."[28] This new doctrinal formula has been introduced among the May 1976 CPSU slogans. According to the French Communist leader, Jean Kanapa (*Le Monde*, 1 April 1976), this "Soviet regional variant of proletarian internationalism" has been opposed by the French CP. It was also criticized by the Italian CP. It became the subject of a Soviet propaganda campaign, while the Bulgarian Party secretary, Todor Zhikov, proclaimed the need for an "organic" relationship between "socialist countries." The Rumanians and Yugoslavs have of course rejected it vehemently and they were infuriated when the "Sonnenfeldt doctrine" provided unexpected succour to the "Brezhnev doctrine."[29] As the Bucharest *Scinteia* (13 April 1976) put it:

> The "Sonnenfeldt doctrine" in its essence is a doctrine denying the people's right to independence and free development, a doctrine of domination and oppression, a doctrine of dividing the world into zones of influence among the big powers. ... Public opinion is hopeful that the US foreign policy will be founded on the ideas of liberty, equality and independence and not on the ideas of the "Sonnenfeldt doctrine" which should remain a mere episode of sad remembrance.

It is unlikely that this will be so if the approach to foreign policy embodied by Dr Kissinger continues to be essentially the same. His successor may modify it, but Dr Kissinger remains unreformed. If reality does not conform to his expectations, it has to be made to conform through increased doses of "incentives to moderation," i.e. through the appeasement of the Soviet Union. If it does not show itself to be a *status quo* power, as Kissinger-Nixon doctrine postulated, it has to become one through the US policy satisfying Soviet imperial ambitions. If the tiger has not yet digested what it has gobbled, the US better helps him to digest it, so that he would be pleased with the "organic" *status quo* and would not go into any further predatory "adventurism." As we now face a "truly imperial phase of Soviet expansionism," it is necessary to accommodate the beast, in order to salvage what is still possible in the present phase

[28] Cf. Teresa Rakowska-Harmstone, "'Socialist Internationalism' in Eastern Europe," in this issue of *Survey* pp. 38–54, and E. Bagramov, "Zhiznennost Leninskoi Kontseptsii Internationalizma," *Kommunist*, No. 6, 1976, pp. 88–99.

[29] President Tito said at a press conference in Stockholm on 31 Mar. 1976 that "no statement, including the one by Sonnenfeldt, can frighten us or divert us from our path, which we will continue to follow." (*Review of International Affairs*, 5 Apr. 1976, No. 624, p. 17). The gloomy effect in Eastern Europe of the Sonnenfeldt statement, in spite of all the subsequent "explanations" and "interpretations" can be gathered even from

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

of Western decadence. As Dr Kissinger put it to Admiral Zumwalt (who put it on record [30]):

> Dr Kissinger feels that US has passed its historic high point like so many earlier civilizations. He believes the US is on the downhill and cannot be roused by political challenge. He states that his job is to persuade the Russians to give us the best deal we can get, recognizing that the historical forces favour them. He says that he realizes that in the light of history he will be recognized as one of those who negotiated terms favourable to the Soviets, but that the American people have only themselves to blame because they lack stamina to stay the course against the Russians who are " Sparta to our Athens."

It is presumably not the function of the American Secretary of State to indulge in policies based on self-fulfilling historiosophical catastrophism, and to do this without putting the issue to the people. It is certainly ironic to see Kissinger, the victim of Hitler, blaming American people for not living up to his expectations. Hitler also believed in Western decadence; but he became disappointed with the Germans for not living up to his expectations. Things get confused: Washington is not Weimar, 1976 is not 1815, and Dr Kissinger is no Metternich or Bismarck. The trouble with him is that " he is part of the problem, not part of the solution." Or, as Alexander Herzen once said about a contemporary politician: " He is not the doctor, he is the disease." However, Kissinger's resignation is not a sufficient condition for the basic reassessment of the American foreign policy and of the perspective in which it operates.

Such a reassessment after the elections implies not only the recognition of the mistakes of American foreign policy during the Kissinger era, but also a repudiation of the appeasement attitude underlined in it. Belated attempts by Dr Kissinger, such as his " Farewell " talk to the International Institute of Strategic Studies in London (on 25 June 1976) to answer his critics, only confuse the issues and will certainly make their future clarification more difficult. For the sake of acquiring an historical alibi, Dr Kissinger, in his Janus-like way, is now presenting as his own the very positions from which he was so widely criticized, without however so much as a hint that there was anything wrong with his policy in the past and without acknowledging any mistakes. These rhetorical amalgamation technique can impress only people with short memories, but not those who have followed Dr Kissinger's earlier semantic acrobatics.

Now, surely somewhat late in the day, the Spenglerian pessimist warns

the official East European press, as well as from Western correspondents. Dusko Doder reported in the *International Herald Tribune* (27–28 Mar. 1976) that it was taken in Belgrade as an indication of how little the American commitments and assurances can be relied upon, particularly as " America is so far away and the Soviet Union is so near." Cf. also J. Brezaric, " The so-called Sonnenfeldt Doctrine," *Review of International Affairs* (Belgrade), 20 May 1976, pp. 9–11. The Rumanians made it quite clear that the Sonnenfeldt statement was a serious blow to the autonomy of their foreign policy.

[30] Elmo R. Zumwalt, Jr., *On Watch, A Memoir*, New York, 1976, p. 317.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the West of the danger of "paralysis by gloom," the architect of *détente* declares that "as far ahead as we can see, we will live in a twilight area between tranquility and open confrontation," the *Realpolitiker* says that "the power of our ideas depends only on our will to uphold them," the official who advised President Ford not to see Solzhenitsyn extols "the indestructible power of man's yearning for freedom," the man behind the "Sonnenfeldt doctrine" asserts that it is necessary "to deal with Eastern Europe on the basis of sovereignty and the independence of its countries." It is pathetic to hear him asking himself: "Can it be that our deeper problems are not of resources but of will, not of power but of conception?" It is no less pathetic to hear him (of all people!) emphasizing that "we could afford neither perilous complacency, nor immobilizing pessimism" and concluding:

> "We know what we must do.
> We also know what we can do.
> It only remains to do it."

Indeed. It only remains to do it now, after nearly eight years of Dr Kissinger's helmsmanship of the American foreign policy. . . .

THE feeling that Western civilization is doomed became widespread with the ending of 400 years of European expansion of which America is the most conspicuous example. Paul Valéry noted that "civilizations are mortal" and Spengler and Toynbee developed historical theories about it. But only historians in the course of time will be able to say what has happened; Tolstoy noticed the tendency to feel that what has happened had to have happened, but this applies only to the past, not to the future, which is open.

In any case, on present indicators there is no reason why the West should regard its decline as inevitable and final. Historically the Western ascendancy was remarkable. Western aspirations have been taken over by others, Western material progress became the universal measure of achievement, Western cultural superiority is unchallenged. Even the Marxist indicator of historical progress—labour productivity—leaves no doubt about Western strength. And last but certainly not least, the West remains the epicentre of the idea of freedom as the embodiment of human dignity. One really has to keep a sense of proportion and realize how concerned about this last point in particular are the detractors of the West.

The fundamental problem for the West is internal. But it is not in its social, economic or political institutions that one detects the most grave causes for anxiety. It is the decline of the political will that is naturally taken as a fundamental indicator of Western decadence. It is the rise of the Soviet empire that gives the Russians the claim that they are the wave of the future. Marxist determinism provides an ideological rationalization for it, but after 60 years of Soviet history few in the West feel that

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

it is the future that "works" (in the immortal phrase of Lincoln Steffens). But it is only if the West can regain its political will that Soviet expansion is likely to be stopped.

Western regeneration is by no means historically impossible. Europe by itself may be too tired, but America in spite of its present "Indian summer" feeling may still possess enough psychological resilience to recover its political will. To repeat: nothing in history or in the present makes the final decline of the West inevitable. Western civilization has gone through many transformations. In its European context it has often faced perils which looked to the contemporaries no less formidable and deadly than the ones we are facing now. However, on several occasions the internal decline has been reversed and political will has re-emerged after periods which could be seen as terminal stages of the process of decadence. In the present global context, it is of course the United States that provides the hope that recovery can be accomplished.

American history itself does not give a sufficient perspective-in-depth to see that it can be done. It is too short and too imbued with the idea of unilinear progress. In times of trouble, like today, shallow optimism of the American past can only too easily give way to an exaggerated historical pessimism. Nowadays many Americans, as well as Europeans, feel that America has assumed its global role quite unprepared for it. Even if this is obvious, how could it have been otherwise, given American history? The more worrying problem is the apparent inability of the United States to adapt itself to this role in the post-war period. The shock of Vietnam made the Americans resentful of what has been presented as the role of the "global gendarme." But this is a misleading formulation taken from the quarters which always were anti-American and it also precludes a sensible sense of priorities which alone can provide a rational basis and strategy for the defence of Western civilization. The mistakes of the past can be used as a lesson instead of cumulating a permanent political neurosis. The game is not over. It is the visibly rising peril, both to America and to the Western civilization, which may induce the American people to have another look at the dangers involved. The awareness of the historical issues is for them a necessary pre-condition of realizing the historical risks facing them in future. They may or may not do something about it. But the historical test is still to come and therefore an obituary notice about Western civilization is as premature as the one which Mark Twain once read about himself.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

"Socialist Internationalism" and Eastern Europe—A New Stage

Teresa Rakowska-Harmstone

THIS article reviews recent attempts in the Soviet theory of national relations to extend doctrinal formulae and prescriptive values derived from the domestic experience to the relations between members of the so-called "socialist family of nations," i.e. members of the Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO) and the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA). Key ideological formulae are examined, each representing a specific policy already tested on the Soviet domestic scene,[1] as they are now introduced into the broader arena of inter-state relations. No attempt is made to analyse the implementation of these policies, which are still at their inception, except to indicate practical measures—undertaken or planned—to carry them out, and to assess a probable impact. It might seem futile to concentrate on ideological formulae of an Orwellian "double-talk" in the political context where, most scholars agree, the preoccupation with power has long eclipsed the role of ideology in policy making. Nevertheless, in an "ideological" political system,[2] the doctrine is still the one source of legitimacy of the power of the party and its global aspirations, and doctrinal formulations are all important to justify policies, *a priori* as well as *ex post facto*, and for this reason are of special interest.

REFERENCES to Eastern Europe in the context of discussion of a theory of national relations began to appear in Soviet journals and in statements of Soviet leaders in the early seventies. Starting in 1969 in connexion with the International Meeting of Communist and Workers' Parties in Moscow, their frequency increased after the 24th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) in 1971. By 1973–74 a coherent theory of national relations between socialist states had emerged.

Three major assumptions underlie the theory:

1. that the nature of relations between socialist states is identical to that of relations between nations and nationalities within the Soviet Union; both derive from the basic concept of "proletarian internationalism";

1 For the discussion of the concepts and policies within the Soviet context, see this author's "The Dilemma of Nationalism in the Soviet Union," in John W. Strong, ed., *The Soviet Union under Brezhnev and Kosygin* (New York, 1971); "The Dialectics of Nationalism in the USSR," *Problems of Communism* (May-June 1974); and *Russia and Nationalism in Central Asia: The Case of Tadzhikistan* (Baltimore, 1970).

2 For the definition of the ideological political system, see Z. K. Brzezinski and S. Huntington, *Political Power: USA/USSR* (New York, 1964), ch. 2.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

2. that the socialist states, members of WTO and CMEA, are proceeding on an " irreversible historical course " of gradual *rapprochement* (ever growing closer together—*sblizhenie*), which eventually leads to their " merger " (*sliianie*) [3]; and,

3. that the *rapprochement* stage is already under way as manifested in an on-going and accelerating process of East European integration, which occurs at three basic levels: the economic integration within the framework of CMEA, the political integration on an inter-state basis (within WTO) and on an inter-party basis, and the cultural integration through all-embracing multilateral and bilateral contacts.

An inherent part of the theory is the leading role played by the USSR on the inter-state basis—as the senior partner with 50 years of practical experience—and by the CPSU in inter-party relations. This is clear in the context of the discussion as well as in the choice of formulae adopted, each of which has had a long-standing currency in Soviet domestic politics. The leading role of the CPSU is carefully defined, to avoid accusations of " hegemonistic " tendencies:

> The CPSU has always been aware of its special responsibility to the communist movement. As is common knowledge, the CPSU has come out against all hegemonistic manifestations, and believes that no one Party can assume leadership of the entire movement today. All Parties are independent and enjoy equal rights. However, the objective position of the CPSU as the senior contingent of the communist movement, which has advanced towards the ultimate goal farther than the other Parties and has amassed vast experience in the revolutionary struggle and the construction of socialism, has placed special responsibility on it, and demands of it efforts in the interests of the entire movement.[4]

The concept of national sovereignty in state relations is also carefully worded, restating the principle of respect for the external and domestic independence. For the socialist states, however, this is modified by an additional " guarantee " generated by internationalist unity:

> . . . in relations between socialist countries, the principle of respect for state sovereignty also includes their close friendship and mutual assistance in building socialism and communism and in defending their sovereignty against encroachments by imperialist powers. . . . *The entire socialist community guards independence and territorial integrity of the socialist countries.* This helps to strengthen the sovereignty of each and provides reliable guarantees for their sovereignty.[5]

[3] The wording is identical with that used to describe relations between Soviet nations and nationalities in the 1961 CPSU Programme.

[4] V. V. Zagladin, ed., *The World Communist Movement: Outline of Strategy and Tactics* (Moscow, 1973), p. 478.

[5] E. Usenko, " International Legal Principles of Relations Between Socialist Countries," *International Affairs* (Moscow, Aug. 1973), p. 51.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Thus, should a socialist state abandon the aim of building socialism and communism, the principle of respect for its independence would no longer remain operational, i.e. the "guarantee" would automatically be invoked in the form of an intervention by others (if feasible), on the grounds that interests of proletarian unity overrule specific national interests generated (inevitably) by "bourgeois nationalist elements" egged on by the forces of "world imperialism." The "Brezhnev Doctrine" and its application in the case of Czechoslovakia in 1968 illustrate the point.[6] In the historical context, the application of the Doctrine in Eastern Europe in 1968 is a direct parallel to the actions (and their doctrinal justification) of the Bolshevik Party in the early twenties which resulted in the forcible reincorporation of the rebellious borderlands into the new Soviet state.

Doctrinal assumptions behind the theory of relations between the socialist states are not new, although they have been newly reformulated to fit the particular case. In the theoretical context they should be considered on a historical continuum, the final outcome of which is to be the world-wide victory of socialism. The establishment and consolidation of the Soviet state is seen as the first phase of the process; the emergence and integration of socialist states as the second phase, with more to come until the final goal is reached. In the practical context they serve the interests of power and security of the Soviet state and legitimize its policies.

It should be noted here that in the discussion of the theory of relations between the socialist states, two issues are invariably raised as directly relevant: the WTO intervention in Czechoslovakia, presented as the reassertion of the "international" over the "national" principle, and the challenge, by the Chinese Communist Party, to the CPSU's leading role in the world communist movement. The CPC is portrayed as having succumbed to nationalism and chauvinism; it thus represents "great danger to the communist movement" because its actions are directed against the movement's "general line." Both are too well known to be discussed here beyond noting the obvious relevance.

IN the official Soviet doctrine "proletarian internationalism" is the basic concept which governs relations between socialist nations and states as well as relations between workers and the oppressed the world over.[7] It postulates a basic unity rooted in the common *class interest*, the binding ties of which override national and racial loyalties. It is the principle which shapes the domestic Soviet formula of a multinational political

[6] In this context, the interpretation that the Soviet Union has abandoned the "Brezhnev Doctrine" because it signed the "Final Act" of the CSCE in Helsinki in 1975 appears highly questionable. In ideological terms the WTO intervention in Czechoslovakia was not an intervention but fraternal assistance rendered by the socialist countries in defence of the sovereignty of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic.

[7] The discussion in this paragraph is based on A. K. Azizian, *Leninskaia natsional'naia politika v razvitii i deistvii* (Moscow, 1972), pp. 353–54.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

system, "socialist in content" (the governing class principle expressed in the leading role of the unitary communist party), and "national in form" (as expressed in the federal constitution). In the global setting at the current stage of historical development, class unity develops in the context of the "three great current world forces": the world system of socialism (i.e. the socialist states), the international working class, and the national liberation movements. The world socialist system is the most advanced on the path of historical development and thus provides the leadership for the other two forces. But its unity and growth depend on correctness in domestic and foreign policies. It should, therefore, wage a relentless struggle against factionalism, "Right" and "Left" deviations and particularly against nationalism, in all its manifestations: national and racial prejudice; survivals of nationalism in the workers' consciousness, and "national egoism, national pride and national arrogance" within the communist movement. "National and internationalist tasks" converge in proletarian internationalism into a concept of patriotism directed at cooperation and a common revolutionary struggle—the opposite of nationalism which pursues specific and mutually conflicting national interests.

The "world socialist system," as the most advanced, has already reached the stage of "mature socialism," at which point proletarian internationalism has entered a new and higher phase of unity and cooperation, that of "socialist internationalism":

> With the formation of socialist nations within the framework of the Soviet state and especially with the rise of the world community of socialist states, proletarian internationalism has entered a new stage of development, that of socialist internationalism. Socialist (proletarian) internationalism *underlies the totality of relations between the fraternal socialist countries—interparty, interstate, cultural, and others.*[8]

It should be noted that no distinction is made here between the inter-party and inter-state relations, each considered but a different aspect of the same type of relationship.

Socialist internationalism presupposes the formation of the "ties of a new type." According to CPSU Secretary General, Leonid Brezhnev:

> The victory of socialism in a number of countries has made it possible to establish between them relations of a new type—fraternal relations based on the principles of socialist internationalism.[9]

This conception of the ties of the new type which have had their test already in the 50 years of common statehood of the various nations

[8] M. Yakovlev, "Blend of National and International Elements in the Policy of Communist and Workers' Parties," *International Affairs* (Moscow, Oct. 1969), p. 42. (Italics mine.)

[9] Leonid Brezhnev, *On the Policy of the Soviet Union and the International Situation*, prepared by the Novosti Press Agency Publishing House, Moscow (New York, Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1973), p. 51.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

and nationalities of the Soviet Union, provides a base for the *explicit* transfer of Soviet experience in national relations from the domestic Soviet to the East European scene, and its application to relations between WTO-CMEA countries. To quote Secretary Brezhnev again speaking at the 50th Anniversary of the formation of the Soviet Union, 21 December 1972:

> When the question of uniting the Soviet Republics in a single Union of Soviet Socialist Republics arose 50 years ago, Lenin pointed out that the Union was necessary in order to withstand the military onslaught of imperialism, to defend the gains of the Revolution and to accomplish the peaceful creative tasks of socialist construction more successfully by common effort. In principle, *the same applies to the fraternal community of sovereign socialist states that belong to the Warsaw Treaty Organization and the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance.* This community was formed primarily to counter the imperialist threat . . . and to safeguard in common the cause of socialism and peace. . . .[10]

Similar application of the experience of Soviet republics to the current stage of relations between the socialist states is provided in a recent Soviet text on national relations:

> The experience of the Soviet Union in implementing the policy of proletarian internationalism in construction of a national state shows how the fraternal cooperation of socialist nations, the Soviet republics, can be built on the basis of equality, voluntary adherence and mutual help, and on the basis of respect for national sovereignty, taking into account specific features of each. When new *socialist countries appeared*, as a result of the Second World War, *the above experience of the CPSU came to play a great positive role in solving the question of the nature of relations between the socialist countries.*[11]

It is interesting to note that Soviet journals and monographs dealing with the problem of national relations apply the "*rapprochement*-merger" (*sblizhenie-sliianie*) formula to the future of relations between the socialist states, members of the CMEA-WTO group.[12] It is the same formula which was officially articulated in the 1961 CPSU Programme to project future stages of development of national relations within the Soviet multinational state.

Referring to current policies of integration of the socialist bloc, the official journal of the CPSU Central Committee noted that the ongoing economic integration, the growing social and political cohesion of socialist

[10] Ibid. p. 217. (Italics mine.)

[11] Azizian, op. cit. p. 358. (Italics mine.) Reference here to the national sovereignty of the Soviet republics should be seen in the light of the Soviet constitutional theory.

[12] See, for example, T. Yu. Burmistrova, *Natsional'nyi vopros i rabocheie dvizhenie v Rossii* (*Leninskaia politika proletarskogo internatsionalizma, 1907–17 gg.*) (Moscow, 1969), pp. 256–7; and E. Bagramov, " Razvitiie KPSS Marksistsko-Leninskogo ucheniia o natsional'nykh otnosheniiakh," *Kommunist*, no. 4, 1973, pp. 34–48.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

societies and their ideological unity, the formation of the ties of the new type and further consolidation of the leading role of the working class, are all "*creating preconditions for the transformation of the state of the dictatorship of the proletariat into a multinational state; in the USSR such a national state is already in existence and continues to be strengthened.*" [13] This last quotation (1974) is the most significant because it hints at a possibility of an eventual political merger of East European countries with the Soviet Union into a multinational state, a possibility whch was considered and rejected by Stalin in the period immediately following the second world war [14] as, presumably, premature.

The "fraternal parties" have allegedly entered the stage in which the realization of a long-range socialist integration programme begins. This process requires three successive phases in the "solution of the national problem." The phase of "democratic solution" is followed by that of a "socialist solution" and, ultimately, by the phase of the "flowering and *rapprochement.*" The first introduces the bourgeois type of formal legal equality but does not effectively remove national exploitation and oppression. These disappear only in the socialist phase, when genuine political equality is established and the road opens toward economic and cultural equality. These two phases may overlap, as in the case of the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia and some other socialist countries. The full unity of socialist nations is achieved only in the final phase in the process of transformation of socialism into communism. At this point the identity of the social system, economic equality and international culture will be established, and all manifestations of nationalism and chauvinism will be overcome.[15]

In the early seventies the strength and unity of socialist states were considered to be at an all-time high; nevertheless, two caveats were voiced repeatedly. One is the need to accelerate integration. As formulated by Secretary Brezhnev:

> . . . even in the present conditions, far from diminishing, the need for unity and the closest cooperation among socialist countries have become even greater. Today we require unity, cooperation and joint action chiefly in order to accomplish more quickly and effectively the tasks of developing socialist society and building communism. . . .[16]

The other concerns problems in the implementation of "the ties of the new type" in view of the still recurring "regrettable cases of serious

[13] L. Yagodovskii, "Sotrudnichestvo-Vazhnyi Faktor Stroitel'stva Sotsializma i Kommunizma," *Kommunist*, no. 15, 1974, p. 74. (Italics mine.) The exact wording in Russian is: ". . . nakaplivaiutsia predposylki dlia razvitiia gosudarstva diktatury proletariata v obshchenarodnoe gosudarstvo (v SSSR uzhe sushchestvuet i prodolzhaet ukrepliatsia obshchenarodnoe gosudarstvo)."

[14] See the letter of the Soviet Ambassador in Belgrade, Sadchikov, *re* the Yugoslav desire, as expressed by Kardelj in 1945, to become one of the Soviet republics. Reference to Sadchikov's letter is in "Letter from the Central Committee of the CPSU to the Central Committee of the CPY, 4 May 1948," in *The Soviet-Yugoslav Dispute (Text of the Published Correspondence* (London: RIIA: 1948), pp. 37–38.

[15] Bagramov, op. cit. pp. 35–39.

[16] Brezhnev, op. cit. p. 217.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

disruption." [17] Nationalism has proved to be the main culprit on the road to internationalist unity. Considered to be a transitory historical phenomenon, part of the superstructure at the capitalist stage of development and bound to decline under socialism and eventually to disappear altogether, it has, nevertheless, demonstrated its tenacity. In Soviet domestic politics the "national problem" is said to have been solved, but "problems in national relations" are admitted to exist and to require application of "correct" policies as well as "tactful" handling. In relations between socialist countries it has fuelled centrifugal forces and spawned ideological deviations. Soviet sources admit that "the solution of the nationalities question in some of the socialist countries has proved more complex than Communists expected." [18]

> Nationalist prejudices are most tenacious. Born of concrete historical conditions of oppression and exploitation of certain nations and peoples by others, nationalist prejudices, distrust and alienation among peoples have become deeply embedded in the minds of a certain part of society. . . . Such survivals live on for some time even after the victory of the socialist revolution, since it is impossible overnight to remove economic and cultural inequality or to eradicate traces of abnormal relations among nations as inherited from capitalism. In certain conditions, nationalist survivals may even flare up unless they are dealt with.[19]

It is recognized that conditions differ widely in the socialist states, the variety of which has created "additional difficulties in the establishment of a new society" and in "effecting all-round cooperation among them":

> Each of them has travelled an historical road of its own, differs in the level of economic, social and political development, and retains specific features of national culture and psychology.[20]

Differences in levels of development of socialist nations, as well as the survival of "nationalist prejudices" create a fertile ground for the revival of nationalism, especially as it is exploited by the "imperialist bourgeoisie" for its own ends. Nationalism, therefore, "is doubly dangerous" when "it surfaces among Communists in a socialist country"; it "invariably leads to disunity of the Communist Parties, the socialist countries and of all the revolutionary anti-imperialist forces," and "benefits nobody but the enemy":

> In the Communist Parties of the socialist countries, nationalism is expressed in a distortion of, or an erroneous and one-sided emphasis on, the narrowly understood interests of one's own country, in contrast with those of the socialist community or the entire communist

[17] Ibid. p. 51. The "disruption," specifically referred to in the context was caused by Chinese policies. See also Brezhnev's report to the 24th congress of the CPSU, ibid. p. 83.
[18] Zagladin, op. cit. p. 450.
[19] Ibid. p. 452.
[20] Ibid. p. 451.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

> and revolutionary movement, or else in an imposition of one's views and decisions on other Parties.[21]

Nationalism is considered to be the source of both the "Left" and the "Right" revisionism; the policies of the CPSU on the other hand are clearly identified with the "general line" of the world communist movement to be followed by all other parties, the injunction against "imposition of one's views on other parties" notwithstanding:

> Experience shows that nationalism may assume the form of either the "Right" or "Left" revisionism. Both varieties inevitably merge when directed against the general line of the communist movement, against Communist Parties following that line and, particularly, against the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.[22]

SEEN in the perspective of the last two decades, the growing forces of nationalism in Eastern Europe may well have prompted a renewed drive for the integration of the area under the Soviet umbrella.

Global power considerations and the increasingly pronounced independence of non-ruling communist parties in Western Europe may also have been a factor. Considered in this context, the integration does not necessarily mean regional integration (on the pattern developed in Western Europe)—although this also appears to be a part of the new blueprint—but the increased dependence of East European countries on the Soviet Union.

An accelerated effort to hasten all phases of East European integration became noticeable at about the same time that the theory of the "new ties" began to be articulated.[23] Economic integration has received special emphasis, as the necessary base for the creation of the new unity. This has been accompanied by vigorous activities to solidify and to regularize political ties, to promote cultural exchanges and to present a common Soviet—East European front in foreign policy.

An overall picture of the new policy emerges clearly from an important article by Konstantin Katushev, Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU in charge of relations between ruling parties, which appeared in the party's authoritative journal, *Kommunist*, in 1973. In the name of strengthening unity among the socialist states, Katushev outlines the policy of integration in its three separate aspects—the economic, political and cultural, emphasizing also the coordination in foreign policy. In the discussion he uses both the "*rapprochement*-merger" formula and the "national form—socialist content" formula. He also stresses the special role played by the Soviet Union (and the CPSU) in the socialist

21 Ibid. p. 457–8.

22 Ibid.

23 For the general picture of integration policies within the context of *détente*, see J. F. Brown, "Détente and Soviet Policy in Eastern Europe," *Survey*, vol. 20, no. 2 and 3 (Spring–Summer 1974), pp. 46–58.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

bloc, as the senior partner and by virtue of the applicability of Soviet experience to relations between the socialist states.[24]

THE policy of economic integration of East European countries, within the region and with the Soviet Union, is not a new one, but it has received new impetus in the seventies. Integration "from above" by means of supra-national planning and coordination was attempted by Secretary Khrushchev through the CMEA in the early sixties, but proved to be a failure, largely because of the resistance of some East European countries, notably Rumania. The Brezhnev-Kosygin leadership has initiated a far more effective method, that of a long range step-by-step integration "from below," beginning with the coordination of selective and more economically feasible aspects of East European economies. The two key vehicles of economic integration are joint planning and the division of labour among the socialist states, both conceived in terms of a step-by-step approach to specific issues and areas where joint action is needed. The approach is gradual, and allows for the development of bilateral as well as multilateral arrangements, to be pursued through the existing network of inter-state agencies, while simultaneously developing new "international" forms. The milestones in the development of CMEA as an instrument of economic integration have been the April 1969 conference which adopted a 25-point agreement on the coordination of economic activities; the establishment, in 1970–71, of an investment bank, and the adoption of the Comprehensive Programme of Socialist Economic Integration. A new standing committee for cooperation in planning was established (considered by some a major step in providing a framework for the integration of economic plans), and a beginning was made in joint scientific research, and in joint management in selected areas of economic endeavour such as management of fuel resources and production of certain types of commodities.[25] A June 1975 Budapest session of CMEA adopted an Agreed Plan for Multilateral Integration Measures, more detailed than any of the previous ones, which was hailed as the great achievement on the road to integration by a July 1975 session of the Central Committee of the CPSU.[26] The plan selected major problems for joint solutions including specific blueprints for their implementation, and provided for joint construction and financing of several major projects.

[24] K. Katushev, "Ukreplenie iedinstva sotsialisticheskikh stran—zakonomernost' razvitiia mirovogo sotsializma," *Kommunist*, no. 16, 1973, pp. 17–31.

[25] See Zbigniew M. Fallenbuchl, "East European Integration: Comecon," pp. 79–134, in John P. Hardt, ed. *Reorientation and Commercial Relations of the Economies of Eastern Europe*, a Compendium of Papers submitted to the Joint Economic Committee, Congress of the United States, 16 Aug. 1974 (Washington, D.C., 1974). Also, Michael M. Boll, "The Complex Integration Program for East Europe," *Military Review*, vol. 54, no. 4, (Apr. 1974), pp. 56–69.

[26] As reported in *Pravda* and *Izvestiya*, 9 July 1975. *The Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, vol. 27, no. 27, pp. 1–3. (Hereafter *CDSP*.)

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

East European states depend heavily on imports of Soviet raw materials, particularly fuels (of which the Soviet Union is the principal net supplier); they also need Soviet markets for exports of machinery, their major commodity, which, in most cases, is too outdated to sell in Western markets. There are thus strong economic forces pushing East Europeans towards greater dependence on the Soviets, and hence towards integration.[27] These have been strengthened in the wake of the 1973 inflation and its impact on the terms of East-West trade. The pattern of integration which emerges favours bilateral ties with the Soviet Union rather than multilateral regional integration and indicates a partial return to conditions characteristic of the 1950s.[28] Soviet fuel is sold to Eastern Europe at below world prices; East European industrial products are poorer in quality than those available from the West and the countries' dependence on Soviet credit supports is growing. On the whole the terms of East European trade are adverse to the Soviet Union and deteriorating, and the policy of integration appears disadvantageous to Soviet economic interests. In the words of one Western observer:

> Evidence indicates that there is a net cost to the Soviet Union which is measurable, large, and increasing—so that these costs now constitute a significant pressure for some type of economic disengagement by the Soviets from Eastern Europe. . . . The USSR is paying an increasingly steep price for the continued dependence of the East European countries on the Soviet Union.[29]

The situation thus created has resulted in a kind of paradox. On the one hand, CMEA economic integration, politically highly desirable for the Soviet Union, has imposed an increasingly onerous burden on the Soviet economy. For the East Europeans, on the other hand, it is economically indicated, but carries with it overtones of growing political dependence on the Soviet Union which most of them would give much to avoid. Some observers have questioned the sincerity of the Soviet Union's current promotion of integration in view of the economic loss that it has to sustain to keep its East European clients happy. In the eyes of this author at least, it seems that the economic price the Soviets have to pay is well worth it to them, particularly in view of the potential for political instability economic problems may engender (as they have in the past), in the area seen as vital to their security. This is not to say, however, that the Soviet Union has not already taken steps which would minimize their economic burden, such as East European investment in the development of Soviet raw materials, and provisions for gradual adjustment to world levels of the prices East Europe pays for Soviet fuel. Moreover, the Soviet economy benefits from the technology transfer attendant on East European trade with the West.

[27] Zbigniew M. Fallenbuchl, "Comecon Integration," *Problems of Communism*, March–April 1973, pp. 25–39.

[28] Based on oral comments by John P. Hardt, 20 Jan. 1976.

[29] Paul Marer, "Soviet Economic Policy in Eastern Europe," in Hardt, op. cit. p. 136.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

POLITICAL integration efforts receive much less attention in the West than those aimed at economic integration, and have largely escaped notice. They nevertheless spearhead the process and have been in the forefront of attention of the Soviet leaders. At the 24th congress of the CPSU Secretary Brezhnev stated:

> The Central Committee's attention has been constantly centered on questions of further cohesion and development of the world socialist system and relations with the fraternal socialist countries and their communist parties. . . .[30]

Developing the theme further, Brezhnev emphasized the importance the CPSU attaches to the development of cooperation between " fraternal " parties, and to the coordination of socialist states' activities in foreign policy.[31] Military cohesion is also seen as a vital aspect of political integration, the point reinforced by the General Secretary with a quote from Lenin:

> " We represent an alliance that requires close military unity, and any attempt to violate this unity we regard . . . as a betrayal of the struggle against international imperialism." To this day . . . [added General Secretary] . . . these words . . . are a sacred behest to all contingents of the socialist front fighting imperialism in the Leninist way. Remembering these words, we shall bend every effort to make the Warsaw Treaty Organization . . . still more powerful and to strengthen the joint defense capability of the socialist states.[32]

In line with the " sacred behest," the role of the Red Army, the core of WTO forces, has also been adjusted. It is now said to have entered a third stage of its development, where its task is to defend not only the Soviet motherland, but all the socialist countries:

> Following the emergence of the socialist world system and the establishment of the Warsaw Treaty political and military organization, the Soviet Army entered the third stage of its development. The Soviet Armed Forces have been confronted with new responsible missions. Today the task of defending socialism includes the defence of the gains not only of the peoples of the USSR, but of the other socialist countries as well.[33]

The Political Consultative Committee of the WTO is the highest body for political integration on the state-to-state basis. In addition to that,

[30] Brezhnev, op. cit. p. 82.

[31] Ibid. pp. 83–4.

[32] Ibid. p. 53.

[33] Col. A. Korkeshkin, " Strength of the Soviet Army " (pp. 58–60), *Soviet Military Review*, no. 11 (Nov. 1972), p. 60. It is interesting to note that the new role of the Red Army in the WTO context, and the principle of " socialist internationalism " and its application to relations of socialist states, are well covered in the Red Army political education programme. See, for example, Capt. A. Starovarov, " The Armed Forces of the Socialist States and their Combat Cooperation; A Guarantee of the Peace and Security of the Peoples," *Kommunist Vooruzhennykh Sil*, no. 17 (Sept. 1970), pp. 61–8. The article discusses a programme of lectures on the subject in great detail.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

and increasingly growing in importance, is the systematic and regular consultation of communist parties under the leadership of the CPSU. Initiated, at the top level, with leaders meeting at the communist parties' conference in 1969, it has since been regularized in annual meetings of first secretaries of East European parties and the CPSU,[34] as well as in numerous other multilateral and bilateral inter-party contacts. This is promoted to exchange experience, to review all forms of cooperation and common work on theoretical problems, and to coordinate policies in the light of common political, economic and other tasks.[35] It is reported that systematic contacts between parties are carried out on all levels and in many forms, with contacts between governments facilitated by bilateral party contacts and exchanges of party-state visits. It is difficult to overestimate the importance of these meetings, conferences, consultations, and mutual exchanges of experience, states the official journal of the CPSU:

> The Communist Party of the Soviet Union assigns major importance to the multivaried study of practical activities of fraternal parties, in depth and at all levels of leadership of state, social, economic and cultural life. It promotes all-round development of inter-party ties, keeping in mind that such cooperation contributes to the mutual enrichment of experience, helps to work out jointly the principal problems of construction of socialism and communism, finds more rational forms of economic ties, collectively charts common line in international affairs, exchanging views on work in ideology and culture. . . . The strengthening of the multifaceted cooperation between the CPSU and the fraternal parties is the hopeful pledge of the consolidation of unity of the socialist family of nations, and of the development and deepening of economic, political, cultural and ideological ties between member governments.[36]

While interparty contacts between the ruling parties are only beginning to develop, the pattern, as it emerges, is modelled closely on intraparty activities of the CPSU.

CULTURAL integration and the development of "internationalist" attitudes among member states is another important aspect of the overall integration effort, although, until now, the least developed. In the article quoted above, Secretary Katushev devotes much space to the discussion of the various measures of cultural integration, and gives

[34] The first meeting was the Crimea meeting in July 1972 (to which Rumania was not invited). This was followed by meetings in 1973, 1974 and in March 1975. At the 1972 meeting the following were present from the Soviet side: L. I. Brezhnev, A. A. Gromyko, the foreign minister but not yet a member of the Politbureau, B. N. Ponomarev, C. C. secretary in charge of relations with the non-ruling parties, and K. F. Katushev, C. C. secretary in charge of the relations with the ruling parties. See "V interesakh razvitiia sotsialisma i ukrepleniia mira," *Kommunist*, no. 12, 1973, pp. 3–11.

[35] Yagodovskii, op. cit. This and M. Yovchuk, "Aktual'nye voprosy ideologicheskoi raboty," *Partiinaia Zhizn*, no. 7, 1973, pp. 12–21.

[36] Yagodovskii, op. cit. p. 79.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

considerable details of cultural exchanges in the 1968–72 period, which ranged from exchanges in ideological work, joint activities such as cultural events, symposia and conferences among scholars, joint standing commissions, and joint publications, to regular contacts between Academies of Sciences. His message, however, is clear. So far the volume of cultural exchanges has been inadequate; it should be developed further in the direction of exchanges of cultural treasures, literature, art, festivals and fairs, and the establishment of regular ties between cultural and academic organizations.[37]

A random review of the press in the first half of 1975 indicates that in January there was a conference of editors of party historical journals in Warsaw, and a meeting of central committees' secretaries for ideological affairs in March in Prague, both of which overlap two categories of contacts: political and cultural. At the Sixth General Conference of the International Association of Universities, meeting in Moscow in August, the Rector of Moscow State University, Academician R. Khokhlov, discussed the possibility of integrating higher educational systems of the socialist countries:

> Over the next twenty to twenty-five years this cooperation [between the Soviet Union and other socialist countries] will deepen. It appears that there will come about an integration of the systems of higher education in the socialist countries that will provide their citizens with free access to all the institutions of higher learning in the countries of the Socialist Commonwealth, and allow a division of labor to be implemented in the basic training of certain types of specialists, in scientific research, in " adult education," and in other kinds of activity.[38]

Cultural integration measures are seen as particularly important, because they open up the possibilities for the development of a " new *culture* ":

> *socialist in content and national in form*, [whereby] . . . the cultures of the fraternal nations will lose neither their national color nor their national tone, [but] will continue to draw ever closer together in their aims, their humanist essence, and in their method and themes.[39]

The above formula, used also by other authoritative Soviet sources [40] strikes a familiar note. It is the same formula which has been applied, since the 1930s, to describe Soviet culture and the " successful solution " of the Soviet national problem.

[37] Katushev, op. cit. p. 26.

[38] *Izvestiya*, 22 Aug. 1975, as quoted in *Radio Liberty Research*, RL 459/75, 5 Nov. 1975.

[39] Katushev, op. cit. p. 27. (Italics mine.)

[40] See, for example, Azizian, op. cit. p. 363, in reference to cultural relations: " The principles of the friendship of the people, the mutual enrichment of cultures which are *socialist in content and national in form* (first adopted in the Soviet Union), have now been successfully adopted in relations between the socialist countries." (Italics mine.)

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

THE East European response to the Soviet theory of relations between socialist states and the policy of integration can be examined here only superficially, as it is reflected in the official statements by party leaders. For an analysis in depth, a separate study is required for each country. Briefly, the response varies and forms a basis for a three-fold division. In the first group are the countries which unequivocally and enthusiastically support the Soviet point of view in all its aspects, including the Soviet leading role in party and state matters. This group contains the German Democratic Republic, Bulgaria and, its enthusiasm somewhat muted and the interpretation largely riveted to its own special problems (the Czech-Slovak relations and the 1968 " fraternal assistance ") —Czechoslovakia.[41] Poland and Hungary are in a second group; while paying the required lip service to overall arrangements, their support is expressed primarily for economic integration measures and a coordinated foreign policy; their sovereign status within the bloc is explicitly underlined. Rumanians stand alone in the third group, rejecting the Soviet version of socialist internationalism in favour of national sovereignty, which they consider compatible with the general concept of internationalism. Rumania opposes the inter-party aspects of the arrangements and rejects common foreign policy, but has been cooperating selectively (if reluctantly) on a state-to-state basis.

In view of past historical experience and domestic requirements the line-up seems logical. GDR has much to gain and little to lose under the arrangements. It has expectations of an increasingly important role within the " fraternal family," by virtue of its economic strength and organizational and technical know-how.[42] Its national base, in a divided Germany, derives strength from its membership in the bloc and from Soviet tutelage. To Bulgaria, economically least developed and historically dependent on Russian support, the arrangement is advantageous. Czechoslovakia, in the aftermath of 1968, has little choice but to go along with the scheme. The Polish and Hungarian leadership has to contend with historical nationalism and anti-Russian attitudes, the requirements of domestic political stability and national interests. Rumania, since the sixties, has embodied national sovereignty in the centre of its own ideology and is loath to give up the room for manoeuvring it has achieved within the bloc as well as outside.

[41] Mongolia, a member of the CMEA, and in good standing within the " socialist family of nations," also belongs in this group. In fact, Mongolia has progressed the furthest on the road to integration with the Soviet Union and, in most aspects, except in its formal independent status, resembles the Soviet Central Asian republics more closely than it does the East European countries. For examples of its attitudes, see reports from the Brezhnev-Marshal Tsedenbal meeting in Nov. 1974, *CDSP*, vol. 26, no. 48, pp. 1–5.

[42] The East Germans are reported to play an increasingly important role in CMEA affairs. In a historical throwback one is reminded of the traditional Russo-German alliance for control of Eastern Europe, a memory which may well make East Europeans uncomfortable.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

"Our future plans"—said GDR's Erich Honecker, First Secretary of the Socialist Unity Party (SED)—

> are implanted *in the historical process of merger* within the socialist community of nations, the economic integration of our countries, which is visibly accelerating now. . . . The integration of the national economies correlates with all developments which *draw us closer together*. . . . Common traditions and new ties evolve, and their historic permanence is based on their social character, their relevance to the authority of the working class. *In this socialist family of nations we find the present and future of our republic.*[43]

Honecker also plainly states his loyalty to the Soviet Union:

> The relationship with the CPSU and with the Soviet Union . . . [is] the touchstone of loyalty to the cause of the working class and to Marxism-Leninism. Without the brotherly bond with the Soviet Union no one will be a true communist. . . .[44]

Bulgaria's Tane Tsolov, member of the Politbureau of the Bulgarian Communist Party and first deputy prime minister, is not far behind. Speaking in an interview for the Bulgarian Radio he said:

> I would like to emphasize the fact that Bulgaria's integration within the CMEA framework depends to the utmost on the degree, scale, and rates of the integrational processes with the Soviet Union . . . in the future . . . our country will take a most active part in expanding fraternal cooperation and deepening socialist economic integration on the basis of the closest rapprochement with the Soviet economy. . . . By its active participation in the integrational process Bulgaria's national economy will gradually become an organic and inseparable part of the united world socialist cooperative.[45]

The organ of the Bulgarian Central Committee also expressed unequivocal support for the integration with the Soviet Union:

> We cannot imagine present-day Bulgaria and even its future without growing integration and ever closer rapprochement with the Soviet Union in all spheres of economic and cultural life.[46]

It may be remembered that there was a rumour quoted by Western news services in the early spring of 1975 that Bulgaria was considering becoming the 16th republic of the Soviet Union. Statements above would make a decision of this type not totally unexpected.

[43] As quoted by Gerhard Weiss in *Einheit*, Jan. 1974, pp. 24–33, in *Translations on Eastern Europe*; "Economic and Industrial Affairs," No. 1049, JPRS 61298, 22 Feb. 1974, pp. 10–21. (Italics mine.)

[44] Erich Honecker in *Neuer Weg*, no. 24, December 1972, pp. 105–110, Ibid. *Political, Sociological and Military Affairs*, no. 673, JPRS 58298, 22 Feb. 1973, pp. 1–10.

[45] Tane Tsolov, "One of the Most Remarkable Phenomena in the Development of the World Socialist System," interview for the Bulgarian Radio, pp. 23–28, *Information Bulletin*, Central Committee of the Bulgarian Communist Party, No. 2, Year XXVIII, Sofia, 1974, p. 25 and p. 28.

[46] "Jubilee Year of the Socialist Revolution in Bulgaria" (*Novo Vreme*, no. 1, 1974), ibid. p. 51.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The view of integration with a lower degree of enthusiasm is represented by Edward Gierek, First Secretary of the Polish United Workers' Party:

> Of major importance for the future development of Poland and its position among other countries are the fraternal relations and ideological bonds of unbreakable alliance of friendship and cooperation with the great Soviet Union. . . . We have prepared a joint cooperation program for the next five year period with particular emphasis on a considerable increase of mutually beneficial economic cooperation. . . . Thus while undertaking new tasks, we are attaching special importance to further tightening economic, scientific, and technical links with the Soviet Union. . . . The People's Republic of Poland will in its foreign policy, as it has been doing, consistently strengthen the comprehensive fraternal relations with the Soviet Union and other socialist countries.[47]

He nevertheless strongly underscores the "fundamental importance of the fraternal relations with the Soviet Union for the Polish People"[48] and the value, to Poland, of the membership in the socialist commonwealth:

> The dynamic development of the countries of the socialist community and the tightening of links between them raise the strength and heighten the position of the entire socialist community. The community's power and ideological unity, the close cooperation between its member countries, in particular with its leading power—the Soviet Union—are the basic guarantees of success of each of our peoples.[49]

Similar themes were echoed by the Hungarian party leaders. Speaking at the 11th Congress of the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party in March 1975, First Secretary Janos Kadar expressed strong support for the socialist commonwealth and the ties with the Soviet Union:

> As in the past, we will also in the future systematically endeavor to actively promote the strengthening of the unity of the socialist countries and the deepening of the manifold political, economic, cultural and ideological cooperation.
>
> We attach particular significance to their constant strengthening of our deep and unbreakable friendship with the Soviet Union. . . . The Congress can note with satisfaction that Hungarian-Soviet friendship is cloudless: relations between our parties and peoples are fraternal and unbreakable.[50]

[47] Speech to the 18th Plenum of the Central Committee of the Polish United Workers' Party, 4 Sept. 1975, quoted in FBIS-EE, 5 Sept. 1975.

[48] Report at the 7th Congress of the PUWP, January 1976, as reported in the *Press Release*, Embassy of the Polish People's Republic, Washington, D.C., p. 3.

[49] Speech to the 11th Congress of the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party, 19 Mar. 1975 (quoted in FBIS-EE, 24 Mar. 1975).

[50] Speech to the 11th Congress of the HWSP, 17 Mar. 1975 (quoted in FBIS-EE, 18 Mar. 1975).

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Expressions of loyalty to the Soviet Union were echoed by Antal Apro, Central Committee Secretary and a member of the Hungarian Politbureau:

> It is a consequence of our principled policy that we are constantly strengthening and broadening our fraternal friendship with the liberating Soviet Union. . . .[51]

East European leaders were quoted at length in a 1973 issue of the CPSU official journal on the subject of the value of Soviet experience in national relations for the relations among the socialist countries, and their acknowledgement of the CPSU leading role.[52] These included President Ceausescu of Rumania. Ceausescu, nevertheless, is the one East European communist leader who stubbornly refuses to abandon the "national" for the "international" principle. The Rumanian Communist Party's view, cast in impeccable Marxist-Leninist terms, insists that each socialist nation has to develop its capacity fully before true internationalism can be achieved. The Rumanians argue that the development of the socialist system "does not . . . lead to the disappearance of the nation, but raises it onto a superior stage . . . (that of) the socialist nation":

> The Rumanian Communist Party permanently has in view the objective law of nations drawing nearer on the basis of equal and free cooperation; the prospect that in a future stage of social development, [that of fully developed communism], some essential differences between nations would gradually disappear; that there would be a multilateral close collaboration among them. Having in mind this very historical prospect, greatest attention must be granted to the development of the nations. . . . Society is still far from the time when the nation will have ended its historical mission, and the dialectical process of the drawing together of the nations in no case means the reduction of the nation's role, but the development and powerful affirmation of each nation. . . . The Marxist-Leninist parties should do everything for the development and assertion of the nations, for the defense of national independence. . . . Between the national and international interests of the peoples, there is not only no contradiction but, on the contrary, there is full dialectical unity. The preoccupation for the strengthening and development of one's own nation is in no case the expression of national narrow-mindedness, does not run counter in any way to the requirements of proletarian internationalism. . . .[53]

[51] Ibid.

[52] "Po stranitsam zhurnalov bratskikh partii. Sovetskii Soiuz veren znameni sotsializma i mira," *Kommunist*, no. 2, 1973, pp. 56–63.

[53] "Draft of the Norms," pp. 143–169, *Documents, Natonal Conference of the Rumanian Communist Party*, 19–21 July 1972, Rumanian News Agency, Agerpress, pp. 159–161.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Yugoslavia After the Tenth Party Congress

Jacob Walkin

IT is undoubtedly a truism to say of Yugoslavia today that it has one of the most singular political systems ever known. That it is different from the Soviet political system and that of other "orthodox" communist states is widely known, but how and why it is different and the precise significance of the Yugoslav political transformation have not yet received the attention they deserve. The issue has unquestionably been obscured since autumn 1972, when as a result of the initiative taken by Tito in the so-called "Tito letter," the Yugoslav party has reaffirmed its "leading role," its right to intervene in all aspects of Yugoslav life, its "monolithic" unity, the principle of "democratic centralism," and has condemned once more liberalism and pluralism, now also even "spontaneity." Given these developments, upheld at the 10th Party congress held in Belgrade on 27–30 May 1974, the question could be raised of how different Yugoslavia really is from the Soviet Union or whether the Yugoslav party was not returning to the total centralism which it had long condemned as Cominformism, Stalinism, étatism, administratism, and the like.

This writer spent part of the summer of 1974 in Yugoslavia trying to determine how much conditions had changed since his last visit in 1971. He is prepared to affirm that the changes have not been basic and that the party's new rhetoric has been much more spectacular than its practice. The Yugoslav party is still miles apart from the Soviet or any other ruling communist party; the unique form of genuine federalism introduced in 1971 giving every republic and autonomous province an effective veto on much federal legislation remains intact. Also intact are such older forms of decentralization as the market economy and its network of enterprises free to make their own decisions on enterprise operations. Despite the continued dominance of the party, the Yugoslav political system is a dynamic one very different from the Soviet model of totalitarianism. Moreover many of its institutions are *sui generis*, never previously tried elsewhere, and not therefore subject to the guidance of precedent.

II

IF the distinction between the two political systems is to be understood, then the distinction between totalitarianism and authoritarianism must also be understood. I have attempted to explain this distinction at some length in another article,[1] but a brief summary is in order here. It is a

[1] "Some Contrasts Between the Tsarist and Communist Political Systems," to appear in a forthcoming issue of *New Review* (Toronto).

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

distinctive aspect of the Soviet regime that it attempts to control Soviet society totally. In Leninist theory, which is still Soviet theory, only the party, by which is meant the party leadership, can make political decisions, and it is the sacred duty of everybody else to obey them. Of course deviations from this pattern are massive, and the theory does not give an accurate description of how the system actually works. But it is equally inaccurate to discard the theory as totally irrelevant; party leaders have traditionally made important decisions in complete secrecy and the system has remained viable despite a traditional emphasis on heavy industry as against consumer goods which no people would ever consciously accept.

One factor, certainly, in the successful operation of the communist regimes is the distinctive system of thought control they have imposed for which there is no parallel in any non-communist regime, past or present. Unique is the party's attempt to provide for every subject exactly what he should think about politics, society, economics, and even private morality. The party's monopoly of all media of communication, as well as its control of all public organizations, ensures that only the party's message reaches all citizens. The party is able to obtain the people's obedience sufficiently to make the system work only because outside interference with the party's indoctrination is reduced to a minimum. The world outside, in substance any non-communist regime, is *ipso facto* infected with evil and is doomed to ultimate extinction. This alleged unchanging and inflexible hostility of the outside world to a communist regime justifies the party in isolating the people over whom it rules, controlling the movement of its citizens abroad and the admission of aliens to its home territory.

Authoritarian regimes may share some of the practices characteristic of the Soviet type of thought control but not all. Most authoritarian regimes institute preventive censorship intended to block out criticism which the authorities deem to be destructive. The effectiveness of such preventive censorship is dubious; it is certainly no substitute for the carefully selected information released to the public in the Soviet Union. Authoritarian states do not have the means available to totalitarian states to prevent the rise of an independent public opinion and they do not have the means to cajole public opinion to go where it does not wish to go. They must, in short, have a minimum of public support, passive or active, to survive. This is true of South Korea and Spain; it is also true of Yugoslavia and it was true of the former regimes in South Vietnam, Greece and Portugal.

If the Soviet leadership has succeeded in satisfying its public to the extent necessary to maintain stability, it is because it keeps its people isolated and ignorant. The Soviet system of thought control is one of the pillars of the regime. Without it the regime would probably collapse. The party leaders themselves seem to make this assumption and there is no reason to question it.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

III

THAT Yugoslavia is different from the Soviet Union, and fundamentally different, even if the Yugoslavs call themselves communist and Marxist, is apparent from the fact that its frontiers are open. Most Yugoslavs now have no difficulty in getting a passport, are no longer required to obtain exit visas, may take vacations or go to live and work freely in Western Europe or elsewhere, and may return home at will. It is generally accepted that there are about a million Yugoslavs living abroad, most of them temporary workers in Western Europe, the majority in West Germany, some with their families and some without. The majority are young, mostly under thirty, and most will return home when economically feasible. The Yugoslav government welcomes their return home, and it as well as the republic governments are constantly concerned with measures which would encourage them to return. The Yugoslav political system has long since passed the point at which the government and party need fear that Yugoslav workers know too much about how their counterparts in "capitalist" countries live or that they might become infected by "bourgeois" ideology.

It is also true that Yugoslavia is one of the most relaxed countries in the world in so far as entry for aliens is concerned. Since the mid-1960s, the Yugoslav government has sought agreements with other governments providing for the reciprocal abolition of visas for their citizens. The 1974 edition of the *Statistical Pocket Book of Yugoslavia* lists 38 countries, the citizens of which do not require visas to enter Yugoslavia, but the book does not appear to be up to date, and the number of countries is certainly greater. The citizens of other countries (including the United States, which will not consent to abolition of visas for aliens) maintaining diplomatic and consular relations with Yugoslavia can readily obtain visas at the border.

Most astonishing of all in view of the tight border controls the Soviet Union maintains is the Yugoslav-American teenage exchange programme. Begun in 1968 by the Michigan-based Youth for Understanding, with the American Field Service following in 1969, in recent years well over 100 Yugoslav teenagers have gone to the United States to live with an American family for a year while attending high school. In the academic year 1974–75, the number was reduced to 25, all sponsored by the American Field Service, the programme of Youth for Understanding, which in the past has sponsored as many as 121 Yugoslavs in one year, having been suspended temporarily, apparently for non-political reasons.[2] Communist countries like to send students to the United States to study, but they come as mature students usually to study technology and they are kept under careful control. To send high school students to live with American families is to invite upbringing inconsistent with communist

[2] For further details on the suspension of the programme of Youth for Understanding, see *Borba*, 15 June 1974, and NIN, 16 June 1974.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

objectives, and for the time being at least only unorthodox Yugoslavia is ready to do it.

YUGOSLAVIA has no free press in any recognizable sense in which we use that term. Even before the recent purges among journalists and editors and the renewed insistence that the press always promote party objectives, Tito and others were constantly emphasizing that there can be no freedom in Yugoslavia for foes of socialism. Little diversity can be found in the daily press in the comment on foreign affairs and the diversity in the comment on domestic affairs, while important, is limited; printing broadsides against the regime is a criminal offence punishable by a stiff jail sentence. What is different about the Yugoslav press is that it is reasonably objective. In general the daily press is much more stimulating and informative than the Soviet press, although slogans and cliches are still plentiful. The Yugoslavs have long since given up the stultifying ideological outlook of Soviet communism with its rigid black and white outlook on domestic and world affairs. Reporting is free of the deliberate lying and distortion so prominent in the Soviet press and it is not unusual for a popular paper like *Politika* to carry articles translated from the *New York Times* and other Western and Eastern newspapers. Yugoslav papers are much more substantial than the four or six page Soviet newspapers and cover a wide range of subjects likely to interest their readers; otherwise nobody will buy them. In addition, a wide selection of newspapers and periodicals in various languages from the United States and Western Europe is available.

IV

IF the Yugoslav and Soviet political systems are to be considered as distinctly different, then it must be demonstrated that the communist party of each has a different role to play. Central to the contrasting roles the two parties do play is the fact that the League of Communists (LCY) has given up the myth that there are no conflicts inside Yugoslavia, that the League leadership alone makes decisions *in camera* which necessarily benefit all elements of the population, and that all elements must obey and carry out party decisions on pain of punishment. It is probably true that so long as the Communist Party of the Soviet Union maintains this position, then the flexibility of its internal and external policies and the possibility of fundamental change in these policies will remain severely limited. Conversely, the first sign that the party is turning to a more imaginative and constructive policy than it has so far displayed would probably have to start with the admission that there are conflicts which have to be resolved within the Soviet Union and that party fiat cannot resolve them. Needless to say, the outlook for any such development in the Soviet party appears to be exceedingly poor for the foreseeable future.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Since the Yugoslavs do acknowledge conflicts of interest and have abandoned what they refer to scornfully as the fiction of abstract unity, there is no intention to abandon the decentralization they have practised for many years but on the contrary to deepen it. There is also no thought of returning to a system of imposed solutions reached by party leaders in secret and carried out without discussion or debate by the public. Because of the abandonment of the latter technique, it is probably true to say that every phase of the Yugoslav political system has been affected in important ways, even if the party retains its dominant role and is re-emphasizing its dominance. To fully understand this point, it should be kept in mind that the one interest, one party doctrine is not only a myth, but has also served as a cover whereby the party promotes above all its own vested interests. The party's primary objective in the Soviet Union from 1917 to the present day has been the preservation of its own power. Stalin's devotion to his own security was one-sided and obvious. His successors have to pay more attention to the wishes of their constituents, but the preservation of their own power surely remains the most important component of their policy decisions.

Since the Yugoslav party has ceased to impose decisions reflecting its own vested interests on the people, there is no longer any need for that all-pervasive conspiratorial atmosphere so characteristic of the Soviet party; or for that matter of the Yugoslav party when the writer first came to Yugoslavia to work in the American Embassy in 1956. At that time members of the party kept their distance from Americans and while limited social contact with government and party officials was feasible, they could not say much beyond the official slogans. One of the most refreshing changes the writer found in the summer of 1971 after an absence of 13 years was the readiness of many party members to talk freely about affairs of state. Naturally, not all party members are available, but most are. Returning in the summer of 1974, the writer would have had to guess whether one or another contact was not possible for political or other reasons. However officers at the American Embassy did maintain that the atmosphere was more restrictive for them. Nevertheless, the writer would also argue that there was no qualitative change from the freer atmosphere of 1971, and certainly no shift to significantly more party secrecy. As a matter of fact, party officials state that in view of the leading role of the LCY, it is legitimate for visiting political scientists to ask whatever questions they wish about the LCY. Naturally, this is what they would be expected to say, and naturally also, forthright answers will not always be given to forthright questions. Further developments remain to be seen, but, if it is true that decision-making in Yugoslavia is not held from public view, then the truth is the best antidote to the distorted impressions concerning Yugoslav policy about which Tito and the others have been so sensitive.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

V

PRIOR to the Tito letter of 1972, it was constantly asserted in the Yugoslav press that the Yugoslav system of self-management works best if the public is kept informed of developments in the decision-making centres, even at the highest levels. There appears to have been little change in this since the Tito letter, except of course that the emphasis has been on the need for the party to control the press and keep out alien influences. Aside from the renewed emphasis on party control, the party claims to be deepening self-management through the basic organizations of associated labour and the delegate system (both discussed below). Clearly, the delegates cannot be expected to make decisions without information, regardless of the level at which they operate, and the workers whose views the delegates are supposed to reflect cannot know what their best interests are without information.[3] A check of the press shows that meetings of the party presidium are announced in advance and the substance of what is said by many party leaders is usually reported in the press. It is usually announced when the Executive Committee of the LCY Presidium will meet and what they will discuss, but the substance of the comments by individual members is not usually printed. Meetings of the Executive Committees or the Central Committees at republic level are usually reported in detail. A party information specialist in Belgrade confirmed to the writer in the summer of 1974 the accuracy of these observations. He asserted that Yugoslav (but not foreign) reporters may cover the meetings of all forums except the LCY Executive Committee and the Federal Executive Council (FEC), the latter allegedly only because of the impracticability of admitting to every session as many as 50 correspondents who would wish to attend. This general rule does not exclude the possibility of exceptions announced in advance so that meetings of organizations other than the Executive Committee and the FEC may be held behind closed doors for one or more sessions.

A device frequently used by the principal publications, daily and weekly, is to invite a high government or party official to meet with the

[3] Article 168 of the 1974 constitution formulates information policy as follows: " The press, radio and television and other media of information shall be bound to inform the public truthfully and objectively and to make public the opinions and information of bodies, organizations and citizens which are of concern to the public." It should be recalled that the adverbs " truthfully " and " objectively " have no place in the Soviet scheme of things. Information in the Soviet Union is class oriented, either proletarian or capitalist.

There are various formulations of information policy to be found in the Yugoslav press. The seventh congress of the League of Communists of Serbia adopted a resolution on 25 April 1974 in part as follows: " Proceeding from the view that the possession of full information by the working class and the working people . . . represents an essential prerequisite for a direct, involved and informed participation of the working class and the working people in decision making . . . the Seventh LCS Congress charges the organizations, leaderships and all communists with the task of struggling for . . . insuring the public nature of work wherever political decisions are made. . . ." *Politika*, 27 Apr. 1974 Supplement.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

editors for a question and answer session; both questions and answers are then printed. The same procedure is sometimes followed on television and sometimes the transcript of the television interview is printed in a newspaper or weekly. The subjects discussed are sensitive and the information value of these interviews is of course high. If in spite of all the above, it is still possible to read in the Yugoslav press copious amounts of stereotyped verbiage without tangible meaning, perhaps the Slovenian party leader, Franz Popit, gave at least one possible explanation in an interview some years ago with the editors of NIN. Since, he said, the party leadership pretends to follow the interests only of the working class when in fact party leaders have other interests in mind, then candour is inhibited and they have become addicted to the language of diplomacy.[4] Since the Popit interview, the stress on the party as the party of the working class has increased. After the issue of the Tito letter and the purge of so many leaders in the communications media, competent observers of the Yugoslav media agree that the press and television have become duller than they were before. However, it should be kept in mind that the change is one of degree only and that the Yugoslav media remain vastly more informative and more objective than their Soviet counterparts. It is also important to keep in mind that the Yugoslavs have long abandoned the agit-prop approach to information, i.e. the maintenance by the party of an army of propagandists intended to bring the party line to the masses by means of oral agitation.

VI

IN considering the present position of the party and the new emphasis on its leading role, it is also important to consider the reported reduction in the size of the police, as well as the certainty that the police have played a reduced role in Yugoslav society since the ousting of Rankovic in 1966. One key to the changed position of the police is the lack of interest shown in the position of Federal Secretary for Internal Affairs by the republics. The republics used to be interested in obtaining their share of positions in the Federal Secretariat for Internal Affairs under the inter-republican agreement on parity formerly affecting 140 administrative positions in the federal government. Now their interest has shifted to those federal functions " which dispose of large material funds." [5]

The validity of this point was illustrated when the position of Secretary for Internal Affairs went begging at the end of July 1971 just as a new Federal Executive Council was being organised following the adoption of 23 amendments to the constitution. The writer was in Yugoslavia at the time and heard from authoritative sources that the position had been offered to two men of stature but both had declined it,

[4] NIN, 18 June 1972.
[5] NIN, 2 Apr. 1972.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

in part because most of the functions of the Federal Secretariat of Internal Affairs are now lodged primarily in the republic secretariats. Even state security, still a federal function, must have the cooperation of the republics. Ultimately appointed to the position was Luka Banovic, then a relatively obscure 45-year old Montenegrin who had risen within the ranks of the Secretariat and served as Acting Secretary from June to December 1971.

Banovic is now President of the Committee on Internal Affairs of the Federal Assembly, his place as Federal Secretary having been assigned in May 1974 to Franjo Herljevic, a 59-year old Croat from Bosnia who is a Colonel-General in the Yugoslav Army and who was elected to the LCY Central Committee by the 10th Party congress in May 1974. Given the division of the police function between the republics and the federal government as well as the lack of interest in the position of Secretary for Internal Affairs previously manifested, it hardly seems likely that the appointment of an Army general with high party status must be interpreted as an attempt to place state security firmly in the hands of the military. It seems much more likely that the job was offered to a competent administrator who was unable to refuse it. The position does after all still have significance, as was shown by the infiltration of 19 Ustasi guerrillas in 1972, the explosion in the Belgrade railway station in 1973 and the arrest of the pro-Soviet Cominformists only a month before Herljevic's appointment. Certainly the appointment of an Army General to head the police has so far not signified any increase in police repression of the population.

The reduced influence of the police, the ending of the conspiratorial approach to decision-making by the party already referred to as well as the shift in the party's priorities toward a balanced economic development, these and other developments appear to have brought about the neutralization of the massive potential opposition created by the regime's originally harsh treatment of the population. The presence of this opposition was unmistakable during the writer's stay in Yugoslavia from 1956 to 1958 as an officer of the American Embassy. Because the regime has moved so far in the direction of becoming the servant rather than the master of the people and because of striking improvements in the standard of living during the last 10 years, party and people have a much more relaxed attitude toward each other than was true earlier. This is not to imply that the relations betwen party and people are now idyllic, but it does appear to be true that the party's former distrust of the people has been dropped and that the smouldering opposition of the people to the party has on the whole disappeared. The writer first noted this shift in a visit to Yugoslavia in the summer of 1971; he saw nothing in the summer of 1974 which would require any change in this assessment. The stress on the unity of the party of the last few years has not been accompanied by any change in the party's attitude toward the people nor by a significant reduction in the basic rights acquired by the people.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Purges, trials and dismissals from jobs have affected only a small part of the population particularly exposed to charges of liberalism, nationalism and other alleged transgressions, including some cases of *de facto* violations of Yugoslav law.

VII

WITH the grip of the party and police relaxing, it was inevitable that the fiction of the harmony of interests among the republics deduced from the establishment of a Marxist order break down, that the republics acquire increasing powers of autonomy in relation to the federation and that the federation gradually be converted from an ersatz to a real federation. By the fall of 1970 it became apparent that if the federation was to work at all, the republics would have to be allowed to make their own decisions on the full range especially of economic matters on which disputes tended to be most tendentious. The necessary changes were made in two stages, the first in July 1971 when 23 amendments to the 1963 constitution were adopted, followed in February 1974 by the adoption of a new constitution, unique not only in many of its features but also containing a text longer than any other written constitution on earth. The 1971 amendments and the 1974 constitution give the six constituent republics and the two autonomous provinces within Serbia virtually complete jurisdiction within their own territories. To the federation is left only defence, foreign affairs, and money, banking and other economic matters which would create a single market within Yugoslavia. Moreover as concerns these economic functions and the question of a single market, the amendments and the new constitution provide that federal laws may be made only with the unanimous consent of the six republics and the two autonomous provinces. The federal budget also requires unanimous consent since most taxes except for customs fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of the republics and provinces. To an extent unique among existing federations, the federal government must now have the active cooperation of the republics and autonomous provinces in formulating and carrying out federal policies. In addition, considerable powers of self-government, including powers of taxation, have been granted to the communal assemblies below the republic level.

In announcing the coming reorganization of the government in September 1970 in Zagreb, Tito expressed the hope that there would be no more skirmishing between republics and between the republics and the federation. When the Yugoslav party governed à la Soviet, proclaimed that the nationality problem had *ipso facto* been solved and itself made all decisions for the federation and the republics, the dissatisfied republics bitterly attacked the federal government and were jealous of each other. Regime spokesmen may well be right in asserting that now that the republics and provinces have a say in determining federal policies, they regard them as their own and are prepared to live with them. The test

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

of course will come when Tito leaves the scene. If, by that time, the republics and provinces have learned to protect their own interests while compromising to the extent necessary to protect Yugoslav interests as well, the future of the federation seems assured. This observer is inclined to agree with the opinion of some informed Yugoslavs that barring outside interference the Yugoslav federation and state will survive the passing of Tito.[6]

VIII

APART from the transformation of the federation to more democratic and equal foundations intended to resolve one of the most difficult nationality problems to be found anywhere, the 1971 amendments and the new 1974 constitution also projected bold new advances in the sphere of self-management intended to place decision-making securely in the hands of the workers and to free them from the grip of self-seeking managerial personnel and bureaucrats. The key institutions created are the basic organizations of associated labour and the delegate system; they can be described here only in the most simplified form.[7] The basic organization of associated labour (BOAL) is the lowest feasible income-producing unit which can be distinguished in a large enterprise and through which the workers may exercise their self-managing rights, e.g. determining how the unit's gross income is to be divided between personal income for each worker and investment. By electing a workers' council in such a unit employing about a hundred workers instead of a huge enterprise employing thousands, the workers may more easily acquire the information they need to actually assume a decision-making role. If a BOAL is part of a larger enterprise it elects delegates to an enterprise workers' council, where in conjunction with delegates from the other BOALs, they make decisions for the enterprise as a whole, including fixing the salaries of the director and other administrative personnel.

Better control than in the past of the actions of the enterprise directors is of course one of the fundamental aims of the organization of the BOALs, and the new situation they face is obviously not to the liking of some of them. A Professor of Law of the University of Belgrade, speaking in July 1974, stated that in the last year and a half, as many as 200 directors of Belgrade enterprises have left their jobs, some voluntarily, some by action of the local party organizations. Unlike the situation obtaining for some time before the Tito letter, directors must now have the approval of the enterprise party organization in addition to the

[6] Tito has stated more than once that because of advancing age, he has been able to devote his energy only to foreign affairs. Although he has been and remains the final arbiter on internal affairs, he has evidently not been responsible for day-to-day internal decisions for many years.

[7] A detailed explanation of the basic organizations of labour and the delegate system is available in English, Edward Kardelj, " Principal Causes and Trends of Constitutional Changes," *Socialist Thought and Practice* (Belgrade), No. 52, May 1973; 53, June 1973; 54, July 1973.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

workers' council if they are to be hired. Moreover, in this new phase of self-management, the aim is to give the workers control as well over banks, insurance companies, and trading enterprises, the managers of which, disposing of assets not really earned by them, have become "alienated" from the workers. Consequently, the productive enterprises which have contributed to the assets of these non-productive enterprises are to have a voice in their management through the sending of delegates from the investing BOALs to the management of the banks, insurance companies and trading enterprises. In general the new Yugoslav constitution envisages the BOAL as the basis of all society with the interrelations between them regulated in part by legislative law but mostly by self-managing agreements and social compacts among these BOALs.[8]

Yugoslav communists will readily admit that they do not really know whether or not these bold conceptions of industrial democracy will work, and that there are no precedents to which they can turn for guidance. If they do not work, they will be abandoned and something else tried.

Also introduced by the 1974 constitution has been a system of delegations to replace conventional parliamentary-electoral representation. The difficulty with electoral representation in the Yugoslav view is that the representatives tend to be professional politicians who manipulate their constituency instead of carrying out their wishes. The real difficulty may be that representatives who acquire a firm foothold among the voters of their districts would be less amenable to party control than delegates. The alleged advantage of the system of delegations is that the delegates are non-professionals elected by their work organizations or other appropriate communities, continue to be paid by their work organizations, must keep in touch with their colleagues in the work organizations, and carry out their wishes in voting whether in the communal, republic or federal assembly to which they are elected. If their fellow workers do not feel that the delegates are carrying out their wishes, then the delegates may be recalled at any time, regardless of the term for which they are elected. However, it is recognized that in practice the delegates cannot literally carry out only the wishes of their fellow workers, since their interests must be compromised with the interests of other organizations sending delegates.

IX

IN theory, too, delegates elected to the federal assembly will literally remain amateurs, continuing to do their job in the factory in which they work, while attending to the business of the federal assembly after hours. In an interview with *Borba* published on 3 August 1974, Kiro Gligorov, President of the Federal Assembly, actually asserted that more than half of the delegates of the newly-elected assembly maintain regular work-

[8] Articles 10–131 of the 1974 constitution, more than a quarter of all articles, are devoted to basic organizations of associated labour and their operation.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

employment relationships in which they are preoccupied with their regular everyday tasks. It is questionable, however, whether such amateur legislators can function at all effectively and it seems entirely possible that Gligorov's statement is one of theory, not practice. He was in fact repeating routinely the previously agreed formula on the number of delegates to the Federal Assembly who should represent basic organizations of associated labour.

One official told the writer that delegates to the national assembly will in fact not remain at work in their local factories, that they will become full-time legislators but that they would continue to draw their pay from a basic organization of associated labour. Compromise on the theory was excluded only on the matter of pay from the BOAL. It is the writer's opinion that Gligorov was referring to the theory, not the practice, and that the LCY has no intention of reversing the historic trend of increasing the decision-making powers of the assemblies at all levels or of reverting to Soviet-style assemblies which approve unanimously all bills placed before them.[9]

Moreover, the delegates, whether professional or amateur, must have information to do their jobs, and not only they but also the workers whom they represent. One information specialist told the writer that the party is not satisfied that the present press is giving the workers the information they need or that the level of expertise of Yugoslav journalists is as high as it should be. For the delegates, additional information is a must, and the writer heard from several sources that under consideration is a journal, newspaper or information bulletin to be distributed exclusively to the delegates. Presumably consideration will be given later to making the journal, newspaper, or bulletin available to the general public.

In general, the governmental assemblies, commune, republic and national, are most certainly not rubber stamps for the decisions of their respective executives, and may and do reject legislative proposals placed before them. As one Yugoslav specialist on the Federal Assembly points out, one reason for its growing importance as the supreme law-making body for the federation is the relative frequency of its sessions, especially of its committees. The rules of procedure of the Assembly explicitly state that it is in continuous session except for two months during the summer, and neither its convening nor proroguing depend on other organs of the federation. Although most laws are proposed by the Federal Executive Council, there are times when the Council withdraws a bill before a formal vote recognizing that it will meet defeat or when as a result of the

[9] Supporting the writer's view is *Radio Free Europe Research*, " Yugoslav Assembly Discusses Economic Situation," No. 2094, 31 July 1974. The report points out that for the first time a report to be presented by a vice-premier was published several days in advance of the discussion and distributed to members of the assembly. The report comments that " the discussion in both chambers of the National Assembly was at an unusually high level " and that " the position of the assembly vis-à-vis the Federal Government in the discussion appeared stronger and more assertive than in the past."

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

debate in a committee, it has changed its position on the bill.[10] Among the recent examples of rejection of bills proposed by the executive to the Federal Assembly is a bill on the press in March 1972 which would have significantly tightened the press laws, and in February 1973 a bill which would have amended the penal code in order to tighten pre-trial investigation in favour of the government.[11] Public decisions in Yugoslavia, wherever they originate, must reflect public consensus to an extent still inconceivable in the Soviet Union.

X

IF the party's continued dominance is no longer based on its ability to enforce its decisions by administrative means, then of critical importance for this dominance has been its cohesion and discipline as a group and its readiness to suppress any other group which dares to compete in policy-making in any sphere. Precisely when the federation was democratized in 1971 and the party appeared to have become six republic and two provincial organizations the agreement of which was essential to the making of federal policy, an outburst of extreme nationalism occurred in Croatia which probably played the most important role in triggering the Tito letter and the recent stress on " monolithic " unity Croatian nationalists and counter-revolutionary centres abroad, as in the party. There is no evidence of any connexion between the jailed charged by the prosecution in their trials, but there seems little doubt that if their brand of nationalism had spread to the masses, then both the federation and party dominance would have been threatened.[12] In December 1971, at Tito's behest, those top Croatian party leaders who had tolerated the activities of the nationalists were forced to resign and were expelled from the party about six months later. Widespread purges of those suspected of complicity in the nationalist movement followed in Croatia in the party, the media, the government, and the public organizations.

Nine months later, the Tito letter was issued with the concurrence of the eight-man Executive Bureau of the Party but without the prior concurrence of the then 52-man Party presidium. A month later Tito demanded of the Serbian Central Committee the resignation of its top leaders, Serbian Party President Marko Nikezic and Serbian Party Secretary Latinka Perovic and others, but he obviously had to overcome considerable resistance in the Committee before their resignations were

[10] Pavle S. Nikolic, *Skupstinski Sistem*. Institut za Uporedno Pravo: Monografije 71. Beograd: Savremena Administracija 1973, pp. 78–79, 81–82.

[11] *Radio Free Europe Research*. " Press Must Remain Free and Independent, Yugoslav Communists Maintain," Yugoslav Report No. 1427, 30 May 1972 and " Yugoslav Assembly Opposes Tightening of Pre-Trial Investigation." No. 1719, 27 Feb. 1973.

[12] The best and most exhaustive treatment of the 1971 crisis in Croatia is a four-part series *Crisis in Croatia* by Dennison I. Rusinow of the American Universities Field Staff, Southeast Europe Series, Volume XIX, Nos. 4–7, June to Sept. 1972.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

announced toward the end of October 1972. As in Croatia earlier a widespread purge followed in the party, government, media and public organizations in Serbia. The purges were extended to the autonomous province of Vojvodina, and to a lesser extent to Slovenia and Macedonia. It was far more difficult for sympathetic observers probably inside as well as outside Yugoslavia to understand the purges in Serbia than in Croatia. The Serbian leaders were known as able and liberal, who had skilfully performed their mission, after they took power in November 1968, of reforming the Serbian party. At issue of course was the question of whether at that stage the unity of the party at the federal level was as important as Tito claimed it to be.

There seems little question that Nikezic was purged precisely because he was so competent and popular, and because he did not agree with Tito's ideas on how the party was to be unified. He and his closest associates were not expelled from the party until April 1974, 18 months after he resigned as chairman of the Serbian party. His place was taken in October 1972 by a lesser-known official who could be counted upon to obey orders from the centre.

It is easy in discussing developments since the Tito letter and the 10th congress to talk about the party's present hard-line policies and to depict them in the abstract as very ominous indeed. It is of course true that the party is in a new phase, a phase which non-Marxists are bound to regret. It is less clear that the party is in an ominous phase or that there has been any qualitative departure from previous practice. It is certain that all strong republic leaders who are likely to reject or evade orders from the centre have been removed. It is also certain that the basic party organizations have been rebuilt after what appears to have been a period of neglect, with the goal of a basic party organization present in all basic organizations of associated labour.

Recent developments would be ominous if the party were seeking once more to make decisions in secret at the centre and to impose them on the entire population. The writer doubts, however, that this is a feasible alternative open to the party leadership; the statements by party leaders that they have no intention of returning to Stalinist totalitarianism may be taken at face value. It is doubtful whether there is any party leader, including Tito, who would be willing to take the responsibility for the adjustment of the party and state mechanism, including their repressive sides, which a return to pre-Cominform methods would entail. Contrary to many confident statements made about present trends, Yugoslavia is likely to move backward only if occupied by the Soviet Union.

XI

IN issuing his September 1972 letter, Tito undoubtedly also had in mind his impending disappearance from the Yugoslav political scene and the need to maintain a strong centre which could inhibit the possible resurgence in any republic or province of any faction or movement

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

which would seek to use the new freedoms granted to the localities to destroy those freedoms and the federation. In moving against factionalism and liberalism or anarcho-liberalism, Tito is also unquestionably aware that he is acting in a way which the Soviet leadership would welcome. His warm relations with the Soviet leadership dating back to Brezhnev's visit to Belgrade in September 1971 seem intended to remove any possible excuse for intervention in Yugoslavia by the Soviet leadership after his death.

That Tito has had to keep a wary eye on Soviet reaction to all his policies, internal and external, has long been taken for granted; in 1972 Kardelj in a public speech came close to admitting this, apparently for the first time. Discussing the possible slogan for Slovenia, "our place is in Western Europe," Kardelj stated: "The question arises as to what form of political dependence such a solution would lead to and how the East European states would look at such a separatist and anti-socialist orientation." [13] There does not seem to be much doubt that the Soviets will not send troops into Yugoslavia while Tito is alive; there is serious doubt that they will do so even after his passing, unless internal disorders should break out. In that unlikely eventuality, the kind of Cominformist party, however small, which the Yugoslavs arrested and sentenced in the spring and summer of 1974 in Montenegro would have obvious utility either in helping to provoke disorders or calling for Soviet intervention, or both.

In view of the major changes Tito has made internally, it is significant that he has succeeded in maintaining such cordial relations with the Soviet Union as he enjoys now. Among other striking features of the internal Yugoslav scene, the kind of federalism established if introduced into the Soviet Union would undoubtedly blow the Soviet regime sky high. The price is paid in many of Yugoslavia's left-leaning foreign policy positions. and in such ritualistic contrasts between imperialist American foreign policy and non-imperialist Soviet policy depicted in Tito's interview with a *Vjesnik* editor in its editon of 23 February 1973. Given Tito's record of realism, and the contrasting treatment he suffered from the Soviet Union from 1948 until 1953 and from the United States from 1950 to the present day, this observer has some doubts that all the statements made in the *Vjesnik* interview need to be taken at face value. Even though Tito himself has commented on his deep-seated addiction to Marxist-Leninism (and the possibility cannot be entirely excluded that this addiction influences his beliefs), it also seems true that his achievements in the internal structure of Yugoslavia would not have been possible without an equally deep-seated sense of realism and flexibility in interpreting the ideology.

[13] *Borba*, 23 Sept. 1972. For a good summary of recent factual developments in Soviet-Yugoslav relations as well as some valuable commentary, see John C. Campbell. "Soviet Strategy in the Balkans," *Problems of Communism*, Vol. XXIII, July–Aug. 1974, pp. 8–11, 16.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Tito's emphasis on Marxism should be put in perspective: Marxism is useful as a device for demanding more discipline and necessary for appeasing the "East European states." But the emphasis is on Yugoslav (not Soviet) Marxism, which has been so drastically modified that the question has been raised whether it can still be called a communist ideology, i.e. an action programme for revolutionary change tied to certain doctrinal assumptions about the nature of reality.[14]

XII

THE party on one side, and government and society on the other, appear then to have been constructed on contradictory lines. The party is hierarchically organized, governed by strict discipline, frequently described as monolithic, and empowered to intervene in all aspects of state and society. Elsewhere, with the exception of the Army, the principle of self-management applies, with the workers allegedly influencing directly all social relations for the first time in history. This contrast is justified by party leaders in direct discussions, and more indirectly in the press, by the need for the party to exercise a moderating influence without which workers' self-management could not work in Yugoslavia. Without the party acting as a kind of referee, the reconciliation of the interests of the basic organizations of associated labour and the larger units, like the individual republics and autonomous provinces, could not be accomplished peacefully. As mentioned above, there is no question that the unique federalism introduced in 1971 is intended to reconcile the interests of the various nationalities on the basis of unanimous consent. But there is also no question that the Yugoslavs regard the BOALs as interest groups with conflicting claims that have to be reconciled. The Yugoslav party demands uniformity of ideology, not uniformity of views, among party members. Within the goals set by the party and until a party decision on any issue is made, clashes of opinion, expected at times to be sharp and perhaps bitter, are encouraged.

Stane Dolanc, Secretary of the Executive Committee of the LCY, speaking in Slovenia on 18 October 1974, stated the problem:

> No one is able any longer to force exclusively his own interest upon anyone else; no one is able, in the name of some kind of abstract unity, to try to force his will on anyone else. And this is not only a question of the relations between the republics and provinces but also a question of the relations between work organizations, branches of the economy, communal interests and so forth.
>
> A constant process of concluding agreements and of searching

[14] A. Ross Johnson, *The Transformation of Communist Ideology: The Yugoslav Case*, 1945–53. Cambridge: MIT Press 1972, pp. 242–43. Johnson writes: "Certainly Yugoslav Communist thought became increasingly less doctrinaire, more secularized and internalized. . . . Under the rubric of self-management, the doctrine of socialist democracy, in particular, became so secularized that it lost most of its character as an ideological 'action program' and was absorbed into a new Yugoslav political culture."

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

> for common interests strengthens and builds up our unity. I would even say that this represents a primary condition for unity within the self-managing socialist relations. . . .[15]

Yugoslav leaders may believe that they are breaking new ground, but Dolanc's formulation has a striking resemblance to the long-held American theory of an unshakable political community based on the cross-pluralization of conflicting interests. Pluralism, officially condemned, has been brought in by the back door with heavy party tutelage.

In its present phase, the Yugoslav party claims the right to screen all cadres, and let us grant that the workers' council members of the BOALs and the delegates sent to higher organizations, up to and including the Federal Assembly, are predominantly communists. (It is official doctrine that loyalty to the party programme is basic for leadership positions and that not all persons occupying them must be members of the party.) Nevertheless it is not their function to pass on the party's message, backed among other things by an army of propagandists. It is their function to represent the interests of the unit from which they come, and to seek reconciliation on the basis of unanimous consent if possible, of all the interest groups involved. If they cannot reach agreement, they will presumably be obliged to seek instructions from the next higher party authority until a compromise is reached.

I see no need to denigrate this arrangement or to assume that either the federation or other forms of self-management are somehow not genuine because of the party's moderating role. If the party can prevent abuses and if the delegates at every level are allowed to make their own decisions without arbitrary interference by party officials, then the system may work and the time may come when the party's moderating role may not be necessary. Judging from the press and the evident sincerity of numerous party officials in discussing self-management, the party means what it says when it insists upon the integrity of the self-managing mechanism and upon its determination to prevent the BOALs from becoming "transmission belts" for party leaders. In *Borba* of 6 September 1974 there is specific condemnation of an instance where communist, trade union and other leaders joined together to issue directives to the basic organizations of associated labour of a complex work organization. At this stage, it is of course impossible to say whether the system will work as the party intends that it should, but there is no evidence either that the scheme will not work at all.

[15] *Delo*, 19 Oct. 1974, as translated by FBIS, *Daily Report*, Vol. II, Eastern Europe, 31 Oct. 1974. Even a person like T. Vlaskalic, Nikezic's successor as head of the Serbian party, stated the following at Trstenik on 7 Sept. 1973: "The LCY has never accepted and does not today accept the formula of dogmatic monopolism in relations within the League of Communists, a formula which on behalf of abstract unity precludes democratic discussion and the contest of views. But this does not mean that it can accept liberalist or anarcho-liberalist theses that discussions and contests of views are in themselves the purpose and the aim without action and real results." *Borba*, 8 Sept. 1973.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

One instance of constructive cooperation which the new system is designed to promote is the signing of an agreement in Zagreb on 2 July 1974 between the electric utility organizations of Croatia, Bosnia-Hercegovina, and Serbia. The latter two republics possess 80 per cent of the potential for energy from hydroelectric and coal-burning sources, while Croatia has 20 per cent of the potential hydroelectric and three per cent of coal-burning sources, all exhausted. The result has been a chronic and massive shortage of electricity in Croatia which this agreement is designed to alleviate. In 1975 and 1976, the two republics will deliver to Croatia as much excess capacity as they can, while by 1978 and 1979 Croatia's energy requirements are expected to be wholly met by the construction of three new power stations at Gacko and Kakanj in Bosnia-Hercegovina, and Obrenovac in Serbia, half of the capital requirement for which will be supplied by Croatia.[16] It is not known how much of the nationalist sentiment of 1971 still survives in Croatia, but such rational forms of inter-republican cooperation can obviously undercut that sentiment. Previously Croatia had sought solution of its energy problem by building generating plants, however uneconomic, within its own territory.

XIII

TAKING the long view of history, this writer would doubt that there is any exact parallel to the transformation of the Yugoslav dictatorship within a span of 20 odd years from the ruthless totalitarianism of the early post-war years to the relaxed dictatorship of today with so many promising beginnings toward democracy. The architect of this transformation has obviously been Tito, who alone among the communist leaders thus far, has shown not only very great ability, but has also had the stature to transform the Communist Party from its usual essentially destructive mission primarily of preserving its own power to the responsible exercise of power on behalf of society and people.

Assertions may be found in the world press that the Yugoslav party has regained its monopoly of power, or has re-established total dictatorship, or even that the party is now operating just as it did when it took power in 1945. Such generalizations are not usually followed by any specifics on just exactly what is meant; they are demonstrably false. Another favourite generalization is to the effect that Tito does not wish to lose his power and is therefore acting to regain it. Again such statements cannot stand up under concrete analysis. The extraordinary degree of decentralization which obtained in Yugoslav public life after the summer of 1971 was after all the work of Tito himself, including the establishment of a true federation discussed above. Even the conversion of the party into six autonomous republic and two autonomous provincial parties was basically Tito's own doing. It is not therefore logical to accuse

[16] *Ekonomska Politika*, 8 July 1974; *Borba*, 3 July 1974.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

him of wishing to retain power that he had earlier voluntarily given up. The pivotal role the events in Croatia of November–December 1971 still occupies in the Yugoslav press suggest that his true concern was the survival of the federation and the party.

Enough information is generally available to suggest that the time has long since passed when Yugoslavia can be treated as just another variant of the repressive and dangerous communist regimes of Eastern Europe. Despite its one-party character, the Yugoslav political system has given its people an abundance of consumer goods and human rights well beyond those available in other communist nations. I am not suggesting that all its acts are defensible; certainly both Djilas and Mihajlov have been seriously mistreated in the past.[17] There are many aspects of Yugoslav public life one would like to see changed, for example that provision of the law which was recently used to indict Mihajlov on the ground of spreading "hostile propaganda." Nevertheless the Yugoslav regime should be accepted as authoritarian rather than totalitarian, and deserving of regard which this writer at least would not be willing to give any other communist regime.

[17] Since the above was written, the trend toward conformity was strengthened by the dismissal from their teaching positions of eight philosophers from the University of Belgrade long known for their critical but not essentially oppositional attitudes towards the party. The dismissal was achieved by the passage of a law by the Serbian Parliament, thus bypassing the university self-managing faculty council, which had consistently refused to suspend the teachers. Numerous Yugoslavs emphasized to the writer that the integrity of the self-managing mechanism would be observed. It remains to be seen how often that principle will be breached. Shortly after the sacking of the teachers, the critical magazine with which they were associated, *Praxis*, was closed.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The Soviet Union, the French Communist Party and Africa, 1945-1950

Roger E. Kanet

IN the years immediately following the second world war, communists throughout most of the colonial world were informed by Moscow that they were to break off all relations with non-communist nationalist movements. Throughout South-East Asia the result was communist-led insurrections against a number of governments, including the newly-independent regimes of Burma, the Philippines and Indonesia. In French Africa, however, this pattern was not followed, and until the break of the nationalists with the French communists in 1950, the PCF and its African supporters continued to work closely with representatives of the *Rassemblement Démocratique Africain*, the major nationalist party in West Africa. The purpose of the present study is to examine the differences between communist policy in Asia and Africa in the late 1940s and to trace the development of communist policy in Africa during that period. The major reason for this difference in policy can be attributed to the fact that the goals of the French Communist Party, through which the Soviets had to work in Africa, did not always coincide with those of their Soviet mentors. Both the hope of achieving power in France and the fear of losing the French colonies to Anglo-American influence influenced the colonial policy of the French Communist Party.

In the following pages, I shall first survey pre-World War II communist contacts with Africa and the new colonial policy advocated by Moscow in 1947–48, before turning to a discussion of the policy of the PCF in Africa.

The Comintern and Africa Until 1945

As early as 1921, the Comintern began its activities in South Africa with the formation of the Communist Party of South Africa. Although this Party was composed primarily of Europeans, one of the early tasks assigned to it by the Comintern was work among the African population.[1] Initial plans also called for cooperation with African nationalist organizations, such as the Industrial and Commercial Union, and the training of American Negroes for use as propagandists in Africa.[2] Neither of

[1] See Otto Huiswood (pseud. "Billings"), "Report on the Negro Question," *International Press Correspondence*, III, no. 2 (1923), 14–16. Hereafter this journal will be referred to as *Inprecorr*.

[2] See Communist International, *The Communist International between the Fifth and Sixth World Congress, 1924–28* (London: The Communist Party of Great Britain, 1928), p. 490, and Rose P. Stokes (pseud. "Sasha"), "Report and Resolution on the Negro Question," *Inprecorr*, III, no. 2 (1923), 21.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

these policies was successful, however, for Clements Kadalle, the founder of the ICU, eventually accused the communists of "interfering more and more in the general affairs of the union" and broke with them in 1927.[3] The second part of the policy failed because of the inability of the American Communist Party to recruit enough blacks even for its own activities.

Outside South Africa, there was almost no communist activity during the 1920s. An American delegate to the fifth Comintern congress in 1924 criticized the French communists for "great laxity" on the colonial question, and refused to accept the French excuse "for not carrying on direct propaganda against French imperialism on the grounds that the French government had adopted a very liberal policy towards the colonies." The French Party had also failed to demand the liberation of French colonies and had ignored the use of African troops by the government.[4] By 1928, the failure of the policy of cooperation with nationalists in Turkey and, especially, China and the struggle between Stalin and his domestic political opponents for control of the Soviet Communist Party[5] resulted in a shift in communist policy in colonial areas. Cooperation with nationalist groups gave way to a policy of opposition and, on orders from Moscow, the South African communists were required to call for the establishment of a "Black Republic" in Africa. In spite of the strong opposition to the new policy line voiced by the leadership of the South African Party, the policy was adopted. However, most of the white Party officials were eventually expelled for refusing to carry out the programme properly,[6] even though the policy did not find favourable response among the Africans, most of whom did not want a separate state but, rather, full citizenship rights. George Padmore, a former member of the Comintern and one of the fathers of African Nationalism, has said that they viewed the new communist slogan of a "Native Republic" as "an attempt to segregate them into

[3] See Victor Demar, "Amsterdam and the Proletariat of the Colonies and the East," *The Communist International*, IV (1927), 119.

[4] *Inprecorr*, IV, no. 51 (1924), 527.

[5] The ultra-revolutionary line adopted by the Comintern in 1928 was the result of both internal Soviet politics and the problems confronting international communism. First, it was used to attack Bukharin, who was identified with the moderate line of 1921–28, and to purge the Comintern of all foreign communists who might support Bukharin. Second, it represented an attack on the socialist parties and nationalist movements that the communists had failed to take over. Finally, the revolutionary mood in international communism would help sustain the revolutionary mood needed within the USSR to fulfil the tremendous tasks outlined in Stalin's plans for rapid industrialization. See Demetrio Boersner, *The Bolsheviks and the National and Colonial Question (1917–1928)* (Paris: Librairie Minard; Geneva: Droz, 1957), p. 69, and Franz Borkenau, *World Communism* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1962), p. 332ff.

[6] A. Shiek, "The Comintern Programme and the Racial Problem," *The Communist International*, V, no. 16 (1928), 407. For a statement of the opposition, see *Inprecorr*, VIII, no. 44 (1928), 780. See also Edwin S. Munger, *Communist Activity in South Africa*, American Universities Field Staff, *Central and Southern Africa Series*, ESM–8–'58, VI (1958), 3, and Edward Roux, *Time Longer than Rope: A History of the Black Man's Struggle for Freedom in South Africa* (Madison, Wisconsin: University of Wisconsin Press, 1964), p. 256.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

some sort of Bantu state, for they knew that Europeans—even those calling themselves communists—would resent being under an all-African government." [7]

The only major attempt by the Comintern to influence developments in colonial Africa during the Interwar Period was the establishment of the Negro International in 1930. In 1922, the Comintern had already called for a meeting of Negro leaders in Moscow to begin revolutionary activity among blacks is Africa and the Western Hemisphere. However, it was not until 1930 that the meeting which established the International Trade Union Committee of Negro Workers was held in Hamburg.[8] Although the organization functioned fairly well for a few years under the leadership of George Padmore and distributed tens of thousands of copies of a periodical called *The Negro Worker*, changes in Soviet foreign policy after the rise of Hitler in Germany led to its collapse.[9] In spite of its moderate successes and the rather favourable outlook for its future, the Negro International had to be sacrificed to the requirements of Soviet foreign policy which now called for a *rapprochement* with the colonial powers against a resurgent Nazi Germany. After breaking with the Comintern, Padmore accused the communists of dropping the organization "simply in order not to offend the British Foreign Office which has been bringing pressure to bear on Soviet diplomacy, because of the tremendous indignation which our work has aroused among the Negro masses in Africa . . . against British Imperialism." [10]

From the mid-thirties until the end of the Second World War, almost all communist activity in Africa ceased. The few articles on Africa that appeared in Comintern journals called for the creation of broad anti-fascist fronts rather than anti-colonial revolution. By the end of the war, however, the communists were beginning, very gradually, to revive their revolutionary propaganda and to set up cells from which to spread their influence in Africa. Toward the end of the war, the French communists established "unity fronts" between the workers in France and the colonial population, and in the colonies they formed *Groupes d'Études Communistes* (GEC) in the major cities of Abidjan, Babo-Dioulasso, Bamako, and Canakry.[11] In Eritrea a Communist Party was established

[7] George Padmore, *Pan-Africanism or Communism?: The Coming Struggle for Africa* (London: Dobson; New York: Roy, 1956), p. 352.

[8] See *Inprecorr*, III, no. 2 (1922), 16. On the first meeting see V. Chattopadhyaya, "The First International Conference of Negro Workers," ibid., IX, no. 34 (1930), 636.

[9] For an excellent discussion of the Negro International, see Rolf Italiaander, *Schwarze Haut im roten Griff* (Dusseldorf-Vienna: Econ Verlag, 1962), pp. 42–74.

[10] George Padmore, "An Open Letter to Earl Browder," *The Crisis*, XLII (1935), 302.

[11] For a brief discussion of the role of the GEC in the political education of the West Africans; see Thomas Hodgkin and Ruth Schachter, "French Speaking West Africa in Transition," *International Conciliation*, no. 528 (1960), 387.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

among the Italian workers, but by 1948 it counted only a few native Eritreans and half-castes among its 200 members.[12]

The Colonies and the "Two Camps"

In 1945, Soviet troops stood on the Elbe in central Germany and the Soviet government controlled all of Eastern Europe. In spite of the devastation of the previous four years, the Soviet Union was the strongest military power on the European continent. The enemy had been crushed and one could have expected a period of partial relaxation within the Soviet Union—although a period devoted to the reconstruction of the ravaged country was necessary. However, in the last year of the war, friction between the Western allies and the Soviet government became evident over such questions as the types of political regimes that were to be established in the Soviet-occupied territories of Eastern Europe.

In the months immediately following the end of the war, the differences between the Soviet Union and the West multiplied, and by Spring 1946 both the United States and the Soviet Union had apparently given up any idea of compromise on the questions that divided them. Little more than a year later, in a speech before the inaugural session of the Communist Information Bureau in September 1947, Andrei Zhdanov divided the world into two antagonistic camps—one of "peace, socialism and democracy" and the other of "capitalism, imperialism and war."[13] In the light of the worsening international situation, it is not surprising that Soviet attitudes towards colonial areas also underwent a major change. In late 1945, a British communist could still see some good in British colonial policy in Africa,[14] and not until 1946 did articles reappear in the communist press condemning the racial and social injustices which existed in the British colonies in Africa.[15] The renewed communist attack on colonialism, however, did not require a break with the nationalists in the colonial areas. According to one Soviet Asian specialist, the Soviet Union strongly supported a united front "from above" in Indonesia, for the unification of the various levels of the population gave the revolutionary movements in the colonies a special

[12] Franz Ansprenger, *Politik in schwarzen Afrika: Die modernen Bewegungen im Afrika franzosischer Prägung* (Cologne-Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1961), pp. 82–83 and Martin Ebon, *World Communism Today* (New York-Toronto: Whittlesey House, 1948), p. 426.

[13] Andrei Zhdanov, "The International Situation (Report to a Meeting of the Cominform), September 1947," *For a Lasting Peace, For a People's Democracy*, 10 Nov. 1947, p. 2. For an interesting discussion of the relationship of the "two world image" to Stalin's desire for total control in both foreign and domestic policy, see Robert C. Tucker, *The Soviet Political Mind* (New York: Praeger, 1963), pp. 169–171.

[14] Desmond Buckle, "Administrative Reform in Kenya," *World News and Views*, XXV (1945), 245.

[15] See, for example, "Kenyan Settlers on the March," ibid. XXVI (1946), 159 and W. H. Andrews, "The South African Ghetto Bill," ibid. p. 147.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

strength.[16] In South-East Asia the communists had been able to forge alliances with various segments of the population during the period of Japanese occupation, and after the war they retained their contacts with these nationalist movements against the returning colonial rulers.[17]

In 1946, the Soviet economist, Evgenii Varga, saw a change in the relationship of many colonies towards their mother countries. No longer were all the colonies economically indebted to the metropoles, but in some cases the opposite was the case. Varga argued that it followed that the changed economic conditions would be accompanied by changed political relations. A new upsurge had developed in the anti-imperialist movement in Asia, which was based on three factors: the strengthening of the native bourgeoisie and the proletariat, the military training which native troops had received, and the availability of these troops for a struggle against the colonial rulers. Varga's views left open the possibility of recognizing an evolutionary progress of colonial countries toward independence.[18] However, articles published in the spring and summer of 1947 condemned his theory of the possibility of peaceful development of independence. According to one critic, the economic prerequisites for independence were not yet present and the possibility of a peaceful transition from colonial status to independence was precluded.[19] In addition, Evgenii Zhukov, a Soviet expert on Asia, wrote a strong denunciation of Varga's theory in which he condemned the Indian national bourgeoisie, and by implication the non-communist nationalists throughout Asia, for being anti-national and willing to compromise with the imperialists.[20]

In his speech at the initial meeting of the Cominform in September 1947, Zhdanov called for a more aggressive policy in the colonies, in line with the new view of international affairs as a struggle between two world blocs. Although Zhdanov did not openly condemn the bourgeoisie, either in Europe or in the colonies, he did emphasize the leading role which the communists must play in the "struggle against the new American expansionist plans".[21] A few months after Zhdanov's speech,

[16] A. A. Guber, *Natsionalno-osvoboditelnoe dvizhenie v Indonezii* (Moscow, 1954), p. 4; Cited in Ruth T. McVey, *The Soviet View of the Indonesian Revolution* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University, 1957), p. 14.

[17] For a good study of the Communists in South-East Asia in the early post-war years see Malcolm D. Kennedy, *A Short history of Communism in Asia* (London: Wiedenfeld and Nicolson, 1957), pp. 341ff. See also, John H. Kautsky, *Moscow and the Communist Party in India* (New York: M.I.T., 1956), pp. 16–24.

[18] Evgenii Varga, *Izmeneniya v ekonomike kapitalizma v itoge Vtoroi Mirovoi Voiny* (Moscow: Gospolitizdat, 1946), pp. 219–226. E. M. Zhukov, a leading authority on the Far East, saw in the United Nations trusteeship system a possible way for liberation without revolution. The United Nations could help guarantee gradual development of social, economic, political and educational advancement toward self-government or independence. E. M. Zhukov, "Porazhenie yaponskogo imperializma i natsionalno-osvoboditelnaia borba narodov Vostochnoi Azii," *Bolshevik*, nos. 23–24 (1945), p. 86.

[19] V. Vasileva, "Ekonomicheskoe razvitie kolonii v gody Vtoroi Mirovoi Voiny," *Mirovoe khozyaistvo i mirovaya politika*, no. 5 (1947), p. 64.

[20] E. H. Zhukov, "K polozheniyu v Indii," ibid. no. 7 (1947), p. 6.

[21] A. Zhdanov, "The International Situation," pp. 2–4.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Zhukov applied this new thesis on world affairs to the colonies and observed that there had been an upsurge of revolutionary activity in the colonies which was being led by the working class, and called for a broad revolutionary front, led by the communists, against the imperialists and those sections of the national bourgeoisie which were connected with foreign capital. However, the communists were to unite with all truly revolutionary segments of the population, including the middle bourgeoisie.[22] John Kautsky argues that this is the first clear statement of a neo-Maoist strategy to come from Moscow. The neo-Maoist strategy combines a direct appeal to all "patriotic" elements of society with a struggle against foreign imperialism, but the Communist Party must stand at the head of this anti-imperialist alliance. For two years, from 1947 to 1949, there was no clear guideline for communists in the colonies, since, besides the advocates of the neo-Maoist strategy, the CPSU also contained important officials who advocated a return to a complete "left" policy which would eliminate all cooperation with the bourgeoisie, including the middle and lower segments. By mid-1949, however, the neo-Maoist position had won out.[23]

For the next few years, communist attitudes towards bourgeois nationalist leaders were extremely hostile. In an address to the Academy of Sciences in June 1949, Zhukov stated that bourgeois nationalism in the colonies had already gone over to the imperialist camp:

> The national bourgeoisie is especially directed against the unification of the national-liberation movement in the colonial and dependent countries with the anti-imperialist, democratic camp. Bourgeois nationalism is the most important ideological weapon used by the Anglo-American, aggressive bloc for the goal of strengthening the shaky system of imperialism. . . . Similar to the situation in the developed capitalist countries where the right socialist betrayers of the working class have attempted to spread the rotten notions of the possibility of some sort of "third" middle road between communism and capitalism . . . the national reformists in the colonial countries are deceitfully chanting about their desire to "stand aside" from the struggle of the two camps, about their "neutrality" toward what they call the "ideological conflict" between the USSR and the USA. Actually they are allied with the reactionary bourgeoisie and slander the USSR and actively help the imperialists.

Zhukov went on to condemn the national bourgeoisie for attempting to deceive the masses into believing that they had attained independence, although they had merely aided the imperialists to "replace open, crass forms and methods of colonial rule with more refined and secret forms," such as dominion status and the establishment of treaty relationships on the basis of the formal equality of the participants. However, the truth

[22] E. H. Zhukov, "Obostrenie krizisa kolonialnoi sistemy," *Bolshevik*, no. 23 (1947), pp. 55, 57.

[23] Kautsky, *Moscow and the Communist Party of India*, pp. 8–13, 27–28, 55–56, 86, 89–91.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

was that the big bourgeoisie who ruled the new "independent" states were merely acting as agents for their imperialist masters.[24] Gandhi, Nehru, Sukarno, and the other nationalist leaders were condemned for their anti-democratic policies and were called everything from lackeys of the imperialists to betrayers of their nation.[25]

In the Soviet view, only a revolutionary movement grounded on the broad base of the patriotic masses could ever attain true independence. The movement must be led by the working class and its vanguard, the Communist Party, in order to sharpen the conflict with the imperialists. In 1950, the official journal of the Cominform quoted a long passage from a speech by Liu Shao-chi in which he had argued that the "path taken by the Chinese people is the path that should be taken by the peoples of many colonial and dependent countries in their struggle for national independence and people's democracy."[26] The whole gist of the editorial was that China offered the model for a successful independence movement which was based on an alliance of workers, peasants, intelligentsia and the national bourgeoisie, led by the working class.[27]

The logical extension of the Soviet attitude to the newly-independent states of Asia was a policy of non-recognition and subversion. As a result of this policy, the Soviet Union, in spite of its protestations of support for national liberation movements, was unable to make any real progress in influencing developments in Asia until after the death of Stalin and the initiation of a radically new appraisal of events in the area. The wave of communist-inspired insurrections occurred not only in territories still under colonial rule, such as Indo-China and Malaya,

[24] E. M. Zhukov, "Voprosy natsionalno-osvoboditalnoi borby posle Vtoroi Mirovoi Voiny," *Voprosy ekonomiki,* no. 9 (1949), pp. 57–58. The Soviet list of these "sham" governments was quite long and included Iraq, Jordan, India, Pakistan, Ceylon, Burma, the Philippines and Indonesia. See S. V. Datlin, *Afrika pod gnetom imperializma* (Moscow: Gospolitizdat, 1951), p. 10 and R. Palme Dutt, "Struggle of Colonial Peoples Against Imperialism," *For a Lasting Peace,* 15 Oct. 1948, p. 5.

[25] A. M. Dyakov, "Crisis of British Rule in India and the New Stage in the Liberation Struggle of Her Peoples," in *Crisis of the Colonial System: National Liberation Struggle of the People of East Asia,* Reports presented in 1949 to the Pacific Institute of the Academy of Sciences, USSR (Bombay: People's Publishing House, 1951), p. 4; N. Sh., "Indonesia Never Shall be Enslaved by American Imperialists"; *For a Lasting Peace,* 8 Jan. 1951, p. 4. Zhukov described the presumed "metamorphosis of Nehru, who from a left member of the [Indian National] Congress and an accuser of imperialism turned into an adroit servant of two masters—both England and the USA—into an ally of the Indian princes and landowners, and into a bloody strangler of the progressive forces in India. . . ." Zhukov, "Voprosy natsionalno-osvoboditelnoi borby," pp. 58–59. As late as 1953, V. A. Maslennikov, a noted Soviet orientalist, was repeating the same accusations. "Natsionalno-osvobiditelnoe dvizhenie," in V. A. Maslennikov, ed. *Uglublenie krizisa kolonialnoi sistemy,* (Moscow: Gospolitizdat, 1953), pp. 43–44.

[26] "Mighty Advance of the National Liberation Movement in the Colonial and Dependent Countries," *For a Lasting Peace,* 27 January 1950, p. 1. The speech had been made in November 1949, to a trade union conference of Asian and Australian workers and printed in *Wen-hui Pao* (Shanghai), Nov. 25, 1949.

[27] This model was even to be applied to Africa, where there hardly existed a sharp division of classes. I. Lemin, "Uglublenie krizisa kolonialnoi sistemy i imperialisticheskoe sopernichestvo v Afrike," in V. Ya. Vasileva et al. eds., *Imperialisticheskaia borbaza Afriku i osvoboditelnoe dvizhenie narodov: sbornik statei* (Moscow: Izd. Akademii Nauk SSSR, 1953), p. 31. However, in a speech in 1951, Zhukov had stated that he

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

but also against the nationalist regimes in Burma and Indonesia. In Burma the communists first welcomed the independence which was to come in January 1948. However, the new line which came from Moscow required a condemnation of the Anglo-Burmese agreement which brought about independence. Within three months the new government was involved in a major struggle against the communist-inspired revolt which had broken out.[28] In Indonesia the beginning of 1948 brought a change in communist policy and condemnation of agreements between the Indonesian government and the Netherlands which the communists had previously supported. By September they had issued a call to arms, but the Sukarno government was able to suppress the revolt.[29]

For Stalin and the executors of his foreign policy there was no room for non-aligned states. Professor Ivan Potekhin, one of the founders of African studies in the Soviet Union, outlined the Stalinist theory of colonial revolution in 1950. According to the theory, "the solution of colonial slavery is impossible without a proletarian revolution and the overthrow of imperialism."[30] The only type of revolution which Moscow was willing to support was that based on the Chinese model. In January 1950, an editorial in the Cominform journal presented the Chinese and Vietnamese revolutions, the activities of the guerrilla troops in South Korea and the revolts in Malaya and Indonesia as examples of the development of people's liberation armies under the leadership of the Communist Party.[31] The goal was nothing less than a communist take-over. In an article published in 1963, long after Stalin's rigid policy had been replaced by a policy of cooperation with nationalist movements and regimes, G. I. Mirskii admitted that many Soviet writers on the colonial areas "did not yet take full account of the meaning and historical resonance of the events which were occurring" in Asia and Africa, because "the deadening influence of Stalinist dogmatism was too strong". Even though Soviet economists interpreted the liberation of the colonies from colonial rule as a manoeuvre by the colonial powers to secure their control over the people, in reality "the liberation of the

doubted the efficacy of viewing the "Chinese revolution as a kind of pattern for the popular-democratic revolution in other countries. In particular, it is doubtful whether other countries of the East which take the road towards "People's Democracy could expect to be made to get the most important advantage of the Chinese revolution—namely, a revolutionary army." *Izvestiya Akademii Nauk SSSR, Seriya istoril i filosofil*, IX, no. 1 (1952), p. 81.

[28] Kennedy, *Communism in Asia*, pp. 440ff.

[29] Ibid. pp. 463–466.

[30] I. I. Potekhin, "Stalinskaya teoriya kolonialnoi revolyutsii i natsionalno-osvoboditelnoe dvizhenie v tropicheskoi i yuzhnoi Afrike," *Sovetskaya etnografia*, no. 1 (1950), p. 24. In a study of colonialism in Africa, S. V. Datlin was forced to argue that the reason for the slow development of anti-colonialism in Africa compared with Asia was the later development of "industrial production and capitalist relations." However, even as early as 1915 the workers had played an important role in demonstrations against colonialism. Datlin, *Afrika pod gnetom imperializma*, pp. 70, 66–67.

[31] "Mighty Advance of the National Liberation Movement," p. 1.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

colonies was already an important revolutionary step in the development of human society ".[32]

Moscow's refusal to recognize the existence of the new force of nationalism that was struggling against the old colonial empires cost the Soviet Union the friendship of potential anti-Western allies. This refusal was based largely on the conviction that these states and their leaders were still controlled by the West—a basic component of Stalin's two-camp view of the world which allowed for no possibility of neutral states.[33] Marshall Shulman has argued that communist policy was in 1949 already beginning to appreciate the potentialities of the trend toward neutralism, and Leland Strauber, one of Shulman's students, adds that Soviet policy was making a " progressive reorientation toward increasing support for nationalist governments ".[34] Although one can find a number of statements to this effect during the 1949–53 period—for example, in April 1952 the President of the Soviet Chamber of Commerce stated that the Soviet Union wished to increase trade relationships with the developing countries [35]—there is no real evidence to support the argument that Soviet policy towards developing countries underwent a shift before Stalin's death. In fact, the general Soviet position toward these governments remained much more accurately presented in the hostile statements referred to above.[36]

Communism and African Nationalism

In the period after World War II, just as before the war, the Soviet Union had very little direct contact with Africa. It was only through communist front organizations, such as the World Federation of Trade Unions, through West European Parties, and in the United Nations that they could exercise indirect influence on developments in Africa. As mentioned above, during the second world war communist agitation in Africa was almost brought to a halt, although some contacts with potential African leaders were maintained. Towards the end of the war, the French Communist Party, which was by far the most important for communist activity in Africa, set up *Groupes d'Etudes Communistes* in the major cities of French West Africa, and it was through

[32] G. I. Mirskii, " Tvorcheskii marksizm i problemy natsionalno-osvoboditelnykh stran," *Mirovaya ekonomika i mezhdunarodnye otnosheniya*, no. 2 (1963), p. 63.

[33] Robert C. Tucker argues that Soviet foreign policy was based on Stalin's desire for absolute control. This desire for control made it virtually impossible for Stalin to develop normal diplomatic relations with the newly independent states. Robert C. Tucker, " Stalinism and Cold War," in his *The Soviet Political Mind*, pp. 166–179.

[34] Marshall D. Shulman, *Stalin's Foreign Policy Reappraised* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1963), p. 100 and Leland Stauber, " Recent Soviet Policy in the Underdeveloped Countries: The Significance of the ' National Democracy ' Doctrine of 1960," unpublished doctoral dissertation, Harvard University, 1964, p. 62.

[35] See Comité de contribution au développement du commerce international, *Recontre internationale de Moscou* (Paris, 1952), pp. 67–72, cited in Louis Kawan, *La nouvelle orientation du commerce exterieur sovietique, Asie, Afrique, Amérique Latine*. (Brussels: Centre National pour l'etude des Pays à Regime Communiste, 1958), pp. 61–62.

[36] See notes 24 and 25 above.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

these groups that later efforts to influence events in post-war Africa were channelled.[37]

Even though the Soviets did not yet have direct contacts with Africa, they were beginning to develop their theories about the situation there. The most complete summary of the Soviet view of Africa during the last years of Stalin's rule has been provided by Professor Ivan Potekhin, who noted that Stalin's theory of colonial revolution was based on the assumption that the solution of the colonial questions was impossible without a proletarian revolution and the overthrow of imperialism. Although he recognized that the working class in Africa was quite weak, and that much of the labour movement that did exist was influenced by the Western trade unions, Potekhin concluded that the Soviet Union " serves as an inspirational example even for the peoples of Africa ".[38] Potekhin's article indicated virtually a complete lack of knowledge of the situation in Africa. Nowhere outside the far North and South of the continent did a proletariat exist upon which the communists might hope to build a strong revolutionary organization.

Since the Soviets had virtually no direct contacts with Africa, the task of developing a communist movement there was delegated to the communist parties of Western Europe. By far the most active of these was the French Communist Party which, during the war, had already laid the foundations for its future work by forming communist study groups. Anti-colonial feeling was spreading throughout Africa, and a large number of Africans—mainly those with some Western training—had begun to regard independence, or at least equality with their white rulers, as a right which was owed the African population. However, for the immediate future, the goal of African leaders was restricted to equality with the peoples of the metropole and an extension of the rights of citizenship to the population of the colonies. As late as the mid-1950s, the African delegates to the Assembly of the French Union were interested more in the equal treatment of Africans and the development of full citizenship rights than they were in independence. Those Africans who had referred, even indirectly, to eventual independence, such as Souron Mignan Apithy of Dahomey in 1946, were definitely in a minority.[39] Even the " radical elements " of African leadership in French

[37] See the article by Franz Ansprenger entitled " Communism in Tropical Africa," in *The Soviet Bloc, China and Africa*, edited by Sven Hamrell and Carl G. Widstrand (Uppsala: Scandinavian Institute of African Studies, 1964), pp. 78–79. For a brief survey of French Communist activity in Africa see Kurt Müller, *Über Kalbutta nach Paris? Strategie und Aktivität des Ostblocks in den Entwicklungsländern* (Hannover: Verlag für Literatur und Zeitgeschehen (1964), pp. 16–19.

[38] Potekhin, " Stalinskaya teoriya kolonialnoi revolyutsii," pp. 24–40.

[39] See Michael Crowder, " Independence as a Goal in French West African Politics, 1944–1960," in William H. Lewis, ed., *French-Speaking Africa: The Search for Identity* (New York: Walker, 1965), pp. 19–20. In 1946, Apithy alluded to the fears of some Frenchmen that, in a new French union, the French would be dominated by the colonial peoples and stated that there was no cause for such a fear, for " we must simply but firmly say that our ideal is not to become French citizens . . . I should equally like to state that our ideal is . . . to regulate the affairs of our own country. . . ." France, *Journal Officiel, Débats de l'Assemblée Nationale Constituante*, 1946, IV, 3802.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Africa, represented by Gabriel d'Arboussier, argued that they merely sought the full application of the French Constitution in Africa, for " we remain convinced that union with the people of France is the best and least costly means to assure the emancipation of Black Africa ".[40]

THE most important political development in the French colonies in the immediate post-war period was the formation of a united African political movement. In October 1946, 800 delegates from throughout French Africa met in Bamako, the capital of the French Sudan, to outline a programme of political unity for French Africa. Houphouet-Boigny called for the fusion of all Africans into a single party in order to bring about a real French Union of Africans and their friends among the French democrats.[41] The conference resulted in the establishment of the *Rassemblement Démocratique African* (RDA) which was to be a federation of territorial parties.[42] The French communists had been quick to see the advantages which a united African political movement would offer them, and Raymond Barbé and a group of French communists were present at the Bamako Conference and were very influential in the organization of the fledgling political movement. The RDA was modelled on the structure of the Communist Party, with authority delegated in the style of a pyramid, with a small group at the top.[43] The African representatives, who went to Paris after the first elections of 1946, found in the French communists their strongest and most consistent allies. In response to a question about the ties of the RDA with the communists, Houphouet-Boigny later replied to Georges Monnet:

> It is correct to say that we are connected with the Communist Party, but that does not mean that we are communists. Is it likely that I, Houphouet, a traditional chief, an African doctor, a big landowner and a Catholic, should be a communist? But our connection with the Communist Party is valuable to us, in that we have found in it a French parliamentary group that welcomed us in friendly fashion, while others paid no attention to us. . . . Each time that we, the RDA, defend a project, we can count on the 183 votes of the

Felix Houphouet-Boigny of the Ivory Coast was quick to assure the French that no West African delegate to the Constituent Assembly sought secession from the French Union. Ibid. p. 3849.

[40] France, *Journal Officiel. Débats de l'Assemblée de l'Union Française*, 1950, I, 233.

[41] Quoted by Thomas Hodgkin in *West Africa*, January 23, 1954 and cited in Virginia Thompson and Richard Adloff, *French West Africa* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1957), p. 85.

[42] Proposals by Gabriel d'Arboussier and other more radical members of the RDA to turn the party into a single, unified inter-territorial party, rather than a federation, were not accepted. See William J. Foltz, *From French West Africa to the Mali Federation* (New Haven-London: Yale University Press, 1965), p. 55.

[43] Richard Adloff, *West Africa: The French-Speaking Nations Yesterday and Today* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1965), p. 192. Pressure was exerted by Marius Moutet, the Minister for overseas France, on Lamine-Gueye and Leopold Senghor, fellow socialists, not to attend the meeting. The result was that the more " extreme " elements of the African leadership were able to dominate the Bamako Conference. See Foltz, *From French West Africa to Mali*, p. 54.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

> Communist Party. If, in exchange, we loan our votes to the communist group, what is that to us? [44]

The major area in which the communists were of assistance to the African cause was that of extending constitutional rights to Africans. They supported African opposition to the double electoral system in which the first college was essentially a white college. They were also influential in the elimination of the hated system of forced labour which had been prevalent in West Africa.[45] The alliance between the RDA and the PCF was truly advantageous for the Africans, for, as Houphouet-Boigny pointed out, it gave them strong, influential allies in Paris. However, the communists were not satisfied with the amount of influence which they exercised within the African movement, and in 1948 they made an attempt to gain even greater influence in the RDA. It should be noted that this move towards more control came after Zhdanov's call for a harder line in foreign policy and after the communists withdrew from the French government.

In July 1948, Raymond Barbé, the French communist who had been present at the founding of the RDA in Bamako, sent a circular letter to the communist study groups in Africa, in which he outlined future communist policy within the RDA and means by which the communists could gain more influence in the Party. He stated that the decisions of the Cominform " call for a profound examination of the problems of the orientation and direction of the democratic political movement in Black Africa." What was needed was a mass organization, " not a vanguard political party ", which was led by the working class, as outlined by Stalin in the early 1920s. Barbé warned against the dangers of underestimating the importance of class differences and of deviating into paths of nationalism and parliamentarianism. The communists must agitate among the masses to prevent them from reverting to spontaneous movements. Even though no organized communist parties existed in Africa, a close alliance must be sought between the RDA and the PCF, which " goes beyond the simple parliamentary union now existing." The RDA was not to become a communist party, but it had to be allied with the French workers and the Communist Party in the anti-imperialist struggle. The work of the communist study groups was to be enlarged by more regular fuctioning in the capitals of the various African territories and by expansion of their activity into the countryside. It was especially necessary, Barbé noted, for systematic collaboration between the study groups and the directors of the mass movements in Africa.[46] What

[44] Quoted by Monnet in the French Union Assembly on 9 Feb. 1950. *Débats de l'Assemblée de l'Union Française*, 1950, I, 225.

[45] Thompson and Adloff, *French West Africa*, pp. 54–56, 33–34.

[46] Raymond Barbé, " L'Orientation et la direction des organisations politiques en Afrique noire," circulaire no. 144, 20 July 1948. Printed in *Débats de l'Assemblée de l'Union Française*, 1950, I, 255–258. The letter was read into the record in its entirety on 10 July 1950, by the Communist deputy, Donnat, after Georges Monnet had read sections of it the day before.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Barbé was calling for was greater control of the RDA by African communists who would seek to attain positions of importance within the leadership of the Party. In response to accusations by non-communists that this had occurred, d'Arboussier admitted that some members of the RDA were also members of the communist study groups, but he maintained that "the positions of confidence granted to our comrades of the study groups in the organs of the RDA do not result from their membership of communist study groups, but from their activity, their desire for struggle and action in the service of the African masses; that is the sole criterion for qualification in our cadres."[47] That, however, was exactly the point. By appearing to devote themselves to the cause of the RDA, some communists had been able to attain positions of importance within the Party and were able to influence its policies.

To assist in the development of more influential communist groups and in the expansion of the RDA, Barbé and other French communists made a number of trips throughout French Africa in 1948–49. While in Africa, Barbé called for tactics of disobedience to the colonial administrators and to the traditional chiefs who had "sold out" to the French government. However, Barbé made the mistake of condemning de Gaulle and local wartime resistance leaders, which alienated an important segment of the European and African population. In one city the meeting broke up in disorder after Barbé condemned the moderate leaders.[48]

Other problems in the relations between the communists and the African leaders developed during this period. First of all, a number of very influential Africans had not come to the Bamako Conference and had never joined the movement.[49] As the Party turned leftwards in the period after 1947, a number of the more moderate members of the RDA became alienated from it. Among these was F. C. Sissoko, who had been elected Secretary General of the co-ordinating committee.[50] In his circular letter of July 1948, Barbé had condemned those "elected officials of the RDA who had abandoned the common struggle with the French working class and its Communist Party" and were seeking refuge in "African autonomism." This group, which believes it is "strong

[47] Ibid. p. 252. In a speech before the Co-ordinating Committee of the RDA in 1948, d'Arboussier had outlined a policy for the party which coincided exactly with the goals which Barbé had set for the movement. *Le RDA dans la lutte anti-imperialiste* (Paris, [1948]) cited by Ansprenger, "Communism in Tropical Africa," p. 82. See, also, the selections cited in Ruth Schachter Morgenthau, *Political Parties in French-Speaking Africa* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1964), pp. 97–98.

[48] Virginia Thompson and Richard Adloff, *The Emerging States of French Equatorial Africa* (Stanford-London: Stanford University Press, 1960), pp. 45, 48.

[49] These included Diallo of Guinea and Mm. Lamine-Guèye and Senghor of Senegal. *Débats de l'Assemblée de l'Union Française*, 1950, I, 224, and Victor Dubois, "The Independence Movement in Guinea: A Study in African Nationalism," unpublished doctoral dissertation, Princeton University, 1962, p. 43.

[50] Ibid.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

enough to direct the struggle for the emancipation of the African population alone," forgets what Black Africa "owes to the forces of the anti-imperialist camp in the world and the French communists in particular." Only in union with the workers of the whole world can Africa develop freely.[51]

During the entire period of communist influence in the RDA, from 1946 to 1950, the communists "showed no enthusiasm for demands for autonomy on the part of the overseas territories," according to one commentator. The PCF, which participated in a governing coalition in France immediately after the war, opposed the nationalist uprising in Algeria, refused to vote against military credits to crush the revolution in Indo-China and took a moderate stand on the bloody repression of the revolt in Madagascar.[52] The communists did not call for independence, but viewed the French Union as the most favourable framework for realizing "the strivings of the colonial peoples"

> The collapse of the French Union would bring upon you [the colonial peoples] an apparent independence, as the prelude to the pressing rule of the powers among whom the trusts rule as masters, among whom racist ideas are current, and by whom Negroes are lynched. Therefore, remain in the French Union with us. It will be what we together make of it, and nothing can be strong enough to hinder the workers and republicans of France, in union with your democratic and national forces, from making out of it a real, brotherly and progressive Union.[53]

A number of African leaders strongly condemned the RDA and its communist mentors for their failure to strive for independence.[54] According to Thompson and Adloff, the failure of the PCF to take a strong position in favour of independence for the colonies was important in the decision of nationalist leaders in Madagascar to break all contacts with the French communists soon after the war.[55] In his open letter to

[51] *Débats de l'Assemblée de l'Union Française*, 1950, I, 257.

[52] See David Caute, *Communism and the French Intellectuals (1914–1960)* (London: Andre Deutsch, 1964), pp. 208–209. See, also, Alfred J. Rieber, *Stalin and the French Communist Party*, 1914–1947 (New York-London: Columbia University Press, 1962), pp. 319–320. Rieber shows that the policy of the French communists towards the colonies was one of assimilation rather than autonomy or independence. In an article in *Cahiers du Communisme*, no. 5 (May 1947), pp. 399–412, Raymond Barbé argued that the collapse of the French Empire would play into the hands of Great Britain and the United States, and that British agents had fomented the revolt in Madagascar. "In the present situation," he argued, "the French Union can be an important factor in the progress of democratic forces." Barbé's article is reprinted in Jakob Moneta, *Die Kolonialpolitik der französischen KP* (Hannover: Verlag für Literatur und Zeitgeschehen, 1968), pp. 139–146.

[53] Étienne Fajon at the Congress of the PCF in Strassbourg, 26 June 1947. *L'Humanité*, 27 June 1947. Cited in Ansprenger, *Politik im Schwarzen Afrika*, p. 84.

[54] Émile-Derlin Zinsou, the leader of a group of independent African delegates to the French Union Assembly, accused the communists of preventing the discussion of independence at Bamako in 1946. *Débats de l'Assemblée de l'Union Française*, 1951, I, 232.

[55] Virginia Thompson and Richard Adloff, *The Malagasy Republic: Madagascar Today* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1965), p. 45.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Maurice Thorez, Aimé Césaire, the noted black poet and sometime communist, condemned the communists for viewing the colonial revolution as merely a "part of a more important whole" to which the revolutionary movement must be subordinated.[56]

By 1949–50, the RDA had greatly expanded its influence in West Africa. From an initial membership of 50,000 in 1946, it had grown to a million and a half members in 1950.[57] However, the expansion of RDA influence began to meet the strong resistance of local political leaders in Senegal, Guinea and other territories, and the close connections with the communists, who were no longer in the government coalition, were now a hindrance to the Party. The Colonial administration began to clamp down on the more militant members of the party in 1949, and a year later, after the outbreak of riots in the Ivory Coast, all public meetings of the RDA in Africa were banned.[58] In the light of these new difficulties, Houphouet-Boigny and the vast majority of the Party broke with the communists in October 1950, and began to follow more moderate policies. Only a small group, led by d'Arboussier, refused to sever ties with the communists.[59]

By 1950, therefore, the communist policy of support for a "bourgeois nationalist" movement had proven to be a failure and the communists switched to more radical demands for the dissolution of the French Union and independence for all overseas territories.[60] The communists, for reasons that will be pointed out below, failed in their attempt to gain control of the nationalist movement in West Africa, and two decades later they have not yet recovered from the defeat inflicted on them by the moderate elements of the RDA.

ALTHOUGH attempts to influence the policies of the RDA were the most important activity of the communists in Africa in the late forties, other methods of influencing events were also tried, mainly through the trade unions and by contact with African students in Europe.

[56] Aimé Césaire, *Lettre à Maurice Thorez* (Paris: Présence Africain, 1956, 3rd edition), p. 8.

[57] Gabriel d'Arboussier, "National Liberation Movement in French West Africa and Equatorial Africa," *For a Lasting Peace*, 9 June 1950, p. 3.

[58] Du Bois, "The Independence Movement in Guinea," p. 45 and Ernest Milcent, *L'AOF entre en scene* (Paris: Bibliothèque de l'Homme d'Action, 1958), pp. 49.

[59] Georges Chaffard, *Les carnets secrets de la décolonisation* (Paris: Calmann-Levy, 1965), pp. 126–127. According to the Soviet interpretation, most members of the RDA opposed the new line and the moderate policies did not have the support of the African masses. See V. P. Verin, *Prezidentskie respubliki v Afrike* (Moscow: Izd. "IMO", 1963), p. 34, D. A. Olderogge and I. I. Potekhin, eds., *Die Völker Africas* (Berlin: VEB Deutscher Verlag der Wissenschaften, 1961), p. 429. This is the revised and updated translation of *Narody Afriki* (Moscow: Izd. Akademii Nauk SSSR, 1954).

[60] Not until September 1949 did the PCF openly condemn the war in Indo-China, when J. Guillon published an article in *Cahiers du Communisme*, no. 9 (September 1949), pp. 1118–1121; reprinted in Moneta, *Der Kolonialpolitik der französischen KP*, pp. 157–158. In May 1951, in an article on the RDA, Leon Feix called for the liquidation of the entire colonial system. *Cahiers du Communisme*, no. 5 (May 1951); cited in Moneta, *Der Kolonialpolitik der französischen KP*, p. 151.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

After the second world war, the Soviets set up various international front organizations which included the World Federation of Trade Unions and the World Federation of Democratic Youth, rather than openly communist organizations such as the pre-war Red International of Trade Unions. By means of these fronts, which were controlled by the communists, the Soviet Union hoped to channel its influence throughout the non-communist world. In the late forties, the French communists set up branches of the *Confédération Générale du Travail* (CGT) in Africa, and most French African unions remained affiliated to this communist-dominated organization until Sékou Touré severed relations with it and with the WFTU in 1956.[61] However, since the unions played a very minor role in developments in Africa before independence, this instrument of potential Soviet influence did not prove particularly successful.

More important were communist contacts with Africans in France and Great Britain.[62] James Coleman has described the tactics of the communists towards these Africans as comprising " solicitation regarding lodging, social relations and entertainment; unconditional support of all nationalist objectives; arranging of summer tours behind the Iron Curtain; and the stimulating of a return to Africa armed with funds and the potential might of the Soviet Union to become leaders in African Soviet Republic."[63] Many of the Africans in London and Paris were members of the West African Student Association (WASA) and the *Fédération des Etudiants d'Afrique Noire en France* (FEANF). Both these organizations are still affiliated to the communist-led International Union of Students and have been extremely hostile to moderate African leaders. For example, when the RDA split with the communists in 1950, the FEANF refused to sever its ties with the French communists.[64] In his study of nationalism and communism in Africa, George Padmore stated that the work of the communists with African students was not very successful in this period. He argued that most of the students who were attracted by the communists while in Europe " shed their Marxist garments on returning home and revert to what they have always been at heart—bourgeois nationalists."[65]

As is evident from this brief survey of communist activity in post-war Africa, the policies which the communists pursued there were quite different from those they followed in Asia. Co-operation with local nationalists, rather than complete hostility toward them, characterized

[61] Fritz Schatten, *Afrika—schwarz oder rot?* (Munich: Piper, 1961), pp. 309ff; Thompson and Adloff, *French West Africa*, pp. 507–508.

[62] In 1945 there were about 100 African students in French universities and about 500 in Great Britain. By 1950, the figures had increased to 1,250 and 3,500. George H. T. Kimble, *Tropical Africa* (New York: Twentieth Century Fund, 1960), II, 283.

[63] James S. Coleman, " Nationalism in Tropical Africa," A working paper for George H. T. Kimble. Cited ibid.

[64] Donald K. Emmerson, " African Student Organizations," *Africa Report*, X, no. 5 (1965), pp. 6–7.

[65] Padmore, *Pan-Africanism or Communism?*, p. 239.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

communist activity in French Africa up to 1950. There are several important reasons for this difference in policy. First, in West Africa, no communist parties had yet developed upon which a revolutionary movement comparable to those in South Asia could be based.[66] In addition, the PCF was concerned with expanding its voting strength and Party support in both France and the French empire. As long as the communists remained within the coalition government (until 5 May 1947) and felt that they had a chance to come to power in France, they were unwilling to advocate independence for French colonial territories, which would then be lost to them.[67] Since the communists had no mass following in Africa—even of the limited type that existed in South Asia—their major hope of influencing events lay in attempting to infiltrate and influence organizations like the RDA.

After their removal from the government and the shift in the Soviet line of co-operation with nationalists, the PCF continued to work within the RDA, because by then they were exerting great influence within the African Party and prospects for controlling it were quite favourable. After May 1947, when the PCF began opposing the French Government, the RDA supported the communists. Although Houphouet-Boigny remained the leader of the RDA in West Africa, d'Arboussier, who was a member of the Communist Party and an RRDA deputy in Paris, forged tighter links with the PCF.[68]

However, the French communists failed to recognize two very important factors concerning the rise of the RDA and their own relationship with that party. First of all, the expansion of the RDA was the result of local appeals and not of the radical doctrines of the party. Whenever the RDA opposed local leaders, it made little progress. In fact, by 1948 the party's strength was located almost exclusively in the Ivory Coast, the home of Houphouet-Boigny. As the Party's policies moved leftwards, leaders in Senegal, Guinea, Dahomey, Niger, Ludan, and Upper Volta broke with the Party.[69]

Second, as the RDA initiated more radical policies which resulted in administrative repression of the party in Africa and wholesale resignations by more moderate members, Houphouet-Boigny, for whom the alliance with the communists had been based primarily on pragmatic grounds, began seriously to reconsider the continued value of the relationship. In June 1950, d'Arboussier was forced to resign from his position as Secretary General of the Co-ordinating Committee of the RDA, and in October the party officially broke with the communists. The work of the PCF during the prior five years was destroyed.

[66] The absence of West African communist parties was the result of a lack of local leaders and the policy of centralization carried out by the PCF. See Morgenthau, *Political Parties in French-Speaking Africa*, p. 24.

[67] See Moneta, *Die Kolonialpolitik der französischen KP*, pp. 127–128 and Rieber, *Stalin and the French Communist Party*, p. 314.

[68] See Morgenthau, *Political Parties in French-Speaking Africa*, pp. 89–90 and Thompson and Adloff, *French West Africa*, pp. 85–86.

[69] Ibid. pp. 87–89.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The French communists had seriously miscalculated both their influence within the RDA (only a handful of the members refused to support Houphouet-Boigny's decision to dissolve the PCF-RDA alliance) and the bases for RDA successes in Africa in 1946–47. These miscalculations were the major reasons for the continuation of a policy of co-operation with the African party after the shift in the Soviet line in late 1947.

In spite of the general policy of communist support for the RDA in French Africa during the late forties, the Soviet Union did not look with favour on other nationalist movements on the continent over which the communists had no influence. In his book on imperialism in Africa, S. V. Datlin followed the general Soviet attitude toward underdeveloped states and called the independence of Egypt, Ethiopia and Liberia "illusory." [70] The tactics of those nationalist leaders who were gradually bringing their countries to political independence were looked upon with disdain in Moscow. Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana, for example, was condemned as a docile collaborator with foreign monopoly capital who had betrayed the interests of the African masses.[71] Nnamdi Azikiwe of Nigeria received similar billing as an advocate of "a colonial version of the reactionary American philosophy of pragmatism" and as a "petty bourgeois reformer."[72] V. A. Maslennikov summarized the Soviet view of most African nationalists when he stated:

> The imperialists' attempt to disorganize the revolutionary struggle in the colonies. To this end they employ traitorous elements in the colonial and dependent countries; they use bourgeois nationalism and cosmopolitanism; they set up various nationalities in the colonial and dependent countries against one another and spread Pan-islamism, Zionism, Panturkism and other forms of chauvinism.[73]

At the time of Khrushchev and Bulganin's glamorous tour of South Asia in 1955, which dramatized the shift in Soviet policy towards underdeveloped countries, Soviet and communist influence in Africa was almost non-existent. Three and a half decades of sporadic communist activity in sub-Saharan Africa had resulted in few concrete gains. The communists were banned in South Africa and the study groups in West Africa had lost their influence in the African nationalist movement. A

[70] Datlin, *Afrika pod gnetom imperializma*, p. 6.

[71] Derek Kartum, *Africa, Africa: A Continent Rises to Its Feet* (London: Lawrence Wishart, 1954), pp. 59–60 and I. I. Potekhin, "Manevry angilskogo imperializma v Zapadnoi Afrike," in Vasileva, *Imperialisticheskaya borba za Afriku*, p. 228. It is interesting to note that the 1961 German edition of Olderogge and Potekhin's work on Africa views Nkrumah's rise to power in Ghana in 1945 "as a great victory," even though the Gold Coast was still a colony, while the 1954 edition stated that Nkrumah's election represented no real change. *Die Volker Afrikas*, p. 420 and *Narody Afriki*, pp. 350–361.

[72] Potekhin, "Stalinskayateoriya kolonialnoi revolyutsii," pp. 32–33.

[73] Maslennikov, "Natsionalno-osvoboditelnoe dvizhenie," p. 39.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

small Communist Party existed in Eritrea, but it was composed primarily of Italians.[74] In all areas of sub-Saharan Africa the strength of the communists was either negligible or absent.[75] Not until the rise in the late fifties and early sixties of independent African states and the change in the Soviet approach to African countries, was the Soviet Union able to gain any influence in developments on the continent.

[74] *World News and Views*, XXVII, no. 10 (1947), 119.
[75] U.S. Congress, Senate Special Subcommittee on Security Affairs of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 83rd Cong., 1st sess., *Strength of the International Communist Movement* (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1953), p. 26.

THE CHINA QUARTERLY

An international journal for the study of China

ISSUE No. 66 JUNE 1976

Rural Reconstruction during the Nanking Decade: Confucian Collectivism in Shantung — *Guy S. Alitto*
Economic Aspects of Land Reform in Kiangsu, 1949–52 — *Robert Ash*
Sino-American Relations and the Vietnam War, 1964–66 — *Frank E. Rogers*
Intercessor Roles in Migration: Recruitment Processes in Rural Hong Kong — *Göran Aijmer*

Comment: Centralization and Decentralization in China's Fiscal Management — *Audrey Donnithorne and Nicholas R. Lardy*

Report from China **Book Reviews**
Quarterly Chronicle and Documentation

Editorial Office: School of Oriental and African Studies, Malet Street, London WC1E 7HP.
Subscriptions: Research Publications Ltd., Victoria Hall, East Greenwich, London SE10 0RF.

Subscription Rates: £6·00 or US $15.00 a year
For full-time students: £3·00 or US $7.50 a year
Individual Copies: £1·50 or US $3.75

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Nigeria and Soviet Attitudes to African Military Regimes, 1965-70*

O. Igho Natufe

SINCE the October 1917 Russian revolution the Soviet leaders have been championing the fight against European colonial rule. The collapse of European colonial empires which began to gain momentum after the second world war was not only hailed in the Kremlin, but was viewed by the Soviets as a signal for their entry into the former colonies. The USSR gradually intensified its infiltration in Africa as the European colonial powers withdrew. The 1960s witnessed the systematic growth of Soviet involvement in Africa as the Soviet Government quickly established diplomatic relations with the new independent states and offered both economic and technical assistance. The Soviets anticipated that their anti-colonial ideology, Marxism-Leninism, would win both support and sympathy in the former colonies. This hope was shattered in the 1960–62 period. In the post-1962 period of Soviet African policy the Soviets began to exercise caution in their approach, owing to a better understanding of Africa and African politics.[1]

In the second half of the 1960s an important phenomenon came into play in Soviet-African relations. The emergence of military regimes in Africa caught the USSR unprepared in policy formulation towards the military. The present article will examine and analyse the various stages of Soviet policy formulation regarding the African military regimes during 1965–70, with special emphasis on the Soviet attitude towards the Nigerian military regimes.

BY the mid-1960s the Soviet Union had made a clear dichotomy in her policy towards respective African states. A state was either pursuing a "non-capitalist path of development" or a "pro-Western" policy.[2]

* This article is a revised version of a chapter from the author's doctoral dissertation, Omajuwa Igho Natufe, "Soviet Policy in Africa, 1945–1970: A Study in Political History," McGill University, Montreal, Canada, 1974. The author thanks the Midwest Government of Nigeria and the Government of Quebec, Canada, for their financial assistance which made the research and writing of the dissertation possible between 1971 and 1973. The assistance of the co-supervisors, Professor H. C. Schlieper and Professor M. J. Echenberg, is also acknowledged.

1 See H. D. Cohn, *Soviet Policy Toward Black Africa: The Focus on National Integration*, New York, 1972; Robert Legvold, *Soviet Policy in West Africa*, Cambridge, Mass., 1970, chs. III & V. See also Omajuwa Igho Natufe, "Soviet Policy in Africa, 1945–1970: A Study in Political History," chs. V-VI.

2 In the Soviet view a state pursuing a policy of "non-capitalist path of development" is referred to as a "state of national democracy." For a discussion of this concept and its role in Soviet diplomacy, see A. Sobolev, "Natsionalnaia demokratiia, Put k sotsialnomu progressu," *Problemy mira i sotsializma*, No. 2 (Feb. 1963), pp. 39–48;

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

In the Soviet view the former category included Algeria, Egypt, Ghana, Guinea and Mali, while the latter category included, primarily, Nigeria, Dahomey, Liberia, Kenya and Ethiopia.

The Soviet Government enhanced its position in Algeria immediately following the Franco-Algerian war. The Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) established "comradely" relations with the Algerian National Liberation Front (FLN), even though the Algerian Communist Party was proscribed by President Ben Bella. Ben Bella's visit to Moscow in April–May 1964, and the subsequent arms deal, further enhanced the Soviet position in Algeria. His support for the Soviet position in world politics, especially in the Sino-Soviet conflict, had earned him the Soviet Order of Lenin in 1964. While China demanded the exclusion of the USSR from the "Second Bandung" conference scheduled to convene in Algiers on 29 June 1965, he condemned the Chinese position and stated that the USSR must attend all meetings of Afro-Asian peoples. It was obvious that Ben Bella had established himself as a strong supporter of Soviet policies in Africa.

When viewed from this perspective Soviet policy towards the events of 1965 in Algeria appeared uncertain and rather confusing. Ben Bella's government was toppled by the Algerian military on 19 June 1965. This anti-Ben Bella *coup d'état* took place eight months after the dismissal of Nikita Khrushchev and the emergence of Leonid Brezhnev and Alexei Kosygin as the new leaders in the Kremlin. Colonel Houari Boumedienne emerged as the leader of the military Revolutionary Council that ousted Ben Bella. Though the Soviet press reported the change of leadership in Algeria,[3] Soviet leaders remained silent. In the first communiqué of the Revolutionary Council, Boumedienne pledged the construction of "a real socialist society" and accused Ben Bella of having ruled Algeria by "intrigue."[4] His pledge to construct "a real socialist society" was undoubtedly intended for Soviet consumption. It implied that Ben Bella had failed in this direction. The Soviet leaders did not respond. However, the fact that *Pravda* printed the communiqué lent credibility to the erosion of Ben Bella's popularity in the Kremlin after the dismissal of Khrushchev.

The Chinese Ambassador in Algeria, Tseng Tao, assured Boumedienne of China's support on 20 June 1965. This diplomatic offensive by China was obviously intended to undermine the Soviets in Algeria. The Soviet Government did not know Boumedienne's position on the question of Soviet participation in the "Second Bandung." However, the conference, which was re-scheduled for October 1965, was never convened. Nevertheless, the removal of Ben Bella from Algeria's political scene and Peking's prompt recognition of Boumedienne's regime increased the speculation

Richard Lowenthal, "On 'National Democracy': Its functions in Communist Policy," *Survey*, No. 47 (April 1963), pp. 119–33; Omajuwa Igho Natufe, op. cit. pp. 59–75.

[3] See *Pravda*, *Izvestiya*, 20, 21, 22 June 1965.

[4] *Pravda*, 20 June 1965.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

in Moscow of alleged Chinese involvement in the military coup, primarily to exclude the USSR from the conference.[5]

Soviet desire to participate in the conference was undoubtedly a factor in Soviet recognition of Boumedienne. The Soviet Government decided to recognize Boumedienne on 14 July 1965—a month after Ben Bella was overthrown. According to TASS, Premier Kosygin, on 14 July 1965, sent a congratulatory message to Boumedienne assuring him of continued Soviet aid. Following the coup against Khrushchev in October 1964, both Brezhnev and Kosygin had assured President Nasser of Egypt and Ben Bella that " Soviet policy does not change with individuals." If, according to the Soviet position, the dominant factor in foreign policy is the class orientation of a government, it might be relevant to pose the question: Did Boumedienne represent the " progressive class " in Algerian politics? Or was the Soviet decision to recognize him motivated by the desire to attend the " Second Bandung " conference?

Between June and December 1965, Soviet African policy was dominated by the Algerian question. Soviet leaders held a series of meetings with African leaders in Moscow. The proposed " Second Bandung " was the central theme of these meetings. President Milton Obote visited Moscow in July and the Soviet-Ugandan communiqué of 28 July revealed Soviet concern about the conference.

President Sekou Toure was invited to Moscow in July by the Central Committee of the CPSU. The bilateral talks between Brezhnev and Toure, as reflected in the Soviet-Guinean joint communiqué of 31 July, reaffirmed Soviet and Guinean policies of peaceful coexistence and the fight for " universal and general disarmament." [6]

The meetings between Brezhnev and Nasser, and Brezhnev and President Modibo Keita of Mali, were primarily concerned with the question of Soviet participation in the " Second Bandung." Both Nasser and Keita were invited to Moscow by the Central Committee of the CPSU. President Nasser regarded Soviet participation in the conference as a vital contribution to the anti-imperialist struggle in Africa and Asia.[7] The Soviet-Malian joint communiqué of 11 October 1965 was the most explicit concerning the " Second Bandung." Both parties expressed the hope that the " Second Afro-Asian Conference would help to unite all forces fighting against imperialism, colonialism and neo-colonialism, for universal peace and friendship between peoples." [8]

Soviet diplomacy seemed to have guaranteed Moscow a seat at the conference. The complete abandonment of the conference was therefore a disappointment for the USSR. However, on the occasion marking the

[5] Some Soviet professors expressed this view to the author in Moscow. The author was a student in Moscow 1964–69.

[6] *Vneshniaia politika Sovetskogo Soiuza, 1964-1965 gg: Sbornik Dokumentov*, Moscow, 1966, pp. 277–85.

[7] Ibid. pp. 310–19.

[8] Ibid. p. 390.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

11th anniversary of the beginning of the Algerian war of independence Nikolai Prozhogin, *Pravda's* correspondent in Algiers, reminded Boumedienne that the Algerian war of independence " was assisted by the successes of world socialism . . ." and above all " by the Soviet Union, the other socialist countries. . . ." [9] This was a warning to Boumedienne not to deviate from the pro-Soviet policy of Ben Bella.

The Soviet Government invited Boumedienne to Moscow in December 1965. He arrived in Moscow on 13 December on his first official visit outside Africa. The extensive biographical note on him in the Soviet press did not mention Ben Bella. It was merely stated that he became Chairman of the Algerian Revolutionary Council on 19 June 1965, without any reference to the fact that he overthrew Ben Bella's government in a military *coup d'état.*[10] However, it is significant to note that while President Podgornyi and Premier Kosygin were at the airport to welcome Boumedienne, Party Chief Brezhnev, leader of the CPSU that had established " comradely " ties with Ben Bella, was absent. Boumedienne had his first official meeting with Brezhnev on 15 December 1965. This meeting, which lasted over three hours, was not reported in the Soviet press. According to Algerian sources both leaders discussed " general political relations " between Algeria and the USSR.[11] This could mean an assurance from Boumedienne that his government would not deviate from the pro-Soviet policy of Ben Bella.

THE military *coup d'état* in Algeria set the stage for a chain reaction of military coups which occurred in quick succession in Africa. Between 25 November 1965 and 24 February 1966, the army seized power in six African states by overthrowing civilian regimes:

25 November 1965: General Mobutu ousted Moise Tshombe and President Kasavubu in the Congo (now Zaïre). His first appearance on the political scene was in 1960 when he led a military coup that toppled Premier Patrice Lumumba;

22 December 1965: General Soglo seized power from the provisional President of Dahomey,[12] Tahiorou Congacou. Earlier in 1963 the army had ousted President Hubert Maga. This was the fourth coup in Dahomey;

31 December 1965: Colonel Bokassa led a military coup in the Central African Republic;

4 January 1966: Colonel Lamizana toppled the regime of Premier Maurice Yameogo in Upper Volta;

15 January 1966: armed forces toppled Tafawa Balewa's government in Nigeria. General Ironsi's military regime was overthrown on 29 July 1966 by another military coup. Colonel Yakubu Gowon headed a new military regime;

[9] *Pravda*, 1 Nov. 1965.
[10] See *Pravda, Izvestiya*, 13 Dec. 1965.
[11] *Egyptian Mail*, 18 Dec. 1965.
[12] In Nov. 1975 Dahomey changed its name to the Republic of Benin.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

24 February 1966: Kwame Nkrumah was ousted by the Ghanaian army;
19 November 1968, Modibo Keita was overthrown by the army in Mali.

Initial Soviet response towards the series of military coups in Africa indicated its inexperience in dealing with military regimes outside the socialist camp of Eastern Europe. G. I. Mirsky, a Soviet specialist in African and Asian studies, deplored the neglect of a study of military forces in Africa and Asia by Soviet social scientists.[13] However, this neglect did not inhibit the Soviets from making broad political statements whenever a civilian government was overthrown by the military. Soviet analysts regarded the military coups against "pro-Western regimes" as a sign of a move to the left.[14] For example, G. B. Starushenko, a senior researcher in the Soviet Institute of Africa, hailed the "positive significance" of the coups in Dahomey, Upper Volta, Nigeria and other "pro-Western" countries. He regarded the role of the military in these countries as a campaign to fight "corruption" and "detribalize" politics.[15]

SINCE the Central Committee of the CPSU exercises tremendous ideological control over the writings of Soviet analysts, any noticeable contradiction in their writings should be viewed as a reflection of the different trends within the CPSU's ideological hierarchy. Therefore, in our analysis of Moscow's attitude towards the African military regimes we shall view Soviet policy through the writings of the Kremlin's leading Africanists. Though there is no unanimous viewpoint among Soviet analysts on the role of the armed forces, a majority of them views military forces as the masses' last protector from corruption and oppression. The army is regarded as the "last organized class" in society. For example, when Christophe Soglo led the fourth military coup in Dahomey in 1965, Moscow applauded this as a progressive move in the struggle against Dahomey's "reactionary parties" which had "tried to turn back Dahomey's development."[16] In the views of Soviet analysts, the coups in "pro-Western" African countries were possible because, they argued, the army lacked political education and had no Marxist ideological orientation. The implication of this is clear: the army could never overthrow the pro-Soviet regimes of Ghana, Guinea, and Mali where, it was argued, the army had a Marxist ideological orientation. However, a survey of Soviet writings on the military prior to 24 February 1966, reveals a gross analytical inaccuracy.

[13] G. I. Mirsky, "Ofitserstvo," *Klassy i klassovaia borba v razvivaiushchikhsia stranakh*, Moscow, 1967, Vol. 1, pp. 331–32.
[14] See Lev Stepanov, "Third World in Three Dimensions," *New Times*, Moscow, no. 2 (10 Jan. 1966), pp. 3–5.
[15] G. B. Starushenko, *Natsiia i gosudarstvo v osvobozhdaiushchikhsia stranakh*, Moscow, 1967, p. 223.
[16] V. Sidenko, "Another Coup in Dahomey," *New Times*, Moscow, no. 1 (1 Jan. 1966), p. 19.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

In the view of Boris Payeltsev, the army " cannot revolt against the regimes in Ghana, Guinea and Mali " because in these countries " the army is regarded as an inalienable part of the national political forces." He further postulated that this was particularly true in Guinea and Mali where " the ruling parties are in full control of the army and are responsible for its political training." [17] He was writing four weeks before the coup in Ghana and 11 days after the army had seized power in Nigeria in January 1966. He offered the following explanation for the military coups in " pro-Western " countries:

> The basic factor behind the coups is that in many an African country the ruling faction, with its constant bickering, has no answer to the country's problems, does not know how to run the country in the face of popular discontent. In these conditions intervention by the army, the last organised force of the ruling class, is always possible, indeed probable.[18]

Writing on 15 January 1966, when the army seized power in Nigeria, V. Kudriavtsev, *Izvestiya's* chief Africanist, clearly underlined the tone of Soviet analysis on the military. In his opinion the military coups in Africa symbolised the debility of " the capitalist path of development " and the governments' inability to eradicate " the entire legacy of colonialism." [19]

It was ideologically expedient for Soviet analysts to attack " the entire legacy of colonialism " for every political crisis in Africa. M. Bochkarev continued this trend when he argued that the colonial powers instituted favourable regimes in the colonies before granting political independence. He saw these regimes as local executioners of decayed colonial policies. It was on this basis that he attacked Tafawa Balewa's government:

> Its programme consisted, broadly speaking, of three points: no deep-going reforms; a private enterprise economy; a completely free hand for foreign capital. These reactionary policies, accompanied by repression against the progressive elements who demanded social change, were bound to arouse opposition in the country. The people hated the Balewa regime, and the army officers who set out to overthrow it did not have much difficulty in doing so.[20]

The above analysis indicated the Soviet conviction that the military would not interrupt the political process of countries pursuing the " non-capitalist path of development." In the Soviet view, both Nkrumah and Keita had taken measures to politicize their respective armies. Ghanaian army officers were trained in East European Communist countries, while some of the British-trained officers were re-trained in the Soviet Union.

[17] Boris Paveltsev, " The Military Coups in Africa," *New Times*, Moscow, no. 4 (26 Jan. 1966), p. 12.
[18] Ibid. p. 13.
[19] V. Kudriavtsev, " African Tremors," *Izvestiya*, 15 Jan. 1966.
[20] Yuri Bochkaryov, " Africa: Anatomy of the Military Coups," *New Times*, Moscow no. 14 (6 Apr. 1966), p. 11.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

WHEN the military overthrew Kwame Nkrumah on 24 February 1966, the atmosphere in Moscow was, therefore, one of complete bewilderment. What had gone wrong? The news was disclosed to Nkrumah by the Chinese during his visit to Peking *en route* to Hanoi. Though he "ordered" the rebelling soldiers to return to their barracks and maintained that he was still Head of State, he did not return to Ghana alive. He cut short his stay in Peking and immediately proceeded to Moscow to confer with Soviet leaders. He stayed in Moscow from 28 February to 2 March 1966, before leaving for Conakry where his political friend, President Sekou Toure, declared him a Guinean citizen and appointed him Co-President of Guinea. Nkrumah's stay in Moscow embarrassed the Soviet leaders as the Ghanaian embassy refused to obey his instructions.

The coup in Ghana prompted a critical analysis of the role of the military by Soviet Africanists and the Soviet Government. A double-faced approach was employed in viewing the military. While expressing Soviet embarrassment over the Ghanaian coup, Mirsky lamented the fact that "neither the party, trade union, nor the mass organisations" of Kwame Nkrumah "was able to influence the course of events" in February 1966.[21] The significance of the Ghanaian coup was that Soviet criticism of Ghana, Nkrumah and the Convention People's Party (CPP) became more systematic. Though the immediate rationale in Moscow was that the coup was inspired by US secret agents, some elements of Nkrumah's policies were however criticized.[22]

The "non-democratic" policies of Nkrumah and the CPP were soon castigated in Moscow. Nkrumah was accused of relying on his close aides and thus systematically isolating the masses from the party and government; consequently "the citizen was deprived of any possibility of free expression."[23] Mirsky, in his 1970 book, *Armiia i politika v stranakh Azii i Afriki* (*Army and Politics in the countries of Asia and Africa*), offered the hardest attack on Nkrumah:

> The political and state system which existed in Ghana before February 1966 were connected with one party and with one person.[24]

Thus, Nkrumah, like Stalin, was guilty of the "personality cult." Mirsky remarked that Nkrumah accumulated "unlimited powers" and that he was alone in the seat of power after liquidating his enemies. According to Mirsky, the CPP did not represent the masses:

21 G. I. Mirsky, "Ofitserstvo," p. 331.

22 See V. Sidenko, "Ghana: The Coup and the Imperialists," *New Times*, Moscow, no. 10 (9 Mar. 1966), pp. 14–16; Yuri Bochkaryov, "Africa: Anatomy of the Military Coups," *New Times*, no. 14 (6 Apr. 1966), pp. 10–12; V. Shelepin, "Africa: Why the Instability," *New Times*, Moscow, no. 52 (30 Dec. 1968), pp. 21–24; E. M. Zhukov, *Sovremennye i teorii sotsializma "natsionalnogo tipa,"* Moscow, 1967.

23 N. Gavrilov, "Africa: Classes, Parties and Politics," *International Affairs*, Moscow, no. 7 (Jul. 1966), pp. 42–43, as cited in Cohn, p. 157.

24 G. I. Mirsky, *Armiia i politika v stranakh Azii i Afriki*, Moscow, 1970, p. 249.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

> A revolutionary regime must have a clear social and political orientation. . . . At the head of the state must be a well organized party strongly connected with the people and also dependent on their activeness. The party is summoned to battle; it must be an ideologically armed organization, but not a club of intellectual revolutionaries.[25]

G. B. Starushenko took a slightly different view in his criticism of Nkrumah. He condemned "bourgeois scientists" and "certain Afro-Asian politicians" for viewing the military coup in Ghana as a rejection of the "non-capitalist path of development":

> They portray the reactionary coup in Ghana as a collapse of the idea of non-capitalist development (of peoples) in the direction toward socialism. They view the assumption of power by the military as a proof of the "unacceptability" of democracy in Africa. . . .[26]

Starushenko was referring to a "state of national democracy" when he accused Western social scientists of attempting to negate "democracy in Africa." He conceded however that "national and social progress . . . develops in a zigzag" direction and appealed to bourgeois sociologists to recognize this fact.[27] He dichotomized the coups in Africa:

> In certain cases the coups were organized externally and were meant to remove from power progressive forces, and to change the social orientation of a country's development (for example, Ghana); in other cases the coups reflected internal dissatisfaction caused by the crisis of pro-Western regimes.[28]

It is significant that while Mirsky attributed the *main cause* of the Ghanaian coup to the dictatorial rule of Nkrumah and the elitist policies of the CPP which fermented social discontents, Starushenko attributed the *cause* of the coup to external imperialist intrigue in Ghana. Thus, Starushenko confined himself to standard Soviet analysis, even though he recognized other common denominators in Africa's military coups:

> The relative simplicity with which the coups were effected in all the countries could be explained by the fact that both the progressive and reactionary regimes did not have a solid economic base.[29]

Though there is an element of subjectivism in this analysis, it addressed itself to more fundamental questions as opposed to the rather simplistic explanation of "CIA" conspiracy in the Ghanaian coup. Fundamentally, Starushenko admitted:

> The absence of active support for the national democratic regime from the masses and party during the coup explained the relative simplicity with which the coup was effected. As a national front, the ruling national democratic party was heterogeneous [*raznorodnyi*]

[25] Ibid. p. 262. See also Starushenko, *Natsiia i gosudarstvo* . . . , pp. 225–232.
[26] Starushenko, p. 222.
[27] Ibid.
[28] Ibid.
[29] Ibid.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

> in class relations and had already failed to solve the tasks of the new stage of the anti-imperialist revolution. Though measures were taken to reorganize the party into a vanguard in Ghana, this important political action had no time to produce tangible results.[30]

The implication of the above analysis by Starushenko was exactly what Mirsky had underscored in his book. This meant that the CPP, as a "mass" party, existed only in the minds of a few intellectuals. Kwame Nkrumah was Secretary and Chairman of the Party, and most Ghanaians had joined the party primarily because of the security that membership generated under a political system where Nkrumah had forcibly removed all his visible rivals. The party was Nkrumah and Nkrumah was Ghana.

While Nkrumah was in power, Soviet leaders had claimed that Ghana was building socialism. However, we are told by Soviet analysts that the "dictatorial" powers of Nkrumah and the isolation of the "masses" from political control were ideological blunders that caused the coup in Ghana in 1966. However, these "causes" existed in Ghana when the country was supposedly pursuing the "non-capitalist path of development leading to socialism." Why did the Soviet leaders fail to criticize Nkrumah's policies publicly before the coup of 1966? Did they continue to propagate Nkrumah's policies in anticipation that future communist-inclined Ghanaians would "correct" Nkrumah's errors? Or was it the case of temporary ideological sacrifice for the expediency of Soviet national interest? The Soviet Union needed a base and Nkrumah seemed to have provided one in Ghana.

WHEN the military overthrew Modibo Keita on 19 November 1968, the USSR discovered that they had lost two vital political allies in Africa. Mali was also pursuing the "non-capitalist path of development." In January 1966 Boris Paveltsev had claimed that a military coup was impossible in Mali. The November 1968 coup did not only negate his assertion but was challenged by V. Kudriavtsev:

> The Military Liberation Committee consists of 14 men, mostly army captains and lieutenants whose political views are practically unknown.[31]

Though the overthrow of Ben Bella's government was a setback for the USSR, the Soviet Government had managed to establish friendly relations with Houari Boumedienne before the end of 1965. The reverse was the case in both Ghana and Mali. Both Nkrumah and Keita were formidable Soviet allies following the rupture in Soviet-Guinean relations. Sekou Toure's independent policy and the exit of Nkrumah and Keita from Africa's political scene necessitated extreme caution on the part of

[30] Ibid., p. 224.

[31] V. Kudryavtsev, "After the Coup in Mali," *New Times*, Moscow, no. 49 (11 Dec. 1968), p. 7. See also V. Shelepin, "Africa: Why the Instability," *New Times*, Moscow, no. 52 (30 Dec. 1968), pp. 21–24.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the Soviet Government in dealing with "radical" regimes in Africa. It is significant to note that the Brezhnev-Kosygin leadership did not award the Order of Lenin to any African head of state or government in the 1965–1970 period. The Soviet Government under Khrushchev had awarded this title to Nasser, Sekou Toure, Nkrumah, Keita, and Ben Bella. Mr Curtis Joseph, the Chairman of the Nigerian Peace Council, was awarded the title in 1966.

AN analysis of Soviet policy towards Nigeria's military regimes requires an examination of Soviet attitudes toward Nigeria in the 1960–1965 period. Two questions in this period will be briefly discussed. First, we shall survey the policies of Prime Minister Balewa's government. Second, an analysis of Soviet criticism of Nigerian policy and Nigeria's state structure will help us to understand Soviet disappointments and expectations in Nigeria, before the first military *coup d'état* of January 1966.

Both the USSR and the Western powers hailed the independence of Nigeria on 1 October 1960. The West viewed Nigeria as Africa's "showcase" of democracy, while the Soviet Union hoped that the new state would play a leading role in the anti-imperialist struggle in Africa. The Nigerian trade union movement was the most organized in Black Africa. The Soviets recalled the trade union strike of the mid-1940s. However, they viewed Balewa's government as a "lackey of British imperialism" supported by the feudal lords of Northern Nigeria and the *comprodore* bourgeoisie of Southern Nigeria.[32]

Tafawa Balewa headed a coalition government of his party, the Northern People's Congress (NPC), and the National Council of Nigerian Citizens (NCNC), while Obafemi Awolowo's Action Group (AG) formed the official opposition in the Nigerian parliament. The NPC was strictly a Northern party. The NCNC controlled both the East and the Midwest and was a strong alternative to the AG in the West. These two southern-based parties made significant inroads in the North during the federal elections of 1959 and 1964.[33]

Prior to independence, and for the first six years thereafter, ethnicity was the main ideology of the major political parties. There was no real confrontation on the philosophical plane between well-defined ideologies. It was only in mid-1961 that the AG began to define its ideology as "democratic socialism" while the NCNC propagated "pragmatic socialism."

[32] See L. N. Pribytkovskii, *Nigeriia v borba za nezavisimost*, Moscow, 1961. Pribytkovskii is one of the USSR's leading Africanists.

[33] For an analysis of Nigeria's political parties and government, see Eme O. Awa, *Federal Government in Nigeria*, Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1964; James Coleman, *Nigeria: Background to Nationalism*, Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1965; John P. MacKintosh, *Nigerian Government and Politics*, London, 1966; and Richard L. Sklar, *Nigerian Political Parties*, Princeton, New Jersey, 1963.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

However, with the formation of the Socialist Workers' and Farmers' Party (SWAFP) in the autumn of 1963, ideological struggle became more pronounced in the Nigerian political scene. The formation of SWAFP was hailed in Moscow. Tunji Otegbeye, former President of the Nigerian Youth Congress (NYC), was elected Secretary General of the new political party which immediately established comradely relations with the CPSU. The party adopted "scientific socialism" as its ideology. It had control over the Nigerian Trade Union Congress (NTUC), while a youth organization, the NYC, was its "komsomol." At a time when the Nigerian Government proscribed travelling to Communist countries, the CPSU, Soviet Trade Unions and the Komsomol offered scholarships to Nigerians through the SWAFP, NTUC and the NYC. The CPSU regarded SWAFP as a vanguard party, and sent representatives to the party's first congress held in Lagos in November 1965. The SWAFP based its ideology on Soviet Marxism-Leninism and propagated the class struggle concept, to the distaste of other parties. For example, before the 1964 federal elections the NPC and its allies united to form the Nigerian National Alliance (NNA) while the NCNC, AG and their allies formed the United Progressive Grand Alliance (UPGA). The former was considered reactionary and represented the feudal interests of Northern Nigeria, while the latter claimed to be progressive and socialist in outlook. However, when the SWAFP applied for membership in UPGA its application was rejected because the leaders of UPGA viewed SWAFP as a Soviet Marxist-Leninist party.

The AG crisis of May 1962, following the party's conference in Jos, fundamentally changed the political alliance system in Nigeria. The crisis offered the NPC an opportunity to crush the AG. Meanwhile the deserters from the AG had formed a new political party—the United People's Party (UPP)—which in 1964 was renamed the Nigerian National Democratic Party (NNDP), with Samuel Akintola, Premier of the West, as the leader.

The split within the AG and the impact of a treason trial against the leaders of the party created favourable situations for the NPC. In the Federal House former members of the AG "crossed carpets" to swell the cell of the NPC. In this atmosphere the NPC did not seem to need the NCNC any longer and became politically arrogant. The Soviet Union was implicated in the treason trials against Obafemi Awolowo, Anthony Enahoro and other leaders of the AG. It was alleged that some of these leaders were trained by Soviet military experts stationed in Ghana and were equipped with Soviet-made weapons.

In foreign policy Nigeria professed neutrality but was reluctant to establish diplomatic relations with the USSR and other Communist states even though the Soviet Government was "interested" in establishing close relations with Nigeria. The criticisms from the AG, the NYC and other groups forced the Balewa regime to establish diplomatic relations with the USSR.[34] Even after the establishment of diplomatic

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

relations the Nigerian Government was not enthusiastic in dealing with the USSR. The Soviet embassy personnel was limited to 10 officials. The economic and trade talks which were initiated in 1963 did not produce tangible results because of the indecision and suspicion of both the USSR and Nigeria. When the Nigerian Government started to accept the Soviet Government's scholarship offers, Lagos was reluctant to fill the places allocated to Nigeria in Soviet institutions. This reluctance increased the vacancies in Soviet institutions for the SWAFP, NTUC, and the NYC.

The federal system in Nigeria, like all other colonially created federations, was criticized by the Soviets. They argued that these colonial federations did not take into consideration the ethnic factors in the colonies and that the concept of divide-and-rule dominated British policy in these colonies. For example, while the Federation of Tanzania was applauded, Nigerian federalism was condemned.[35] The orientation of the government in power, rather than the colonial aspect of federalism, was the reason for Soviet anti-Nigerianism. For example, depending on who controlled political power in Lagos, the Soviets constantly shifted their views on Nigeria from condemnation to support in the 1960–66 period. Twice in 1966 the Ironsi military regime came under the axe of Soviet criticism.

THE first military coup in Nigeria on 15 January 1966, was promptly applauded by the anti-government forces in the country as the toppled Balewa regime was generally considered to be corrupt. The coup was bloody as Nigeria's Prime Minister, two regional premiers, the federal minister of finance and a high-ranking army officer were killed. Since the young army officers who effected the coup were all Ibos, and there was no Ibo among those killed, the other major ethnic groups began to accuse the Ibos of plotting to take over Nigeria. Ironically, the army officers who effected the coup were ousted from the centre of power. The fact that the head of the Nigerian army, General Ironsi (an Ibo), assumed power as the head of Nigeria's first military regime seemed to aggravate the situation.

The Soviets welcomed the coup as they thought it spelt the end of feudal and bourgeois domination, particularly since they regarded the army as the " last organized class " of the system capable of implementing policies of a progressive nature. V. G. Grafsky and B. A. Strashun applauded the abrogation of the federal system by General Ironsi and the proclamation of a unitary system of government for Nigeria. This, they argued, was " one of the important steps " taken by the Ironsi regime.[36] Mirsky offered a positive assessment of the army:

[34] See Claude S. Phillips, Jr., *The Development of Nigerian Foreign Policy*, Evanston, 1964.

[35] See V. G. Grafskii and B. A. Strashun, *Federalizm v razvivaiushchikhsia stranakh: Aziia i Afrika*, Moscow, 1968, pp. 3–35, & chapters VII, IX.

[36] Ibid., p. 198.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

> People reasoned within the categories of kinship, tribes, villages, castes, religious sects. The army represents the only organism in which all groups of the population mingle, the natives of the different regions, the representatives of tribal and social groups not conscious of belonging to one nation. The illiterate peasant, whose horizon was confined to the little world of his village, meets with people from other regions and social groups in the army, begins to see himself as a member of one national family. It is precisely the army that inculcates in him national self-consciousness. Therefore, the army has become a symbol of national unity and the bearer of the idea of sovereignty. . . .[37]

Mirsky's assessment of the role of the army as a factor in building national unity is based on the Soviet Red Army's concept of the army. In the views of Starushenko, the January coup in Nigeria was a " revolutionary explosion " which reflected

> The accumulation of mass dissatisfaction over the years which was caused by the domination of feudalists and *comprodore* bourgeoisie, and also by the infringement of national rights of many nationalities.[38]

However, Ironsi's decree of 24 May 1966, abolishing federalism and instituting unitarism, was, in the views of Starushenko, a " progressive measure " towards the formation of a strong state and the eradication of " inter-tribal and national discords." [39]

The logic of the above Soviet analysis is dubious. Soviet analysts not only hailed the army but argued that the abolishment of federalism was a " progressive measure " for Nigerian development, claiming that the infringement of nationality rights under federalism necessitated the proclamation of a unitary system. However, Soviet experts on Soviet nationality policy had always claimed that the USSR was a federal state and that federalism guarantees the rights of national groups within a heterogenous society. Since the Nigerian society is not homogeneous it is difficult to see how a unitary system could eradicate " inter-tribal and national discords." Thus, the Soviets were deliberately ignoring the realities of Nigerian society simply to mollify General Ironsi with whom the Soviet Government wanted to maintain friendly relations since he represented the " progressive army " that overthrew Tafawa Balewa. Therefore, we can postulate that the Soviets were discarding ideological argument for Soviet national interest. It should be recalled that in late January 1966 Tunji Otegbeye, the Secretary General of SWAFP, issued a public appeal for the support of Ironsi's regime and this may have influenced Soviet analysts favourably in their assessment of Ironsi's regime.

[37] Mirskii, " Ofitserstvo," pp. 336–37.
[38] Starushenko, p. 273.
[39] Ibid., p. 274.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

However, the Soviet view of the Ironsi regime began to shift towards negativism in May–July 1966. The "progressive measures" expected from Ironsi were not forthcoming; neither did the "imperialist grip" on the Nigerian economy diminish. Foreign, capitalist investment in Nigeria grew and the Soviets became suspicious of General Ironsi.[40]

Meanwhile in Nigeria the Hausas were incensed by the unitary system proposed by Ironsi, arguing that it implied the domination of Nigeria by the Ibos. The fact that Ironsi was an Ibo even made it difficult for the North to accept unitarism since a unitary system would curtail the dominance of the Hausa-Fulani alliance (NPC) that was obviously guaranteed under federalism. The disturbances in the North between May and July 1966 in which thousands of Ibos were killed were directed against the Ibos and Ironsi's unitarism. The Hausa-led faction in the army overthrew Ironsi's regime on 29 July 1966, killing General Ironsi. Yakubu Gowon, a Northerner from a minority ethnic group, succeeded Ironsi as Head of State. Gowon's first act was to abolish Ironsi's unitarism, which he castigated as "economic and political suicide." The federal system was reinstated.

THE post-July 1966 developments in Nigeria caused a volte-face in Soviet analysis. Ironsi's unitarism was condemned and declared an imperialist policy. The reinstatement of federalism was hailed. The Soviet Government indicated its willingness to cooperate with the military government of Gowon and the long protracted economic and trade agreements were gradually implemented. In the ensuing conflict between Gowon and Ojukwu, the former was supported while Ojukwu was referred to as an agent of Western imperialism in Nigeria.[41]

It must be stressed, however, that the Soviet Government and a majority of Soviet analysts developed a wait-and-see attitude regarding the Gowon-Ojukwu conflict between August 1966 and July 1967. During this period the feudal North was condemned while sympathy toward the Ibos was observed in Moscow. While the Soviet press referred to the killings as genocide the Soviet Government exercised extreme caution.

This dilemma was to cause a problem for Soviet authorities when the Kremlin finally decided to support a faction in the Nigerian crisis. The killings in the North were equated to the pogroms in Nazi Germany. It was during this period that V. Yordansky wrote that African armies

> represent the flesh and blood of the half-feudal, tribal and bourgeois leaders of African countries, travelling the capitalist path, permeated with its ideology, serving its interests.[42]

[40] See Cohn, p. 168.

[41] V. Sidenko, "Oil war in Nigeria," *New Times*, Moscow, no. 11 (15 March 1967), pp. 21–22; "End of Operation Biafra," *New Times*, Moscow, no. 43 (25 Oct. 1967), pp. 20–21.

[42] V. Iordanskii, "O kharaktere voennikh diktatur v tropicheskoi Afrike," *Narody Azzi i Afriki*, (1967), p. 36, cited by Cohn, p. 243.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Yordansky's evaluation represented the views of Soviet analysts at that particular time. Since his viewpoint was not challenged, it thus seemed to represent Soviet Government policy toward the Nigerian military regime till August–September 1967.

Between January and May 1967 Soviet professors in their lectures sought to justify Ojukwu's policies even when it was apparent that Ojukwu was preparing to declare the independence of the East from the Nigerian federation. They blamed the West for the conflict. Ojukwu had clothed his speeches with socialist slogans and promised to build " socialism " in the East. Soviet reports on the Gowon-Ojukwu conflict over the Aburi Declaration tended to support Ojukwu but the events of May 1967 called for caution in the Soviet Union.

On 27 May Gowon declared the creation of 12 states in the federation, including three in the East where the Ibos got their own state in the barren land of the former Eastern region. The other two states were for minorities who had nursed a dislike for the Ibos. The move by Gowon to create these states in the East was primarily to mollify the minorities and to obtain their support against Ojukwu, especially since the non-Ibos in the East had long demanded the creation of their own states. On 30 May Ojukwu declared the independence of Biafra comprising the entire Eastern region. It was at this point that Soviet writers began to grasp the implication of oil politics in the conflict and the " imperialist plot " to divide Nigeria.

When civil war broke out on 6 July 1967, the Soviets began to accuse the West of dismembering Nigeria into spheres of interest, ignoring the fact that Czechoslovakia was also supplying Ojukwu with Communist weapons. The Soviet Government was not yet involved in the war, though the general consensus in Moscow was for Biafra as Nigeria was approaching her " traditional " friends, USA and Britain, for military aid to crush Biafran " rebellion." Britain refused to supply Nigeria with the offensive weapons that Gowon needed.

The Nigerian Ambassador in Moscow, Dr Chukuemeka Ifeagu (an Ibo), was one of the few influential African diplomats in the USSR who had friendly relations with the Soviet Foreign Ministry. By mid-June 1967 Lagos had started to doubt Ifeagu's loyalty. At a Nigerian students' gathering on 24 June 1967, the Chargé d'Affaires, Mr Gadau, alleged that Ifeagu had used his offices as Ambassador to pursue a pro-Biafran policy by pleading with Soviet foreign ministry officials to support Biafra.[48]

The first two months of the war were a disaster for the Nigerian military regime. By early August the Biafran troops had captured the Midwest State and penetrated into the West before they were stopped at Ore. Nigeria's traditional friends turned down her plea for military

[48] The author's personal file. The author was present at the gathering, Pavlovskaia Hostel, Friendship University, Moscow, 24 June 1967.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

aid. Washington's neutrality was influenced by its involvement in Vietnam, while London would only sell conventional weapons and not the offensive weapons that Lagos needed.

Lagos was also negotiating for Soviet weapons. Moscow was pleased to sell her weapons to Nigeria. The Nigerian military regime did not fully understand the rationale behind Soviet support for Lagos during the civil war. Both the Soviets and the Nigerians have repeatedly stated that Moscow " won " the war for Lagos. The Biafrans also viewed the outcome of the war in these terms. In fact, it was the Organization of African Unity (OAU), the embodiment of the decisions of African countries, that won the war for Nigeria. By July 1967 OAU-member states had indicated their support for Lagos. At the fifth summit of the OAU Heads of States and Governments in Kinshasa, 12–16 September 1967, the African states unanimously condemned Ojukwu and the Biafran rebellion. At the initiative of eight OAU members (Ethiopia, Ghana, Cameroon, Zambia, Zaire, Uganda, Liberia and Sierra Leone) the summit pledged Africa's support for Gowon and the Nigerian military regime.[44] In June and July 1967 the Soviet Government was approached for military aid by both Lagos and Enugu. It appeared that the Soviet Government was waiting for the OAU to indicate the path to follow. Thus, aiding Biafra would have meant going against the " wishes " of all independent African states. Therefore, Moscow was reluctantly drawn into supporting Lagos. It is significant to note that throughout the civil war the Soviet Government constantly amplified the Kinshasa OAU resolution on Nigeria and condemned the West for violating this resolution by its (Western) support for Biafra.

The Kremlin successfully put out a case against the West in Nigeria, even though Prague was still supporting Biafra. The Soviet Union sold weapons and war planes to Nigeria while Soviet propagandists began justifying the Kremlin's decision as a part of the " anti-imperialist " struggle. This was a difficult task, as most Soviets, including those in high government offices, remained sympathetic toward Biafra. Soviet support for Lagos compelled Novotny's government in Prague to withdraw its support for Biafra. Czechoslovakia remained neutral until January 1968 when the new regime of Alexander Dubcek joined the Kremlin, temporarily, in aiding Lagos.

Soviet support for Nigeria did not receive nationwide approval in the Soviet Union. In the Ukraine some party and government officials as well as some professors were Biafran supporters, and Nigerian students fruitlessly challenged these officials and scornfully called them " anti-Soviets." At the request of Biafran students, Soviet universities changed the records of their students' nationality from Nigerian to Biafran. Registers in medical clinics were also changed. This was a symbolic declaration of support for Biafra by these Soviet institutions in a country

[44] See *Report on the OAU Consultative Mission to Nigeria*, Lagos, pp. 1–2.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

where strict uniformity is the rule rather than the exception. Soviet citizens publicly wore Biafran badges. All these activities continued till the end of the civil war in January 1970 in face of the Soviet Government's military and diplomatic support for Nigeria.

A public statement by a leading Soviet scholar, former deputy Minister of Education (1955–60) and Rector of the Friendship University (1960–70) was indicative of the anti-Soviet government sentiments in Moscow. On 1 April 1968, Nigerian and Biafran students at the University were engaged in a miniature civil war on the campus. The authorities called in the police to arrest the situation as foreign correspondents rushed to cover the incident. When Professor S. V. Rumiantsev, the Rector, arrived to mediate, his statement provoked violent reaction from the Nigerian community. Addressing the Nigerian students he declared:

> You are committing genocide in Biafra. And here in Moscow you have caused a grave disturbance within the walls of the University, thus showing your disrespect for the Soviet workers whose labour made it possible for you to be here.[45]

It is significant to note that while Biafra accused Nigeria of genocide during the war, the Soviet Government had amplified the Nigerian denial of this offence. Thus, Professor Rumiantsev was aiding Biafran "propaganda" which the Kremlin had condemned.

IN the international scene many nations were apprehensive of Soviet involvement in the civil war. While only four African states (Tanzania, Zambia, Gabon and Ivory Coast) accorded Biafra diplomatic recognition, other African states which supported Nigeria were suspicious of the Soviet presence in Nigeria. They feared that Nigeria might become a Soviet base in Africa. This suspicion was evident in West Africa where all the states, excluding Guinea and Mali, appeared relieved over the anti-Nkrumah coup in Ghana. The leaders of these states feared that Nigeria would eventually become a pro-Soviet state with communist inclinations threatening their countries as was the case with Ghana under Nkrumah. The fact that Nigeria had the largest contingent of African students in the USSR (over 800 Nigerians were enrolled in Soviet institutions in the 1968/69 academic year) was also a source of concern for these countries.

France and China condemned the USSR for aiding Nigeria. The French Government offered Biafra military and diplomatic assistance throughout the war. The position of France was made clear when President de Gaulle declared on 31 July 1968 that Nigeria should respect the "self-determination" of Biafra in accordance with the UNO Declaration on Human Rights. China, on the other hand, seized the opportunity to accuse the Soviet Union of waging an imperialist war in

[45] The author's personal file. The author was present at the meeting, Medical Hostel, Friendship University, Moscow, 1 Apr. 1968.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Nigeria and claimed that the alliance of "social imperialists" (USSR) and "Western imperialism" was exploiting the Nigerian conflict for its own interest.

THE Kremlin's decision to support Gowon was also reflected in the writings of Soviet authors. For example, it was after the Kremlin had decided to support Nigeria's military regime that Grafsky and Strashun commended the abrogation of unitarism by Gowon:

> The attempt of the Central Government to preserve the unity of the country through the liquidation of the regions and the creation of 12 states was positively received by Nigerian patriots, and in the first place by the working class of the country.[46]

Soviet analysts began to develop a positive attitude toward the Lagos regime while analysis of the role of the army took a more general course. The Soviet-Nigerian Cultural Exchange Agreement was initialled in 1968 and bilateral trade was increased.

The Nigerian "victory" in the war was the most important achievement for the Soviets in Africa in the 1960–70 period. Defeat and disappointments had marred Soviet involvements in Guinea, Ghana, Mali, Egypt, Zaire and Algeria. When the war ended on 11 January 1970, the Nigerian Ambassador in Moscow, G. T. Kurubo, thanked the Soviet Government and the Soviet people for aiding Nigeria. He claimed that the "Russians understand African sensitivity" and that the Soviet Union had "made no noise about the assistance it has rendered Nigeria."[47] It is significant to note that Kurubo was a former Biafran military officer who later defected to Lagos and was alleged to have furnished Gowon with Ojukwu's war strategy. Apparently for this service, he was appointed Ambassador to Moscow in the autumn of 1967.

FROM the above it is obvious that the Soviet Government formulated its policy toward the "pro-Western" states and the states of "national democracy" in Africa on the basis of inaccurate analysis contained in the works of Soviet ideologists and Soviet Africanists. Throughout the 1960s the Soviets propagated the concept of "a state of national democracy" as the ideal political framework for nations outside the Soviet East European orbit, particularly in Africa, Asia and Latin America. Ideologically, these nations were supposed to pursue the "non-capitalist path of development." This ideological political framework influenced Soviet analysts to strongly believe, and thus propagate, the invincibility of the state structures of Ghana and Mali under Kwame Nkrumah and Modibo Keita respectively. However, the USSR was forced to reconcile herself with political realities as they unfolded in Africa.

[46] Grafsky and Strashun, pp. 200-201.

[47] G. T. Kurubo's Moscow statement cited in B. Gwertzman, "Credits Soviet aid with assuring win," *The Globe and Mail*, Toronto, 21 Jan. 1970, p. 1.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The Soviets now believe that military coups can take place in any country notwithstanding its social, economic, ideological and political structure. The reconciliation undoubtedly affected Soviet Marxist-Leninist ideology as the ideological rationalization for policy actions begins to erode.

Thus, as we observed above, the Soviet Union did not possess a strong ideological base for her policy towards the Nigerian military regimes. For example, the USSR hailed the emergence of the military government in January 1966 following the *coup d'état* that ousted Tafawa Balewa's government. General Ironsi was praised, only to be condemned when he did not relax the " capitalist grip " on Nigeria's economy. He was, however, hailed in May 1966 when he abolished the federal structure and proposed unitarism. The Soviets offered ideological justification for this action. They however reversed their ideological praise of unitarism when Yakubu Gowon re-established the federal structure in August 1966.

Soviet policy in Africa has been punctuated with a series of shifts since the October 1917 revolution. It is obvious that the USSR has, like any other state, become more concerned with satisfying her national interest, notwithstanding her ideological viewpoint.

The World Today

The monthly journal of the Royal Institute of International Affairs provides the general reader with up-to-date and authoritative information on current world problems

Recent issues include:

US energy policy	**Frank G. Zarb**
Portugal: the search for a new political regime	**Thomas C. Bruneau**
The civil war in Lebanon	**Frank Stoakes**
Beyond the Eurogroup: new developments in European defence	**P. H. Scott**
Securing China's defences	**Clare Hollingworth**

Annual Subscription: £4.75 post free (USA and Canada $15 by accelerated surface post)
40p per copy (plus postage)

Orders may be sent to booksellers and newsagents, or to the
Oxford University Press, Press Road, Neasden, London NW10 0DD
(Tel: 01-450 8080)

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Soviet Decision-Making and the Problems of Jewish Emigration Policy

William Korey

IN March 1971, the Kremlin made a decision on Jewish emigration that was almost unprecedented in Soviet history.[1] Approximately 1,000 Jews were allowed to leave for Israel. This figure for a single month equalled the total for the whole of 1970. Indeed, not since the late 1920s had Jewish emigration abroad reached more than 2,000 a year, and in most years the number allowed out had not exceeded a few hundred. No less dramatic was the sharp upturn in the emigration figures for the last two months of 1971—1,800 in November and 3,000 in December. The latter monthly figure was maintained, on average, during 1972 and 1973. However, it was not an unrestricted emigration process that unfolded; rather, it was a carefully circumscribed and regulated one, with a special delimiting device—the "diploma tax"—attached to it in August 1972. The contradictions inherent in such a process inevitably produced a necessity for further decisions.

This article will explore the nature of Soviet decision-making on the emigration question. In approaching this task, it will attempt to take into account some research findings of Western scholars who have studied Western decision-making in the realm of foreign policy. Both Graham Allison and Morton Halperin, for example, have concluded that US decision-making on foreign policy issues in large part involves the interplay of different and sometimes competing bureaucratic interests.[2] While many aspects of decision-making in the USSR remain hidden from the outside world, our general knowledge of how bureaucratic systems operate would suggest that an interplay of contending interests also characterizes the Soviet political system. Indeed, Gordon Skilling and others have elaborated on this theme at length.[3] With respect to the particular question under discussion here, the probability of the interplay of competing interests is enhanced by the fact that, as we shall see, both foreign and domestic considerations seem to have affected the nature of the decisions reached. Officials dealing with domestic problems function under a different set of pressures from officials concerned with foreign

1 For a discussion of earlier deviations from the traditional restrictive pattern, see William Korey, *The Soviet Cage: Anti-Semitism in Russia* (New York, 1973), pp. 191–92.

2 Graham T. Allison, *Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis* (Boston, 1971); and Morton H. Halperin, *Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign Policy* (Washington, DC, Brookings Institution, 1974).

3 H. Gordon Skilling and Franklyn Griffiths, eds., *Interest Groups in Soviet Politics* (Princeton, 1971).

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

policy matters, and the two broad groups are therefore apt to view issues differently.

For such an analysis, the decision-making models of Allison provide especially useful tools, for they afford a variety of standards against which to assess the character of the decision-making process. In Allison's first model, the government performs essentially as a unitary "rational actor" making reasonable and calculated choices based on national purposes and foreign policy goals. This model does not rule out the existence and participation of a number of bureaucratic actors in the decision-making process, but it depicts these actors as suppliers of the necessary specialized inputs which enable top governmental authorities to arrive at rational decisions.

In the second model, the government is comprised of disparate bureaucratic organizations each of which carries on its own established functions in its own established ways, with their activities partially coordinated by a unified group of leaders. Such a model allows for the possibility that different segments of the government may behave in incompatible fashion in given situations and that "decisions" may reflect "organizational process" rather than conscious design.

The third model pictures the government in competitive bureaucratic terms: a decision grows out of a clash between political interest groups whose respective power and skill in the hierarchical order determine the nature of the ultimate bargain that is struck.

When we look at the concrete circumstances of the Jewish emigration issue (in so far as we have information on the subject) within the framework of these models, we find, first, that the "rational actor" model appears most relevant to the initial Soviet decision to permit limited emigration. Let us review the state of affairs briefly.

The crucial backdrop to this decision was a profound intensification of the Jewish national movement; indeed, the movement in March 1971 asumed such a qualitatively new and challenging form that it demanded some kind of radical response from the authorities. Since the movement's inception in November 1969, its activists had followed a strategy of restricting themselves by and large to accumulating petitions to emigrate and then addressing these to the United Nations and various heads of governments.[4] Otherwise, they had focused on the organization of private circles for the study of Hebrew, Jewish history and tradition, and Israeli society. But the movement took on a more open, militant, and determined cast in the wake of a concentrated effort by Soviet security organs to destroy the movement through a large number of arrests in mid-1970 and several later trials (utilizing, as a pretext, the frustrated hijacking plot of a tiny group largely from Riga). Specifically, leading activists of the movement, encouraged by an international protest drive which garnered support from broad sections of the globe, decided upon a

[4] Korey, op. cit. pp. 170–78.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

spectacular tactic never tried previously in Soviet history—the staging of a sit-in in the chambers of the Supreme Soviet Presidium, the symbol of state power.[5]

On 10 March, 156 Jews assembled in the reception room of the Supreme Soviet Presidium. (The date chosen was calculated: the 24th congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union was scheduled to begin on 29 March, and foreign Communist delegations were already arriving in Moscow.) From 11 a.m. to 7.30 p.m., the demonstrators held fast, leaving only when threatened with arrest by the deputy chief of the Moscow police. The next morning, they marched through the streets of Moscow from the Presidium to the Ministry of Interior, where they staged another sit-in. They refused to budge until a "responsible representative" provided answers to their queries. The authorities, probably never anticipating a challenge of this type, reacted with confusion. An unending stream of officials entered, some arguing with the demonstrators, others pleading with them, still others threatening them. Finally, the Minister of the Interior, Colonel-General N. Shchelokov, himself arrived on the scene accompanied by his top aides. His approach was conciliatory: the Ministry would send "special representatives" with broad powers to various localities to expedite the processing of applications for exit visas.

The mildness of the security organs' response to the provocative demonstrations was scarcely typical, and the fact that high officials were prepared to negotiate with the demonstrators was even more remarkable. This combination of circumstances suggests that a *political* decision had been taken at the highest level on the emigration question.

Apparently, the government had concluded that Jewish activism had reached explosive proportions, that the participants in the national movement had grown so alienated and disaffected that they had passed the point of no return. In short, the body politic contained a totally indigestible element. To excise it would require massive repression, and the authorities obviously felt that the costs involved in such a move outweighed the potential benefits. For one thing, the inauguration of a vast repressive effort would entail a significant revival of Stalinism, with very possibly unpredictable consequences for the ruling elite itself. Since 1953, and especially since 1964, Soviet political leaders have been inclined to maintain a fundamental semblance of order and legality, to "manage" events in a more or less rational manner so as to avoid uncontrollable developments and potential chaos.

Secondly, as the Soviet security organs were fully cognizant, the Jewish national movement had meticulously eschewed involvement in the struggle for internal democracy in the USSR.[6] It was not reform of Soviet

[5] Ibid. pp. 180–82. *Samizdat* material is the source of this episode.

[6] The present author has dealt with this question in "Sakharov and the Soviet Jewish National Movement," *Midstream* (New York), Vol. 20, No. 2, Feb. 1974, pp. 35–46.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

society that Jewish activists sought; rather, they wanted to escape from that society to Israel. Moreover, they were keenly aware of the Soviet hierarchs' deep concern with preventing any domestic change that might affect their own monopoly of power and rigid control. If seriously challenged, the activists knew, the hierarchs would strike without mercy. The leaders of the Jewish national movement had therefore decided that their efforts could not possibly succeed unless the movement steered clear of the broader issues of democracy.

The possible effect on international public opinion also probably figured in the government's calculations. Massive repression would likely have generated an even more powerful international reaction than that provoked by the harsh Soviet judicial verdict in December 1970. While it is true that international opinion would hardly have constituted a decisive consideration if the vital interests of the state had been involved, the striving of Jews for emigration could scarcely be held to pose a threat to such interests. Furthermore, the courting of favourable public opinion in the West—or at least an unhostile opinion—had assumed special importance in the context of the new foreign policy undertakings of the USSR in early 1971. These undertakings, which came to be summed up in the word "détente," flowed from defence considerations and economic needs, and events in early 1971 gave these a pressing and urgent character.

At the beginning of 1971, Sino–Soviet relations had worsened sharply because of the two Communist powers' continuing conflict over mutual borders. In fact, it was precisely in March that China launched one of its bitterest polemical campaigns against the USSR.[7] The resulting tensions had led to heavy deployments of troops on both sides of the two countries' common frontiers.

This situation had been aggravated, from the Soviet viewpoint, by a major shift in US policy towards China. On 25 February, President Nixon's "state of the world" message to Congress had emphasized that the United States faced no more important challenge in the 1970s than that of drawing China into a constructive relationship with the world community.[8] The protection of the Soviet Union's western flank in the event of conflict with China made it imperative in Moscow's eyes to avoid a *rapprochement* between China and the United States at the expense of the USSR. Thus, cultivation of a closer Soviet relationship with the United States was essential.

The compelling considerations on the eastern front were reinforced by others of perhaps lesser urgency on the western front. From Moscow's perspective, Soviet hegemony in Eastern Europe required stabilization, which in turn entailed firm recognition by the West of the postwar territorial changes in the area. Hence, in early 1971 Moscow was

[7] *1972 Britannica Book of the Year* (Chicago, 1972), p. 178.
[8] Ibid. p. 177.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

beginning to push strongly for a Conference on European Security and Cooperation that would officially endorse these changes as well as accept the USSR's predominance in Eastern Europe.

Even more important than defence concerns were the economic needs of the Soviet state. As early as the spring of 1966, Premier Alexei Kosygin had signalled a new policy to meet these needs. Publicly junking the USSR's earlier policy of glorifying autarky, he said that " it is cheaper . . . to import or license foreign processes than to try to reproduce them." [9] In 1971, the Soviet Union gave significant expression to the new policy by vigorously seeking to import many technologically sophisticated items from the advanced economies. While the Russians ultimately purchased more than a thousand million dollars' worth of machinery and equipment from Western Europe and Japan during 1971, it was still chiefly to the United States that they looked for the real solution to the USSR's lagging productivity rates.[10]

Along with this new policy went a shift in Moscow's general economic priorities. The Ninth Five-Year Plan (1971–75), published in February, not only targeted a major increase of 44–48 per cent in the production of consumer gods but also assigned light industry a slightly higher priority than heavy industry.[11] These features amounted to an exceedingly significant concession to the Soviet consumer. Clearly, however, the Kremlin linked maintenance of a relatively lower priority for heavy industry in the interests of the Soviet consumer with the abatement of tensions with the West; hence, fulfilment of the plan was intimately tied to détente in Moscow's eyes.

The mildness of the approach that the USSR internal security organs adopted toward the Jewish demonstrators in March 1971 and the decision to respond to the movement by a partial lifting of the emigration barriers, then, seem to have reflected rational governmental calculations about broader Soviet interests. While the bureaucracies concerned with defence and trade matters may have been particularly forceful in expressing these interests, there is no indication that they played any unusual role or encountered any particular opposition to their views as the decision-making process unfolded.

THE next major developments in the evolution of the Jewish emigration question came in autumn 1971, and one can gain valuable insights into Soviet decision-making preceding and during these developments from all three of Allison's models. To understand the character of official behaviour leading up to the crisis of September–October, the " organizational process " model is most useful. Despite the promises of Soviet

[9] *Pravda*, 6 April 1971, as cited in Marshall I. Goldman, " More Heat in the Soviet Hothouse," *Harvard Business Review* (Cambridge, Mass.), July–August 1971, p. 14.

[10] See Marshall I. Goldman, " Who Profits More from U.S.-Soviet Trade?," ibid. November–December 1973, pp. 79–87.

[11] *1972 Britannica Book of the Year*, op. cit. p. 700.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

authorities in March, Jewish applicants for exist visas continued to encounter harassment and delays over the ensuing months. In large part, such experiences probably stemmed from the bureaucratic routine and outlook of the internal security organs, which proceeded to go about their business in their accustomed manner, rather than from a conscious desire on the part of Soviet leaders to prevent the activists from leaving. Yet the impact on the activists was by and large the same—restriction of their opportunities to depart from the country.

Such a situation swiftly caused a new intensification of the Jewish national movement. This finally manifested itself in another open confrontation with the authorities. On 20 September 1971, 93 Moscow Jews, after sending a telegram to Brezhnev requesting a meeting, went to the offices of the Central Committee of the Communist Party.[12] There they were met by A. I. Ivanov, a Central Committee functionary, and two high officials of the Ministry of the Interior. For two and a half hours, the demonstrators outlined their complaints that their requests for exit visas had produced only harassment and delays from lower-level authorities, and they stressed that unless they received assurances of a fairer handling of emigration matters in the future, they would reserve the right to appeal again to party and state organs.

IN confronting this challenge, Soviet officials opted to respond positively. The "rational actor" model helps considerably in clarifying this choice. In October, the Soviet government was forced to come to grips with the damage that a negative reaction could have on the USSR's interests abroad. During the third week of that month, Premier Kosygin was on an official visit to Canada in an effort to step up the Soviet drive for détente with the West. Everywhere he went, he was greeted by large, though orderly, demonstrations protesting against Soviet emigration policy. More critical yet, he found himself in the awkward position of having to defend Soviet restrictions on Jewish emigration in the course of a two-hour closed session with the External and Defense Committees of the House of Commons. To satisfy Canadian concern, he finally declared: "We are opening doors and will go on opening them." [13]

That the Soviet government felt a particular need to placate Western public opinion at this juncture seems virtually certain. On 5 October, the US White House and Radio Peking had simultaneously announced that the United States and China had agreed that Dr Henry Kissinger would make a second trip to China to work out concrete details for President Nixon's visit (arranged during Kissinger's initial trip to Peking the preceding July), and Kissinger and an American team of experts had arrived in China on 16 October. This growing evidence of Sino-American *rapprochement* had inevitably aroused Soviet concern and suspicion.

[12] Korey, op cit. pp. 291–92.
[13] *Jewish Chronicle* (London), 22 Oct. 1971.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Indeed, the day before Kissinger's arrival in Peking, *Pravda* had published one of its most vituperative anti-Chinese articles, which blasted the Peking leadership for carrying out policies that split the ranks of world communism.

ALTHOUGH the "rational actor" model sheds light on the Soviet government's basic decision to permit increased emigration, one cannot really explain the precise nature of the change in policy without resorting to the "competitive bureaucracies" model, for the government placed a host of qualifications on who could emigrate, many of which were designed to limit numbers or exclude specific categories of persons. From the nature of the imperatives already cited, one can reasonably assume that pressure for a liberalization of Soviet policy on Jewish emigration came primarily from the bureaucracies dealing with foreign affairs and international trade. The evidence would indicate that economic bureaucrats, the military, and the security organs had most to do with bringing about the imposition of the restrictions.

Those concerned with management of the economy were obviously well aware of the losses of skilled manpower that Jewish emigration could potentially entail. The extent of Jewish skills and participation in the economy—despite the existence of innumerable educational quotas and discriminatory employment barriers—is officially documented by a massive 1973 volume detailing the results of the 1970 census.[14] This volume reveals that in the largest union-republic, the Russian Republic (where the greatest number of Soviet Jews live), a much higher percentage of Jews posssessed an advanced education than did the members of any other nationality, including Russians. For example, of every 1,000 Jews in the Russian Republic who were 10 years of age or older, more than a third, or 344 had a higher education, while only 43 of every 1,000 Russians there boasted one. Thus, the relative ratio of educated Jews to educated Russians stood at 8 to 1 in 1970. The spread was much greater in relation to other nationalities inhabiting the republic. Data for the Ukraine, Belorussia, Moldavia, and Latvia indicate a similar, if less pronounced, state of affairs prevailing in these union-republics.

Other statistics from the 1970 census also underscore the literacy and training of the Jewish population. In the Russian Republic, 68·2 per cent of the Jews were specialists, with either a higher or secondary-technical education. In the Ukraine, Belorussia, and Latvia, about 50 per cent of the Jews fell into this category. In Moldavia, the figure reached 40 per cent. Some comparative data will highlight the relatively large representation of Jews among specialists. In the Russian Republic, 19 per cent of the Russians qualified as specialists, with either a higher or

[14] *Itogi vsesoiuznoi perepisi naseleniia, 1970 goda* (Results of the All-Union Census, 1970), Vol. IV, Moscow, Statistika, 1973.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

secondary-technical education. In Latvia, 20 per cent of the Latvians enjoyed this status. In Moldavia, only 7 per cent of the Moldavians were similarly qualified.

The Jews' high level of occupational skills was particularly noteworthy in Moscow, the political as well as the industrial-scientific capital of the USSR.[15] That city, in January 1971, contained 25·2 per cent of all the " scientific workers " in the Soviet Union—233,641 out of 927,709 —and 10·7 per cent of the city's total (25,023) were Jewish. Indeed, nearly 39 per cent of all Jewish " scientific workers " were concentrated in Moscow. It has been estimated that a quarter of all Moscow's Jewish inhabitants are supported by individuals gainfully employed in scientific work (as compared with 8–9 per cent of the overall Soviet Jewish population).[16]

Preoccupation with the economic implications of an exodus of skilled Jews had even surfaced openly in the remarks of Soviet officials to Jewish activists in both March and September. Minister of the Interior Shchelokov had emphasized in March that " valuable " specialists would be refused exit visas. He had told the demonstrators: " We cannot supply specialists with higher education to Israel. We need them ourselves." Ivanov reiterated this theme in September: he stressed the regime's concern about a " brain drain " and stated that " the interests of the state " would receive " primary consideration." [17]

(It should be pointed out, however, that the " brain-drain " argument seemed to lose its cogency for Soviet authorities as soon as a " valuable " specialist applied for an exit visa. Instead of just being turned down, he was promptly fired from his position as well. Thus, his usefulness and value to the economy ceased to exist, and the logical justification for denying him an exit visa appeared to have disappeared. But logic was not a pertinent consideration. The security organs were more interested in intimidating other " valuable " specialists from seeking visas.)

The hand of the military and the security organs was visible in the handling of a second category of persons (besides " valuable " specialists) who were not to be allowed to leave—those whose occupations had a direct connection with " state secrets." Shchelokov had mentioned this exception in March, and some applicants had already found themselves rejected on these grounds. (The critical problem in this area, of course, lay in the vagueness of what constituted " state secrets." It became characteristic for Soviet authorities to cite access to " state secrets " as the reason for turning down applications for exit visas from individuals who had never had any apparent connexion with state secrets or who had severed such connexions years previously.)

[15] *Moskva v tsifrakh (1966–70 gg)* Moscow in Figures [1966–70]), Moscow, Statistika, 1972, p. 140.

[16] Mordechai Altshuler, " Some Statistical Data on the Jews Among the Scientific Elite of the Soviet Union," *The Jewish Journal of Sociology* (London), Vol. 15, No. 1, June 1973, p. 48.

[17] Korey, op. cit. p. 292.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

There is some evidence, however, that the central security organs' attitude on the issue was more complex than that of the military. Interviews with Jewish emigrants from the Baltic area indicate that local officials there displayed more willingness to be helpful when they responded to and processed requests for exit visas than officials elsewhere in the USSR. It seems unlikely that this would have been the case had not the local officials in the Baltic republics received encouragement, or at least no serious discouragement, from central security officials.[18]

While one cannot speak with certainty about the motivations of either the local or central authorities in these circumstances, some possibilities do suggest themselves. As Teresa Rakowska-Harmstone has demonstrated, the elites of non-Russian nationalities have, in their search for "sources of legitimacy in their own unique national heritage," resisted Russifying influences, as well as the hegemony exercised in various fields by members of the Great Russian nationality.[19] In the Baltic area, the local elites have tended to perceive Jews as agents of the Russification process. To personnel in the local security organs, then, the removal of Jews would not only weaken this process but also open up career opportunities, places in higher education, and apartments for fellow members of the Baltic nationalities. From the standpoint of the central authorities, this kind of satisfaction of local nationalist impulses would have the positive effect of helping to blunt or divert the growing nationalist challenges to Great Russian dominance from the borderlands.

WHAT resulted from the compromise arrangements that emerged from the conflicting pressures of the various bureaucratic interest groups was an obviously managed emigration pattern during 1971–72.[20] Emigrants from the Russian Republic—where, as noted, the bulk of the educated Jewish community resided—comprised 5–7 per cent of the total. That a carefully defined quota was in operation with reference to this segment of Soviet Jewry is suggested by the fact that the monthly rate remained consistently within the 5–7 per cent range. The largest number of emigrants, about one-third of the total, came from Georgia. They possessed comparatively limited training and skills. The next largest group came from Latvia and Lithuania, where local nationalist strivings were critical factors. Only 17 per cent of all the emigrants had completed a higher education.

Events, however, soon ushered in still another phase in the evolution of Soviet policy on the question. Here, again, the "competitive bureaucracies" model appears the most fruitful for understanding the character of Soviet reactions to the changing conditions.

[18] See, in this connexion, Zev Katz, "The New Nationalism in the USSR," *Midstream*, Vol. 19, No. 2, Feb. 1973, pp. 12–13.

[19] See "The Dialectics of Nationalism in the USSR," *Problems of Communism* (Washington, DC), Vol. 23, May–June 1974, pp. 1–22.

[20] The following data, drawn from official Israeli sources, are reported in this author's "Quotas and Soviet Jewry," *Commentary* (New York), Vol. 57, No. 5, May 1974, p. 57.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

DESPITE an intense propaganda campaign in the Soviet mass media depicting conditions in Israel as virtually inhuman, and despite burdensome harassments, the numbers of Soviet Jews manifesting interest in emigration continued to mount in a dramatic fashion. The first stage in the process of seeking an exit visa is to apply for a certificate (*vyzov*) from a relative in Israel, and during 1972 such applications ran at an average of 6,500 a month—more than double the monthly contingent leaving.[21]

This circumstance generated bureaucratic pressure—probably mostly from the security organs—for a new device to stem the tide of emigration. On 3 August 1972, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet enacted a decree (No. 572) which required that "citizens of the USSR leaving for permanent residence abroad in other than socialist countries . . . compensate the State for their education received from institutions of higher learning. . . ." Eleven days later, the Council of Ministers of the USSR directed "the Ministries of Finance and Higher Education to institute education fees as compensation for the expenditures for education in institutions of higher education. . . ." [22]

Neither the 3 August decree nor the 14 August order was published in the Soviet press or in any official organ—evidently because of the embarrassment that public disclosure of their specific contents might cause. In the first place, the edicts had an *ex post facto* character. Applicants who had already obtained approval for exit visas as well as new applicants were subject to the fees. Secondly, the "diploma tax"—as it came to be called—was by any standard extraordinarily exorbitant. According to Viktor Perelman, a 1973 emigrant who had earlier worked on *Literaturnaia gazeta*, the scale ranged from 4,000 to 25,000 rubles. He calculated that the cost of an emigration visa for an engineer would amount to the equivalent of his earnings for 5–7 years; for a physician, his earnings for 6 years; and for a scientist, his earnings for 6–8 years. For a family in which not only the man but also his wife and a son (or daughter) held university degrees—a by no means infrequent situation—the required payments became, in effect, prohibitive.

In addition, the imposition of the "diploma tax" coincided with the beginning of extensive trade discussions between the Soviet Union and the United States, and there may well have been a desire in Moscow to avoid any public outcry that would interfere with the negotiations. These discussions, it should be noted, lasted until October, when a firm agreement was reached on two issues that had obstructed any significant expansion of trade. After extensive bargaining, the USSR committed itself to settle its hitherto unpaid second world war Lend-Lease debt,

21 Korey, *The Soviet Cage*, op. cit. p. 302.

22 Korey, *The Soviet Cage*, op. cit. p. 315. See also *The New York Times*, 24 Jan. 1973, which notes that the Council of Ministers' order is officially dated 3 Aug., not 14 Aug.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

which had run into millions of dollars, by paying the United States $722 million in several instalments. In return, the United States would grant the USSR most-favoured-nation (MFN) tariff treatment.

WHILE the withholding of the 3 August decree and the 14 August order from publication did prevent them from having any deleterious effect on the Soviet-American negotiations, they eventually created problems for the realization of the terms of the October agreement. Their provisions could not be kept secret for long, and the revelation of these provisions raised a *furor* in key sectors of American public opinion. US public opinion assumed major importance for Moscow because of its impact on Congress, whose approval was essential for the granting of MFN status to the USSR.

In October, Senator Henry M. Jackson assembled 75 co-sponsors for an amendment which he introduced to the East-West trade bill then before the Senate. This amendment called for the withholding of MFN status and of credits, credit guarantees, and investment guarantees to any "nonmarket economy country" which denied its citizens the right to emigrate or imposed more than a nominal tax on emigration or on exist visas. With three-quarters of the Senate on record as co-sponsors of the amendment, the Kremlin had to face the fact that implementation of the October agreement was uncertain.

The Senate development must have prompted the resumption of the controversy between those in the Soviet bureaucracy pursuing expanded trade objectives and those concerned with the maintenance of domestic controls. Although the controversy may have been temporarily resolved by a governmental decision to issue some tax waivers (190 were granted in late October and early November), its continued existence was amply attested to by the remarks in late October of Colonel Andrei Verein, the chief of the Visa Department of the Soviet police, and Boris Shumilin, Deputy Minister of the Interior, to protesting Jewish activists whom they had agreed to meet.[23] Referring to the waivers, Verein said that these were a "gesture toward a certain foreign power with which the Soviet Union is seeking to develop commercial and economic relations." At the same time, he emphasized that they did *not* constitute "a change of the authorities' approach to the emigration problem." Shumilin, reflecting the view of those concerned with internal controls, was even firmer. He underscored that Soviet policy on emigration "has not changed and will not change."

From these comments, it is clear that bureaucratic forces stressing limitations upon emigration remained in the ascendant. If a concession was made to the pressures of foreign trade advocates, this was regarded as merely a "gesture." The policy of the "diploma tax" held firm.

[23] Details of the discussions of 47 Jewish activists with Verein and Shumilin may be found in a signed *samizdat* letter dated 31 Oct. 1972.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Continued agitation in the United States in favour of the Jackson amendment, however, required a further " gesture." On 29 December, Shumilin announced that all would-be emigrants who had reached the age of 55 would be exempt from payment of the " diploma tax " and that the amount of the tax for those still required to pay it would be reduced in accordance with the number of years they had worked for the Soviet state.[24]

But shortly thereafter the Kremlin seemingly attempted to signal that it would not contemplate any further concessions, by publishing the original Presidium decree on 20 January 1973. (Actually the decree appeared in the 27 December 1972 issue of the *Bulletin of the Supreme Soviet*, which did not come out until three weeks later.) In " making final " the " diploma tax," the Kremlin may have been guided by prevailing opinion among some sophisticated observers in Washington that the Jackson amendment was basically a show of strength and not a serious legislative move. These observers recognized that the Senate was nearing the end of its session and that the amendment would then die; moreover, they knew that a similar amendment had not been tabled in the House of Representatives.

IF such judgments did indeed lie behind the Soviet action, the miscalculation of the Congressional mood was enormous. On 23 January 1973, Senator Jackson called the concessions and the decree's publication " totally unacceptable as a response. . . ." [25] Shortly thereafter, on 7 February, the powerful Chairman of the House Ways and Means Committee, Wilbur D. Mills, formally introduced an equivalent of the Jackson amendment in the House—the so-called Mills-Vanik Bill—with 238 cosponsors.

The Soviet leadership tried to meet and overcome this emerging resistance by direct lobbying with the Congress. An appropriate occasion presented itself in late February in the form of a US-Soviet Trade Conference in Washington sponsored by the National Association of Manufacturers. To attend this conference, the USSR sent a high-level, 15-member delegation headed by Vladimir S. Alkhimov, Deputy Minister of Foreign Trade, and Georgy A. Arbatov, Director of the Institute for US Studies of the Soviet Academy of Sciences.

The individual ways in which the two leaders of the delegation sought to cope with Congressional sentiment appeared to reflect differing bureaucratic viewpoints in Moscow.[26] Arbatov, reportedly a principal adviser to the Politburo on American questions, argued from an unstated premise that the " diploma tax " decision was irrevocable. The problem, he

[24] Novosti report, 29 Dec. 1972.
[25] Press release from Senator Henry M. Jackson's office.
[26] See *The Washington Post*, 28 Feb. 1973; *Journal of Commerce* (Washington, DC), 28 Feb. 1973; and *Jewish Telegraphic Agency* (New York), 28 Feb., 7 Mar., and 13 Mar. 1973.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

emphasized, rested with the Congress, not with the USSR. If Congress frustrated the "normalization of trade relations," that would prove "a harmful thing for Soviet-American relations as a whole," for it would have "serious political repercussions." Among the consequences that he mentioned was a "revival" of anti-Semitism in the USSR and possibly even its growth in the United States itself. His remarks evoked an angry reaction from leaders of the Jackson coalition.

Alkhimov pursued a softer line, focusing on the economic advantages of increased Soviet-American trade. Key Congressmen, in turn, advised him that the burden of responsibility lay with the Russians. As Representative Peter H. B. Frelinghuysen, the Chairman of the Republican Party's Congressional Task Force on International Economic Policy, put things publicly, "Mr. Alkhimov's trip and the meetings he has had should have given him solid evidence that members of Congress are much concerned with Soviet emigration policies and that we tend to link them with the granting of most-favored-nation status." [27] Especially important was the private meeting that Alkhimov held with Representative Mills in mid-March. In this meeting, the influential Arkansas legislator indicated that 350 members of the House would vote to block MFN if the "diploma tax" was still in force, and the Soviet Deputy Minister of Foreign Trade reportedly responded: "I can see we are not going to get most-favored-nation out of this Congress, and my job is to tell Moscow that." [28]

Meanwhile, a high Cabinet official in the Nixon administration was conveying to the Kremlin a message similar to that which Mills was giving Alkhimov. On the very day of the Alkhimov-Mills conference in Washington, Secretary of the Treasury George P. Shultz met in Moscow with Deputy Premier Novikov, Deputy Minister of Trade M. R. Kuzmin, and Chairman of the Soviet State Bank M. N. Sveshnikov; later, he also saw General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev. While the talks focused on methods of effecting a threefold expansion of Soviet-American trade, Shultz took the opportunity to underscore for Kremlin officials the American constitutional system of the separation of powers. The President of the United States, he pointed out, could not simply issue edicts on trade as Brezhnev could.[29]

THIS stress on the education of Soviet officialdom suggests that a serious gap in understanding obtained in Moscow about the American political process. Because of a simplistic class interpretation of American society, many ranking members of the Soviet hierarchy may have found it difficult to grasp how Congress could fail to respond positively to the idea of increased Soviet-American trade and MFN status for the USSR when big business seemed overwhelmingly to support

[27] Ibid. 15 Mar. 1973.
[28] *The New York Times*, 6 Apr. 1973.
[29] Ibid. 15 Mar. 1973; *Jewish Telegraphic Agency*, 15 Mar. 1973.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

it. Moreover, they may have tended to look at the relationship between Congress and the Nixon administration, which vigorously supported MFN, through a mirror-image prism. Some concrete evidence of such a tendency comes from an exchange between Andrei D. Sakharov and M. P. Maliarov, the Soviet Deputy Prosecutor General, on 16 August 1973.[30] After Maliarov had expressed contempt for American democracy and referred to "this demagogic fraud of the Watergate case," Sakharov replied that the Watergate case "is a good illustration of American democracy." The Soviet prosecutor then commented:

> It is calculated to be just to show. All Nixon has to do is show a little firmness, and the whole thing will come to nothing. That's their democracy for you, nothing but a fraud.

Judgments like Maliarov's, of course, would have strengthened the hand of those who took a hard line on the "diploma tax." In this regard, it is worth calling attention to the statement of one Soviet official during the Shultz visit that "a great country like the Soviet Union is not going to let the United States dictate what our internal policies should be."[31]

BUT the information that the American Secretary of the Treasury provided all but dissipated hardline obduracy in the USSR. The trade and banking officials with whom Shultz spoke were now in a position to press for abolition of the "diploma tax" so that trade negotiations could proceed. Shultz reported that Soviet leaders had shown "both the spirit to try to solve the problems and the willingness to tackle them in very real terms."[32]

Indeed, just four days after the Shultz visit, Moscow responded positively, if in limited fashion, to the pressure of the American Congress. On 19–20 March, the USSR allowed 44 Soviet Jews who had obtained a higher education to leave without paying the "diploma tax," and an unusual display of publicity accompanied the waivers. The signal was made explicit on 21 March. Victor Louis, a Soviet journalist whom the Kremlin has often used to give public expression to official leaks, wrote an article for the Israeli newspaper, *Yediot Achronot*, which indicated that the "diploma tax" would "not be enforced any more." Acknowledging that the Soviet decision was the result of Congressional pressure, he observed: "It seems that the Soviet citizens who have decided to emigrate from the Soviet Union have won a victory in the six-month war against the education tax." He might have added that in the internal clash of interests the trade bureaucrats and their allies had apparently triumphed over the resistant security organs.

[30] Harrison Salisbury, ed., *Sakharov Speaks* (New York, 1974), p. 190.
[31] *Newsweek* (New York), 26 Mar. 1973, p. 38.
[32] Ibid.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

THE suspension of the "diploma tax," although welcome, did not really go to the heart of the emigration question. Only one of the numerous harassments of would-be emigrants had disappeared. Even if its removal constituted a significant achievement, the hard-liners in the Soviet bureaucracy continued to maintain the authority to set arbitrary limits on who could leave the country, and there was considerable evidence that they wielded that authority with vigour and persistence after 21 March. For example, the percentage of emigrants from the Russian Republic stayed at a low level. So too did the percentage of scientists among the emigrants.

In light of these circumstances, it was not altogether surprising that Congressional pressures for freer emigration persisted, and these inevitably kept alive the interbureaucratic tension within the Soviet government. Only one day after the suspension of the "diploma tax," Senator Jackson told the National Press Club in Washington that, while the new development was "encouraging," he would still seek to put his amendment on the "statute books." He was convinced that the United States "ought to use our vast economic power to help bring freedom and dignity to thousands of individuals who have been willing to stand up and fight for their right to leave Russia." [33]

Brezhnev himself then intervened personally to try to convince American legislators that the Jackson amendment was no longer necessary. On 23 April he granted a rare, surprise audience of three and a half hours to seven members of the Senate Commerce Committee.[34] One of them, Senator Vance Hartke, reported that Brezhnev was "prepared to go a practically unlimited route" to remove the issue of Jewish emigration as a point of contention. But if the General Secretary offered any concrete assurances regarding harassments, these went publicly unnoted.

One 16 June, Brezhnev arrived in the United States for a visit, and during the course of his stay he renewed his persuasive efforts. He met on 19 June with 17 members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee plus eight members of the House.[35] In this meeting, he presented data which, according to him, showed that 97 per cent of all Jewish applicants for exit visas were permitted to depart. Senator Jacob Javits, however, observed that "figures don't tell the whole story," and he specifically mentioned the forms of intimidation that served as obstacles to free emigration. After this interjection, the discussion became "grim and serious."

Despite further intensive lobbying, especially with big business circles, Brezhnev failed to dissuade the American Congress. By the summer's end, the so-called Jackson amendment had 77 sponsors in the Senate and 285 in the House.

[33] Press release from Senator Jackson's office.
[34] *The New York Times*, 24 Apr. 1973.
[35] Ibid. 20 June 1973.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

On 11 December, the issue was finally resolved in the House. By an overwhelming four-to-one margin, the House voted to refuse credits, credit guarantees, and investment guarantees to nonmarket economy countries which denied their citizens the right to emigrate. Then it approved the entire trade bill containing this prohibition, by 272 to 140. After the vote, Senator Jackson expressed the hope that "the loud and clear message of the House wll be heard in Moscow. . . ." [36]

THE message was eventually heard in Moscow. By the summer of 1974, the Soviet leadership was reportedly prepared to allow as many as 45,000 Jews to emigrate each year.[37] The principal obstacle lay in the issue of harassment, but the administration in Washington no longer saw that issue as insurmountable. In meetings with Jackson and two of his colleagues, Senators Abraham Ribicoff and Jacob Javits, Secretary of State Kissinger suggested that an understanding with respect to the removal of certain harassments and a higher rate of emigration was feasible, and Jackson and his supporters agreed, under these conditions, to accept a significant modification of the Jackson amendment—one that would permit the granting of MFN status to the USSR without credit restrictions for the time being.

A prearranged, formal exchange of correspondence between Kissinger and Jackson—subsequently published—spelled out the details of the understanding. In this correspondence, the Secretary of State said that the Russians had provided "assurances" that there would be no further "punitive" actions against Jewish applicants for exit visas and that "unreasonable impediments" that had previously been placed in the path of would-be applicants would be removed. On the basis of these "assurances," Kissinger stated that he expected the rate of emigration to begin to rise beyond the 1973 level.[38] Later, he revealed that he and President Ford had received these "assurances" from Brezhnev, Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko, and Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin.[39]

In a letter delivered to Kissinger on 26 October, Gromyko denied that any "assurances" had been given, but he did acknowledge that the Soviet authorities had furnished "elucidations" of their position.[40] Kissinger did not regard the difference in terminology as crucial. In testifying before the Senate Finance Committee on 3 December, the Secretary of State reiterated his contention that there existed a definite understanding with the Soviet Union that harassments would cease.[41]

Clearly, the striving for détente was now dominant in Moscow, and in the bureaucratic political conflict the view of the advocates of limitations and controls had been at least temporarily set aside.

[36] Press release from Senator Jackson's office.
[37] *The New York Times*, 21 June 1974.
[38] Press release from Senator Jackson's office.
[39] *The New York Times*, 19 Dec. 1974.
[40] *Pravda*, 19 Dec. 1974.
[41] *Hearing Before the Committee on Finance, United States Senate, 93rd Congress, Second Session, 3 Dec. 1974* (Washington, 1974), p. 53.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

BUT a crucial question remained: had the bureaucratic battle been resolved once and for all, or might it flare up again after a lull? An analysis of the full dimensions of the Jewish emigration problem that was then confronting the Soviet government lent considerable weight to the latter possibility.

In July 1974, Armand Hammer stated that the USSR would allow 200,000 more Soviet Jews to leave the country, and he observed that at an emigration rate of 40,000–45,000 a year the Soviet Jewish problem would be solved in five years.[42] Such a prediction assumed, of course, that the factors that triggered the national movement either would lose their relevance or would have no impact on the balance of the Soviet Jewish community. Certain trends, however, pointed in the opposite direction.

According to Professor Aleksander Voronel, perhaps the most perceptive analyst of the Jewish national movement as well as one of its leading participants, the "national awakening" among the Soviet Jewish intelligentsia occurred as a result of the restrictions imposed upon the admission of Jews to higher education beginning in 1968, with the consequent limitation upon eventual free pursuit of careers. If most Soviet Jews had earlier accepted assimilation "at the expense of national distinctiveness," he wrote, it was largely because the Bolshevik Revolution had removed the rigid quotas on Jews in schools and universities. Education became "the supreme value." But with the new restrictions of 1968 and later, the Jewish community experienced a "crisis" of agonizing proportions.[43]

Quotas upon Jews in higher education had, to be sure, been a staple of the Soviet scene since the postwar period, yet the quotas had varied from city to city and from university to university,[44] thereby permitting an annual increase in the absolute number of Jews enrolled in higher education (even as the percentage of Jews declined). With the severe restrictions introduced in 1968–69, however, the absolute total of Jewish students had by 1970–71 dropped from 111,900 to 105,800.[45] The figure had fallen even more drastically in 1972–73—to 88,500.[46] Such a rate of decline did not bode well for the future. Newly-published data on post-graduate students reinforced this picture. Between 1970 and the beginning

[42] *Business Week* (New York), July 1974.

[43] "The Social Pre-Conditions of the National Awakening of the Jews in the USSR," in Aleksander Voronel and Viktor Yakhot, ed., *Jewish Identity in the Soviet Union* (New York, 1973), pp. 25–37.

[44] The point is noted in Roy Medvedev's *samizdat* essay, "The Near East Conflict and the Jewish Question in the USSR," written in May 1970, published in abridged version in *Survey*, Spring 1971, Vol. 17 No. 2 (79), pp. 185–200.

[45] See Michael Checinski, "Soviet Jews and Higher Education," *Soviet Jewish Affairs* (London), Vol. 3, No. 2, 1973, pp. 12, 14.

[46] *Narodnoe khoziaistvo SSSR v 1972 g.* (The National Economy of the USSR in 1972) (Moscow, Statistika, 1973), p. 651.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

of 1974, the number of Jewish postgraduate students had decreased by about 30 per cent, from 4,945 to 3,456.[47]

Soviet Jews had already begun to feel the impact of the current trend in university admission policy on their career opportunities, for in the USSR, as in any advanced industrial society, higher education is the key to personal advancement in economic and social life. (This is especially the case for Jews since the political and security areas remain almost totally closed to them.) The number of Jews who had entered the ranks of " scientific workers " during 1972–73, for example, had dropped considerably—about 1,000 as compared with 2,000–3,000 per year in 1955–71.[48]

As the drastic drop in the total of Jewish university students appeared likely to make itself felt, a marked decline in the absolute figure for Jewish " scientific workers " seemed likely to set in. In the biggest union-republic, the Russian Republic, such a decline had already commenced in one of the most " popular " of Jewish professions—medicine.[49] For the moment, however, Jews continued to comprise a sizable percentage of " scientific workers " because there were many holdovers from earlier periods when access to this status had been easier. A striking characteristic of Jewish " scientific workers " was that they were, on average, older than their fellow " scientific workers."

A case study of Ukrainian universities afforded some concrete evidence on this score. According to the study, Jews who held doctorates in the social sciences and the humanities were 4·5–12·7 years older than their colleagues. For those in the biological sciences, the figure ran between 2·2 and 6·2 years. Only for those in physics and mathematics did the differential shrink to relatively inconsequential proportions, 0·3–1·3 years. The study's analysis of the faculties of the universities (i.e. those holding doctorates plus those designated as teachers) pointed in the same direction. While 30·8 per cent of all the members of the faculties were in the over-65 category, 37·4 per cent of the Jewish members fell into this group. Morever, faculty members aged 35–44 years constituted 9·18 per cent of the overall total but only 4·2 per cent of the Jewish members.[50]

No similar research seemed to have been carried out for other union-republics of the USSR, but it appeared probable that the findings in this study had general validity. Indeed, one authority contended that the average age of professors of Jewish origin in the USSR was about 10 years older than that of non-Jewish professors.[51]

Not only had the admission policy of universities dimmed the career prospects of many young Jews, but other administrative measures had

[47] " Statistical Material," *Vestnik statistiki* (Moscow), No. 4, 1974, p. 95.
[48] Altshuler, op. cit. p. 47; *Narodnoe khoziaistvo 1922–72 gg.* (The National Economy 1922–72) (Moscow, Statistika, 1973), p. 105; and " Statistical Material," loc. cit. p. 92.
[49] *Sovetskoe zdravookhranenie* (Moscow), No. 3, 1970, p. 12.
[50] Altshuler, loc. cit. pp. 50–54.
[51] Checinski, loc. cit. p. 11.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

placed limitations on the opportunities of a large proportion of those Jews who had succeeded in obtaining academic training. Since the mid-1960s and especially since 1968, restrictions had been imposed on the appointment of Jews to most institutions of higher learning and specialized research institutes. Ordinarily, older Jews, who already occupied senior and administrative positions, did not suffer from this policy, but the middle and younger generations of gifted scientists and academics felt its effects substantially. They usually found themselves assigned to positions in institutes attached to various government ministries to work on the secondary aspects of development problems. This situation accounted for the sharply different percentages of Jews employed in higher educational institutions and in ministerial research institutes. While Jews comprised only 5·5 per cent of the teaching staffs of the former, they made up 9·1 per cent of workers in the latter.[52]

AS a consequence, far more Jews might be motivated to try to emigrate than Hammer foresaw. Roy Medvedev, in a provocative analysis of the Jewish question in the USSR written in May 1970, had warned that "if we want the number of 'repatriates' not to be too sizable, we must change decidedly the position of all the Jews in the USSR, abolishing and prohibiting all the discriminatory measures applied to this national group,"[53] but virtually no one expected the Soviet government to abolish its "discriminatory measures." On the contrary, the very pursuit of exit visas by Jews had tended to arouse suspicion about all Soviet Jews among bureaucrats already given to stereotyped thinking. Arbatov had observed, for example, that increased emigration would place the "90 per cent who want to stay in an unfavorable light."[54] In short, it would invite more, not less, discrimination.

Thus, under circumstances of détente, the pressure of Jews to emigrate would probably continue for the time being to generate within the Soviet bureaucracy the kinds of tensions that had marked the previous three years. And the bureaucratic politics of push and shove on the Jewish emigration question would, in turn, be likely to persist.

EVENTS quickly proved the accuracy of this assessment. On 18 December, a TASS dispatch announced that "leading articles" in Moscow vigorously rejected the view that "assurances" had been extended to the United States on the question. This anouncement came two days after a plenum meeting of the CPSU Central Committee in Moscow at which the understandings reached with Washington a few months earlier were evidently subjected to considerable criticism. The critics may well have emphasized a decision that the US Senate had taken

[52] Ibid.
[53] See the essay cited in footnote 44.
[54] *Jewish Press* (New York), 9 Mar. 1973. See also *The Washington Post*, 28 Feb. 1973.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

that very same day to impose a ceiling of $300 million over a four year period on credits from the US Export-Import Bank. Extension of credits beyond that ceiling would require Congressional approval.

The advocates of a more liberal emigration policy were undoubtedly embarrassed by the low credit ceiling, which authorized an amount of credits which the US Secretary of State called " peanuts " when compared with what the Kremlin sought.[55] On 10 January 1975, the Soviet leadership responded to the Congressional action by repudiating the initial US-Soviet trade agreement of October 1972.

[55] *The New York Times*, 19 Dec. 1974.

CONTREPOINT

REVUE TRIMESTRIELLE

DIRECTEUR: PATRICK DEVEDJIAN
REDACTEUR EN CHEF: GEORGES LIEBERT
REDACTEUR EN CHEF ADJOINT: ALAIN G. SLAMA
RELATIONS EXTERIEURES: JEAN C. TEXIER

N° 20 PRINTEMPS 1976

ACTUELLES

Raymond ARON: De la défense européenne
Raoul GIRARDET: Une mutation de la pensée stratégique
Marc de BRICHAMBAUT: Les " precision guided munitions "
François BOURRICAUD: De la société post-industrielle
Michel LEGRIS: Une lecture du " Monde "

MELANGES

Philipe d'HUGUES: Le cinéma et le réel
Pierre GUIRAL: L'itinéraire de Daniel Halévy
Jean GUITTON: Rencontres avec Daniel Halévy
Alain BESANCON: La difficulté de définir le régime soviétique
Peirre VAISSE: Histoire culturelle de la France
Georges LIEBERT: Cinq ans de Contrepoint

Administration: 4 rue Cassette 75006 Paris Tel. 222 11 46
Le numéro: 25 F L'abonnement annuel: 80 F

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Valentyn Moroz: Individualist in Jeopardy

Harvey Fireside

TWO recent collections present for the first time in English the works of the Ukrainian historian Valentyn Y. Moroz.[1] These writings are of particular interest for two reasons. First, they are all products of *samvydav*, the Ukrainian equivalent of *samizdat*, underground publications that were eventually smuggled to the West. Second, they feature four essays that constituted the corpus delicti for the indictment of Moroz on charges of "agitation or propaganda designed to undermine or weaken Soviet power." For this crime, under Article 62 of the Ukrainian criminal code, Moroz was sentenced in November 1970 to six years in prison, to be followed by three years in a "strict-regime" labour camp and five years in exile. Moroz had spent barely nine months at liberty since his release from four years of imprisonment on a similar charge in 1965. One of the essays stems from his first term in prison; the other three were written during his brief interlude of freedom.

MOROZ has become a symbol of post-Khrushchev repression in the Soviet Union, for the Draconic sentences imposed on him for what are essentially "thought crimes," as well as for his courage in refusing to admit any guilt and in resisting extreme pressure to recant his views. He has shown this resolve from his first arrest in September 1965, to the 145-day hunger strike he conducted from July to November 1974, in order to protest against conditions at Vladimir prison, near Moscow, one of the most notorious Soviet penal establishments. His physical state during the last month of that siege was described by his wife as "frighteningly emaciated" and he was near death from a heart ailment.[2] The tube used to administer forced feedings had scraped the lining of his oesophagus raw and he had lost over three stones.

The plight of Moroz has attracted the attention of western academics and public figures, including the spokesmen for Amnesty International, P.E.N. International, the International League for the Rights of Man and the International Commission of Jurists. The most recent of several resolutions on his behalf in the US Congress found 11 Senators expressing concern for this "most noted and uncompromising spokesman within

1 Yaroslav Bohun, ed., *Boomerang: The Works of Valentyn Moroz*. Baltimore, 1974; John Kolasky, ed., *Report from the Beria Reserve*. Chicago, 1974. The two anthologies are substantially identical, though *Boomerang* has in addition five poems by Moroz and excerpts of four letters to his wife, as well as appeals for his release by Ukrainian intellectuals. The translation of *Report*, however, is considerably more idiomatic.

2 *Novoe russkoe slovo*, 12 Mar. 1975, p. 2; for earlier reports, see also *Khronika tekushchikh sobytii*, Nos. 7, 14, 17, 27, 32; *The New York Times*, 9 Nov. 1974; *The Sun*, Baltimore, 10 Dec. 1974; *The Gazette*, Montreal, 7 Aug. 1974.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the Soviet Union for the rights of the Ukrainian people and for the maintenance of the Ukrainian culture and national heritage." [3] Among Moroz's distinctions is a pending invitation to resume his scholarly work at Harvard University's Ukrainian Research Institute.[4] The appointment letter sent by Harvard President Derek C. Bok on 12 November 1974, commends Moroz for his " outstanding qualifications and contributions in the area of Ukrainian history." [5]

Actually, the publications of Moroz prior to his arrest exhibit little evidence of either originality or ideological dissent. In 1964, while teaching modern history at pedagogical institutes at Lutsk and Ivano-Frankovsk, the 28-year-old Moroz presented a paper on " The Lutsk Trial of 1934," a case of " bourgeois Polish " repression of " revolutionary Ukrainians." This topic was to be his candidate's (PhD) thesis at Lvov State University, but his defence of it was precluded by his arrest for the possession and distribution of " anti-Soviet " manuscripts and foreign publications. Two further papers which he delivered at pedagogical conferences dealt with western Ukrainian peasants and workers, respectively, in the strike movements of the late thirties and in " fighting fascism " as allies of Spanish republicans in the civil war.[6] Moroz at that time, having taught for seven years in secondary schools and institutes, seemed launched on a career as a professor specializing in the history of the Ukrainian regions annexed by the Soviet Union from Poland after the second world war.

According to subsequent official charges, Moroz had used his academic positions as a cover to disseminate materials, during his trips to supervise student teachers, advocating secession of the " Ukraine from the USSR and its transformation into a bourgeois country." [7] That Moroz engaged in such activities, let alone confessed to them, is highly doubtful. That the authorities planned to turn the case against Moroz and a co-defendant, Dmytro P. Ivashchenko, into the first " show trial " in nearly 30 years seems fairly well established.[8] Moroz evidently frustrated that plan by seizing the opportunity at the Lutsk Regional Court to deny any bourgeois or nationalist actions, yet to charge that a " Russification " programme was indeed eroding native culture and making a mockery of the " sovereign " status of the Ukraine, as constitutionally proclaimed.

This turning of the judicial tables probably cost Moroz an extra two years' sentence in a prison camp—he received four as against the two meted out to his colleague, Ivashchenko, at whose flat the conspiratorial meetings were allegedly held. It made him an example to the other *shestydesiatniki*, the Ukrainian writers and academicians of the early

[3] *Congressional Record*, 7 Feb. 1975, S. 1662.
[4] Harvey Fireside, " Harvard Invitation," *The New Leader*, 31 Mar. 1975, p. 3.
[5] *The Boston Globe*, 10 Mar. 1975.
[6] *Boomerang*, p. 140.
[7] *Radyanska osvita*, 14 Aug. 1971, and *News Release*, Soviet Embassy, Canada, as cited in *Boomerang*, pp. 249, 252.
[8] Michael Browne, ed., *Ferment in the Ukraine*. London, 1971, p. 7.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

sixties who protested against Russian cultural imperialism, often with supporting citations from Lenin and Soviet legal texts.[9] It also taught the authorities to hold subsequent trials of such leaders of the movement as the poet Mykhaylo Osadchy in closed session and to release some prominent figures like the literary critic Ivan Svitlychny without a trial. The secret trials were revealed in the West primarily through the disclosure of 20 cases by Viacheslav M. Chornovil.[10]

The Chornovil collection included only a few letters by Moroz written to his wife when in prison.[11] These are notable for his turning to philosophical studies by the autumn of 1966, even teaching himself German and English to read Kant, Hobbes and Bertrand Russell. Further, they indicate his concern with "the problem of individuality," particularly in the realm of spirituality in which human beings are distinguished from undifferentiated, conformist animals.[12] That theme is developed in the seminal essay, *From the Beria Reserve*, that Moroz completed on 15 April 1967, on his 31st birthday, at Yavas, a prison camp in Mordovia. It is addressed to the members of the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet, with several copies of the clandestine manuscript forwarded to those legislators by Chornovil.[13]

THE "reserve" bears the name of Lavrenty P. Beria, the Stalinist police chief executed in 1953, because his lieutenants are still in command. It is a reserve in two senses: because thousands of political prisoners are shut up there like wild beasts, and because officials of the KGB (Committee for State Security) maintain it as a private empire, unchecked by the laws that regulate social life on the outside. This imagery enables Moroz to claim that, far from being a counter-revolutionary attacking the system, he is merely a good citizen exposing "violations of the laws by the officials of the KGB," guilty of "serious crimes such as murder and attempted murder."[14]

At a superficial level, Moroz does appear to be simply cataloguing examples of injustice inflicted on the prisoners by power-drunk, corrupt officials who flout regulations. On a deeper plane, however, his critique strikes at the roots of the political system that has spawned the cancerous colonies of the prisons. The cosmetic surgery of administrative reforms seems a far from adequate remedy for such grave ills. An appropriately radical cure would entail dismantling not only the KGB camp administration, but also the Party hierarchy supporting it and the ideology that rationalizes the repression of independent thinkers.

9 Abraham Rothberg, *The Heirs of Stalin*. Ithaca, 1972, p. 308.
10 *The Chornovil Papers*. New York, 1968, published in Ukrainian as *The Misfortune of Intellect*. Paris, 1967.
11 *Chornovil Papers*, pp. 66–7.
12 *Boomerang*, p. 141.
13 *Report*, p. xxviii.
14 "Petition to the Attorney General of the Ukrainian SSR," 16 May 1968. *Report*, p. 127.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Moroz begins his essay by characterizing his fellow prisoners as " those who think differently, or perhaps those who think at all."[15] In contrast to such caged spirits, he depicts the officialdom of the KGB, " an isolated group which strives with all its might to maintain its position on society's neck where it has been sitting since the Stalin era."[16] Now that genuine counter-revolutionaries are extinct, the thought police has to fabricate " anti-Soviet plots and organizations." Its role thus becomes anachronistic and parasitical, " transfiguring the body which gave it birth into a source of nourishment." [17]

The immediate consequence of this Stalinist vestige is that, as administrators of the camps, KGB officers lord it over their empire like zoo keepers. They restrict prisoners to diets of as little as 2,000 calories a day, in order to " hit the stomach " and transform them into " mere consumers of foods." [18] The atmosphere is one of materialism reduced to its lowest common denominator, the struggle for survival. Should a desperate convict manage to escape, he is invariably returned by a local peasant for a bounty of flour or is shot after surrendering, his half-dead body dumped at the camp gates as an example.[19]

Few, indeed, are the individualists able to withstand such pressure to abandon their ideals as " a psychological disorder." [20] Moroz recalls the KGB captain who supervised his " re-education," who admitted candidly, " Unfortunately we cannot see what is in your head. If it were possible to do this and remove everything that interferes with your being a normal Soviet citizen, there would be no need for all this conversation." [21] Ironically, only as a prisoner subject to extreme physical deprivation does Moroz discover the spiritual values he will not surrender and the moral strength to defy his oppressors.

Most prisoners do not have the inner resources to defend themselves against spiritual castration. After conditioning by the police, they become " cogs " that " desire not to be conspicuous in any way, to merge into the mass, to resemble the next person in order not to attract attention." [22] In the unequal struggle for survival with their warders, these persons are content to rest on the lowest rungs of the evolutionary ladder at the cost of their integrity. After his release, such a cog will " immediately write that he had never been imprisoned and will even brand as liars those who demand his release." [23] As a caricature of the normal citizen, he " will shoot whomever he is ordered to and then at an order will fight for peace. Last and most important, it is safe to introduce any constitution and grant any rights after transforming people into cogs.

15 *Report*, p. 9.
16 Ibid. p. 41.
17 Ibid. p. 34.
18 Ibid. p. 44.
19 Ibid. p. 2.
20 Ibid. p. 12.
21 Ibid. p. 19.
22 Ibid. p. 22.
23 Ibid. p. 25.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The trick succeeds because the cog will not even consider availing himself of these rights."

The long-term effect of the KGB's actions, then, is to extend a pall of fear and uniformity from the prison-camp enclave to the rest of Soviet society. Lawlessness in the camps, at the off-limit stretches of Siberia and Central Asia, permeates the entire land. This process resembles the reverse of human evolution: "the merging of individuals into a grey mass, a return to a massive nonorganic, nonindividual existence." [24] In this converse of an ideal state, "the ruling party proclaims itself the sole fountain of 'wisdom, honour and conscience' for the whole society and then solemnly declares the 'moral-political unity of society.'" [25]

It would appear that the entire populace must eventually succumb to this Orwellian nightmare. A contrary conclusion by Moroz appears to be the product of his romanticism, born perhaps of the hope that his own chronicle of resistance will serve to inspire others. It may also reflect his conviction that the spurious unity of society proclaimed by the leadership will be exposed by something like the exclamation of a child at the emperor's lack of clothes. He does base his hopes on the young person, "no longer familiar with the terror of his parents" of Stalin's vintage, who "begins to regard the dogmas with silent skepticism and moves imperceptibily into opposition—destructive, because he does not yet possess a programme of constructive opposition." [26]

The youth's questioning makes him venture "into the forbidden areas of history, philosophy and literature" and rediscover "with common sense" the truths shrouded by ideology. Before long, "a miracle takes place: the cog becomes human!" To replace a regime in which citizens accept their function as "fertilizer for future generations," Moroz offers his vision of a society reminiscent of the aspirations of Czech reformers for "socialism with a human face." [27]

Vestiges of Stalinism will be swept away, as the next generation asserts its civil rights. Grounds for its claims are provided by such "paper guarantees" as the Soviet constitution's Article 17, which gives each republic "the right to secede freely from the USSR," and Article 125, which provides freedom of speech, press, assembly and organization. The arbitrary officials to be ousted will include "first of all the KGB; then the chairman of the collective farm who fears that if all legals norms are actually complied with, he will not even be appointed swineherd; then the academician who climbed to his chair over the corpses of betrayed comrades in 1937; finally the chauvinist who will have to give up his programme of Russification." [28]

[24] Ibid. p. 22.
[25] Ibid. p. 23.
[26] Ibid. p. 37.
[27] Ibid. p. 30.
[28] Ibid. p. 38.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

THUS, Moroz links the causes of intellectual freedom with the renaissance of national cultures and the reorganization of collective farms despised by the peasantry. This theme is elaborated in the three essays Moroz composed during the nine months he was at liberty before being rearrested in June 1970. In the first of these, *Moses and Dathan*, he engages in a polemic with the Belorussian poet, Yevdokia Los, for her deprecation of national culture and praise of "Soviet patriotism." True love for Russia, Moroz declares, is possible only for a Belorussian or Ukrainian who speaks as an equal, not an inferior. A person like Los who questions the need for her own nation is "morally dead" and, presumably by analogy to the biblical Dathan who plotted against Moses, historically of no consequence.[29] The debate offers Moroz a renewed opportunity to inveigh against the "automatic programming" that is undermining the independence of human beings: "A person is a person because he is on constant armed guard against permanently existing evil, because history is not programmed, because he has the possibility to change the world to coincide with man's purpose." And among the ultimate ends of man, beyond the challenge of utilitarian logic, is the nation, defined as "the synthesis of all the spiritual values acquired by a people."

The fusion of religious and national values underlies the second essay, *Chronicle of the Resistance*. It concentrates on a specific village in the Carpathian Mountains, Kosmach, renowned for its folklore and traditional crafts. The focus narrows yet further to a local landmark, the village church built in 1740, from which a Kiev film studio "borrowed" an iconostasis, or decorated altar screen. Seven years later, the villagers are still awaiting the return of the screen, but officials have installed it in a museum and blame the people's petitions on "nationalist" incitement.[30]

The seemingly minor incident provides the occasion for an eloquent plea by Moroz in defence of Ukrainian national values threatened by a combination of official harassment, the requirements of "progress" and the uniformity of mass culture. He begins by deriding the official claim that "there have never been and there are not now any registered historical monuments in the village of Kosmach."[31] Quite the contrary, Moroz contends, the entire village is such a monument, and for its inhabitants their church represents nearly four centuries of devotion to the Uniate faith repressed under Soviet rule. "The church has become such an integral part of cultural life that it is not possible to destroy it without harming the spiritual structure of the nation."[32] The atheist erosion of national culture is merely the obverse of direct destruction of historic and artistic treasures by "accidental" fires in Kiev, Samarkand and other non-Russian cities during the early 1960s.

[29] Ibid. p. 53.
[30] Ibid. p. 61.
[31] Ibid. p. 62.
[32] Ibid. p. 65.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The isolated village is a microcosm of the nation's spirit, " as a whole world is reflected in a drop of water." [33] Its loss of a religious treasure to a cinema director who used it as a prop epitomizes the despoliation of locally rooted culture. More insidious are the ravages of commercialism, due to tourists and collectors whose appetite for art objects causes artisans to sacrifice originality for mass production. Other sacrifices are demanded in the name of progress; witness the site near Lvov where " a wooden crucifix, dating from the fifteenth century, and the oldest in Ukraine, was pulled down from a height of eight meters to build an automobile parking lot." [34] In Kosmach itself, the materialist faith is supplanting the church with an oil derrick in the centre of town, while " some idiotic holiday of pigtenders or milkmaids " is celebrated in lieu of Easter.

From a historical viewpoint, " ' culture ' and ' revolution ' are incompatible and opposing concepts. Culture signifies age-old maturation which cannot be speeded up. All revolutionary interference is ruinous." [35] Because revolution connotes the overturning of tradition. But Moroz does not fully develop this point. His concern is more with the spurious phenomena of cultural revolution than with the origins of political change; his barbs are directed at " activists " commended by *Komsomolskaya Pravda* for smashing Easter eggs, rather than at Lenin. Not revolution *per se* but its consequences arouse his scorn as he surveys the contemporary scene to " find that the oldest architectural monuments are snack bars, built since 1948 and plastered on all sides with grey cement—the classic Stalin renaissance." [36]

By this time, the passions of 1917 have yielded to " nihilism, the product of mass culture. It sweeps all originality from its path and stamps everything with uniformity." [37] Instead of the note of optimism he sounded in *Report from the Beria Reserve*, Moroz in this essay sees everywhere the signs of " deculturalization, alienation, dehumanization and the loss of our roots." [38] A bland *mélange* of international culture conveys universal mediocrity. " The songs over the radio are the same on all continents. The fashion is the same from Brazil to Japan. . . . People are excessively developing their technical function at the expense of the spiritual, and this, for some reason, is called progress."

The twin effects of deracination are evident in the apathy of the intellectuals and the assimilation of the people into the dominant culture. Moroz castigates the Ukrainian intelligentsia for its failure to protest the rape of local culture. Only a few can be expected to follow him on his pilgrimage to Kosmach to " search for an answer to the question,

[33] Ibid. p. 74.
[34] Ibid. p. 79.
[35] Ibid. p. 78.
[36] Ibid. p. 77.
[37] Ibid. p. 73.
[38] Ibid. p. 80.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

'Who am I?'" [39] Of the ordinary people too, only a minority will heed their "instinct for spiritual self-preservation" and escape a bovine existence.[40] The siren song of cultural assimilation is too potent, in Russia as in America, to keep members of minority nationalities attuned to their traditions. The American melting pot is a cauldron, in the metaphor of Moroz, "a chaotic mixture of fragments of all cultures." [41] Immigrants are eager to be "denationalized" and boast of their "openmindedness" when they have shed their native language and traditions. "It is the same here. If you wish to prove that you are 'progressive,' forget your ancestry and become a 'universal man' (which actually means, a Russian)."

THE final essay, *In the Midst of the Snows*, finds Moroz returning to a polemical vein. His quarrel is primarily with Ivan Dzyuba, one of the literary critics who inspired the *shestydesiatniki* with his essays against Russification and public addresses protesting at the arrests of "nationalists" in 1965.[42] Threatened with expulsion from the Kiev section of the Writers' Union, Dzyuba submitted what appeared to Moroz a recantation, though it did not satisfy the Party ideologists.[43] For Moroz to pin the Judas label on Dzyuba solely on the grounds of an ambiguous statement against the sort of "bourgeois nationalism" that incites ethnic strife appears rash and intolerant in retrospect. Surely, Moroz had reason to regret his philippic after Dzyuba refused to testify against him at his 1970 trial and within two years followed him to prison.

That personal error of judgment aside, the essay is pertinent to an analysis of Moroz's thought for its depiction of the *shestydesiatniki*, the pioneers of the modern Ukrainian renaissance, as a kind of religious brotherhood overcoming "the ice of indifference and nihilism that had accumulated over long years." [44] The moral superiority of the intellectuals inspired the people; their arrests in 1965 merely added "an aureole" of martyrdom. The regime, therefore, realized that "it was necessary to kill the legend of the writers of the sixties, those men with new qualities . . . to deprive people of the example which revived them and to convince them that their God was only a stage prop."

Moroz turns the epithet of "Don Quixotes," which the proponents of a "realistic" accommodation of Ukrainians to their subservient condition had applied to uncompromising nationalists like himself, into a title of nobility. "All discoveries, all inventions, are the works of the Don Quixotes." [45] If his brand of nationalism smacks of romantic idealism, of an apparently hopeless quest for the recovery of bygone values,

[39] Ibid. p. 84.
[40] Ibid. p. 72.
[41] Ibid. p. 74.
[42] Harvey Fireside, "Crackdown in the Ukraine," *Commonweal*, 19 Oct. 1973, p. 61.
[43] Ivan Dzyuba, *Internationalism or Russification?* (London, 1970), p. 249.
[44] *Report*, p. 90.
[45] Ibid. p. 93.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Moroz is satisfied that " there is no alternative." Not arguments to persuade waverers, but living embodiments of " apostolic fervour " are required to inspire the people. Finally, he is able to refute charges that his platform is anything but progressive. Citing the odes to nationalism penned by Nehru, Sukarno and Sun Yat-sen printed approvingly in Moscow, Moroz shows that Ukrainian patriots should not be ashamed of marching under the same banner against their colonial masters.[46]

The imagery of Christian martyrdom employed by Moroz in this essay reappears in the " Final Statement " he addressed to the court at his second trial in November 1970, at Ivano-Frankovsk. The past persecutions of his intrepid band are viewed as stones that " turned out not to be stones but boomerangs, which returned, without fail, and struck you." [47] He refers to himself in the third person as five years ago " a nobody, an unknown history lecturer," catapulted to world renown thanks to his persecutors. His recantation at this point would represent " a stunning blow to all conscious Ukrainians."

He appears to bear his martyrdom, proclaiming, " The dead become a banner. The dead become a symbol which inspires brave souls to new sacrifices." [48] And faced with the prospect of "a lingering death from mysterious chemicals in Vladimir prison," he concludes with the same hope in youth that marked his prison essay three years before. The faith of Moroz in the emergence of the Ukrainian renaissance into a mass movement rests on the fact that " there are 800,000 students and everyone has a radio," to echo his message from abroad.

Under the strictures of his imprisonment for the past six years, Moroz has not been able to do any more writing. Indeed, it is questionable whether he can even survive beyond the halfway mark of his sentence. The occasional bulletins that chronicle his agonies attest to the fortitude with which he has obeyed the code of conduct he set for himself. On 10 May Moroz was transferred from the Nadimyn Prison to the Serbsky Institute of Forensic Psychiatry. In the middle of June he has been declared sane and sent back to a Moscow prison. In the attention he has aroused in the West, Moroz is living up to the assessment of his Canadian editor, John Kolasky, as the " symbol of all opposition to national oppression in the USSR," and " perhaps the most important political prisoner in the USSR today." [49] In his enforced isolation, he is embodying the force of his final declaration, " There is silence which is louder than shouting." [50]

[46] Ibid. pp. 108–9.
[47] Ibid. p. 118.
[48] Ibid. p. 119.
[49] Ibid. p. xxii.
[50] Ibid. p. 119.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

"Thieves" in the USSR— a Social Phenomenon

Yuri Glazov

AMONG the many problems of post-revolutionary Russia, the so-called "thieves" (*vory*), their behaviour and psychology, might constitute an important subject of scholarly interest. "Thieves" means here not so much ordinary pick-pockets and robbers (which these persons could indeed be) as, rather, honoured members of a powerful underground crime institution. In the prison-camp empire which flourished in Russia until Stalin's death in 1953 and a number of years thereafter, thieves were actually permitted by the authorities to establish their supremacy in the camps over millions of *muzhiki*, common workers and peasants, and "fascists," as the intelligentsia were often called in prison-camp slang. The authority and influence of the thieves' brotherhood outside the prison-camp walls was too important to be disregarded.

The thieves' associations are not specifically Russian. Sicilian-born mafia and organized crime institutions in America are typologically related social phenomena, although in many respects the function and structure of the thieves' institution in Russia seem to constitute a quite different picture. The Russian institution of the thieves is an esoteric order of professional outlaws, whose behaviour is based on strictly defined rules. Although it is difficult to trace here the historical traditions of this institution, a list of the notables of pre-revolutionary Russia, including such heroes as Yermak, a conqueror of Siberia in the sixteenth century, Razin and Pugachov, prominent leaders of two peasant revolts, might help us in understanding the thieves' historical roots.[1]

THE Soviet system inherited some features of what might be called the past grandeur of the Russian Robin Hood tradition. The new power came into existence in 1917, using at least a few questionable methods. The party leadership was fully aware, for instance, of the bank hold-ups carried out by Lenin's party members.[2] The behaviour of the revolutionaries in the Winter Palace, where priceless vases were used as chamber pots, aroused the indignation of Maxim Gorky in 1917.[3]

[1] The glorious traditions of robbers in Russia date from the time of the Tartar yoke. In 1375 Kostroma was attacked by robbers. *Entsiklopedicheskii slovar*, Vol. 51, p. 115. A number of famous robbers of ancient Russia were lauded in folklore, like Solovei—robber, Vasili Buslaiev, Ivan Cain, and the Cossacks. Writers of the highest calibre wrote about them, such figures in classical Russian literature as Pushkin, Dostoyevsky, Tolstoy and Chekhov, as well as the Soviet authors Gorky, Mayakovsky, Leonov, Seyfullina, Makarenko, Tendryakov, Maksimov, Solzhenitsyn, and many others.

[2] Leonard Schapiro, *The Communist Party of the Soviet Union*, p. 88; David Shub, *Lenin*, p. 61.

[3] Bertram D. Wolfe, *The Bridge and the Abyss*, Praeger, p. 87, Maxim Gorky, *Nesvoyevremyennye Mysli* (Paris, 1971), pp. 118, 122.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

From the 1917 Revolution to the end of the 1950s the underground world of professional criminals played an important role in the history of Soviet society. As a result of years of war and the succeeding transformation in Russia, millions of youngsters lost their parents and homes. Streets became their playground, robbery a life-long profession, prison and prison-camps their real homes and places of recreation. While on the upper levels of the society the activity of building socialism was in full swing, on its lower levels, embracing millions of common people, the whole country was terrorized on a day-to-day basis by this underground force.

Stalin himself used to boast of his close relations with the underground milieu of pre-revolutionary Russia. The changes in prison conditions and climate after the middle of the 1930s might be explained by Stalin's personal instructions.[4] Stalin obviously understood criminal psychology; and the behaviour of the NKVD leaders and some Red Army chiefs might be better understood if the impact of prison-camp psychology and the underground were traced in more detail.[5]

In the four decades after the Revolution of 1917 a specifically prison-camp subculture came to life. This subculture had clear space boundaries, time dimensions and life-values. The prison-camp world had its own dialect of Russian, grammar and vocabulary. The population of the prison-camp empire numbered up to fifteen million until 1939, and included as a rule the most active and temperamental citizens of post-revolutionary society. The prison-camp kingdom had its own uniformity, prescribed on the one hand by State Security directives and on the other by the well-established organized crime institutions. Prison-camp culture was characterized by its peculiar philosophy and interrelations (including sexual) between members of that highly stratified society.

ALTHOUGH dozens of books have been written in various languages about prison-camps in Russia, there is still no book or article about the "thieves," this peculiar tribe of Soviet society which could be considered as an aristocracy of the prison world. The society of the thieves is an esoteric sect, with its own religion, and an extremely rigid code of secular behaviour. Most writers, however, who describe their prison-

[4] September, 1936 brought the NKVD Stalin's rebuke that it was "four years behind in this matter." Adam Ulam, *Stalin*, p. 419.

[5] Marshall K. Rokossovsky was a former prisoner, well-known for his relations with the former convicts, who were glad to serve in his army. One of the great heroes during World War Two, Alexandr Matrosov was a daring man, whose mentality was shaped by the prison-camp atmosphere. P. Yakir in his *Childhood in Prison* eloquently describes the atmosphere producing young criminals. "Misha talked of the mood in the compound. The likely lads who had come from Moscow were setting the tone, criticizing the activists for collaborating with the camp security officers; friers (who do not belong to the underworld fraternity) made escapes while they, who had once had real rogue's blood in their veins, actually narked for authorities." Pyotr Yakir, *A Childhood in Prison* London 1972), p. 103.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

camp experiences (independently of each other) emphasize the phenomenon of the prison-camp aristocracy as the most important, and most unpleasant, feature of life in their incarceration.[6] "Twenty per cent of criminals keep in terror 80 per cent of morally pure prisoners. Three per cent of criminals (*blatars*) keep in blind obedience all the rest of the criminal world."[7]

For these people, having to live side-by-side with professional robbers and murderers was more unpleasant than the sadism of camp personnel, or the knowledge that as a political prisoner one was condemned to decades of incarceration, enforced, exhausting manual labour, starvation and complete separation from relatives and friends. These criminals were little short of omnipotent within the camp, well-informed by spies, and proud of being incorrigible.

In fact, the whole of the USSR was at one time covered by a network of well-organized and professionally-trained outlaws. The hierarchy of these outlaws is shaped like a pyramid, broadly based and tapering towards the top. But at the top there is no single man like the American

[6] Alexander Solzhenitsyn, *Arkhipelag Gulag* I–II Paris, 1973, p. 415; Aurel Von Juchen, "Was die Hunde heulen," Deutsche Verlags Anstalt, Stuttgart, 1958, p. 124; Lev Ginzburg, "Dudka krysolova," Moscow, 1960, p. 166; Ivan Solonevich, "Rossiya v lageriakh *Golos Rossii*, 1938, p. 253; V. I. Yukshinski, "Sovetskie kontsentrationnye lageri v 1945–1955," Institute for the Study of the USSR, München, 1958, p. 29; Gustav Herling, *A World Apart*, New York, trans. from the Polish by Joseph Mark, 1951, p. 27.

It is worthwhile to give here a passage from the work of a foreign lady who found herself in the post-war prison-camp empire and found out about this phenomenon.

"'Who is Zagriskin?' I asked.

'The king of Vorkuta' Anne explained. 'He owns the whole darn railroad system we are building. Well he does not actually own it, but he behaves as though he did. Imagine, that dog got out of the camp two years ago, and now he practically runs the country. Has the confidence of Moscow—a criminal, a former convict, a murderer, and now he exploits the prisoners worse than any free man. He was one of the worst criminals up here; only sat for eight years though; they let him out on good behaviour. He was a Blatnoy and became a Suka.'

I did not understand, 'What are Blatnie? What are Suki?'

'The Blatnie are a very tight criminal group' Ruth explained. 'They have extremely strict rules by which they live, one of them being that they must never work for anyone, especially not for the government. They live entirely from theft and murder, but usually take from the rich and give to the poor. When one of them disobeys the rules or does anything unworthy of a Blatnoy, such as getting a job, he is called Suka—female dog—and is liquidated by his former gang members. He is a traitor, see, and is considered worse than a government official.'

I tried to find out more about this interesting subject later by asking my Russian colleagues. But they knew very little about it. In fact, most of them had never heard of the Blatnie (thieves) before they became prisoners and were brought in contact with them. It seemed a phenomenon so far outside normal society that an ordinary citizen never suspected its presence. And yet it was an enormous organization, covering the whole territory of the Soviet Union. It was in no way formalized, simply a loose fraternity with an iron code." Erica Wallach, *Light at Midnight* (New York, 1967), pp. 229–30. What Erica Wallach writes about the thieves' habits and customs should be carefully checked and corrected, but her first impression about this tribe of thieves and bitches is of great interest for us.

[7] Mikhail Rozanov, Zavoevateli belykh piaten/*Conquerors of the White Spots*, Possev-Verlag, Limbourg, 1951, p. 255. Regarding domination of the thieves in prison-camps, see A. Solzhenitsyn, *Gulag Arkhipelag*, III–IV, p. 424. Cf. also L. Kopelev in *Khranit vechno*, Ardis, 1975, pp. 447, 605.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

"Godfather." The society is composed of many families (*kodlo*), who are supposed to be united by ties of solidarity, fraternity and relatively equal rights. To become a fully fledged member of the thieves' fraternity, many years of training and tests are necessary. While young, the *maloletka* (teenager) is considered a novice; only later can he call himself a *vor* or true thief, a name which has a respectful connotation among many Russians.[8]

IN a country where the law as an embodiment of justice became the target of wit and cynical remarks, thieves do not fail to live by their own law, based on their own ideals of justice. This law is, naturally, unwritten, but it nonetheless prescribes every aspect of the thief's life. Spiritual life, language, prison-camp *mores*, evaluation of human beings, relations with other thieves in the framework of their own community, judgment and punishment for infraction of thieves' rules, work and leisure, eating and drinking, treatment of their own bodies, attitudes towards sex and women, towards renegades from the thieves' society, relations with common people outside and state officials inside the camps —all these aspects of life are treated in their laws.

FOR the thieves, the basis of their standards is their own spirit (*dukh*), and those who possess it, the thieves, are *dukhariki*. The notion of the spirit is particularly important under the exhausting conditions of the camps which the thieves call their "native home." Given the starvation diet and hard labour there, a person's ability to survive depends almost entirely on keeping his spirit alive. The thieves wear home-made aluminium crosses round their necks, and their chests are often tattooed with a picture of praying angels on each side of a crucifix; underneath are the words: "O Lord, save thy slave!" or "I believe in God." An appeal to God will be found even on their legs, such as: "O Lord, save me from the Cheka."[9] This does not mean that the thieves are religious in the generally accepted sense. Although in rare cases the thieves are known to have been compassionate and helpful towards "saints," as religious people are called in the prisons,[10] there are no facts confirming the existence of any purely religious rituals among thieves.[11]

[8] "Thief" is also a self-definition among the members of this underground body. Other self-definitions among them are: honest thief (*chestnyi vor*), lawful thief (*zakonnyi vor*), thief-in-law (*vor v zakone*), lawyer (*zakonnik*), *vagabond* (*blatnoy, bosiak, brodiaga*), *zhigan, urka, urkach, urkagan, chesniaga.* See M. de Santerr "Sovetskie poslevoennye kontslageri i ikh obitateli," Munchen, 1960, Institute for the Study of the USSR, p. 55.

[9] M. de Santerr, op. cit. p. 89.

[10] Ibid. p. 80. Good attitudes towards religious people were seen in cases when the religious person showed examples of very high spirituality.

[11] Songs and tap-dancing (*chechetka*) among thieves constituted a kind of religious ritual.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Since thieves worship spirit and spirituality, its level is what determines a thief's status in his fraternity. They have various methods of determining whether a newcomer belongs to the thieves or not.[12] If a newcomer shows obvious signs of being a member of their clan, the thieves of the cell or of the camp invite him to their secret meeting (*tolkovishche* or *pravilka*) in order to establish his credentials and spirit in the thieves' society. Like their trials, such meetings are well-guarded, and include some features of religious rituals.

The thieves laws are extremely rigid, and if they find out that one of their number has deviated from the laws, he is usually summoned to a secret trial. If found guilty he may lose his status as a thief and his spirit, a penalty which is termed "earthing." In the case of the death verdict the thieves execute their condemned fellow: they do so by first "rotating" the guilty person, thereby taking away his soul.[13] The death verdict having been announced, the victim stands with his back to the wall, tears his shirt open in front, and addressing his several (never one) executioners, who are armed with knives, says: "Take my soul!"

THE thieves' law declares complete contempt towards females. Under no conditions may women become members of their privileged clan on any level whatsover. Within the society of thieves neither permanent families nor wives are allowed.[14] Fraternal life within the society of thieves is a matter of fierce pride and does not leave the individual any chance for privacy or personal preferences, which might jeopardize his devotion or weaken his ties to the brotherhood, and so endanger his fellows' security as well as his own. A thief is entitled to take only a temporary wife or girlfriend, and the higher the thief's status, the better are his chances of receiving a more desirable girlfriend, whether within the prison-camp or elsewhere.

As far as their sexual life is concerned, the thieves know almost no limits. All pretty female prisoners are considered their property, and the right of the first night belongs to the head of the thieves' family. But a thief has no commitments towards the women he has relations with, whether they are female thieves or not.[15] The female thieves, although

[12] A common trick to identify their own members was to spread on the floor at the entrance of a prison-cell a new silk shirt or clean towel. A newcomer to the cell might be perplexed even to touch the expensive stuff with his shoes and is thus immediately identified as a person alien to the clan. A thief entering the cell for the first time puts his feet on the shirt or towel and quietly cleans them, revealing his membership in the thieves' fraternity.

[13] M. de Santerr, op. cit. p. 58. Solzhenitsyn, op. cit. p. 433.

[14] Varlam Shalamov writes about possible exceptions, but he confirms the point of view according to which the thieves could have their families and wives only in the past, and never in the present. Varlam Shalamov, "A Woman of the Underground World," *Grani*, October 1970, Possev Verlag, No. 77, p. 41.

[15] In Russian, *vorovka* a she-thief, *blatnaia* a woman belonging to the world of the thieves, *blatniachka*, *vorovaika* she who belongs to the thieves' world. A good description of a queen of the women thieves is given by Y. A. Tregubov, "Vosem' let vo vlasti Lubianki," Possev-Verlag, 1959, p. 147 (Eight Years in Lubianki Prison).

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

lacking equal rights with male thieves, are forbidden to have intercourse with any men who are not members of the thieves' family. A female thief may well kill a non-thief if he attempts to make love to her or rape her.[16] A female thief feels proud to be the property, although temporary, of an elder thief (*pakhan*). There are no love triangles among them or cases of rivalry because mutual girlfriends are forbidden. But close ties of solidarity and fraternity allow them in a time of sexual hunger to share the same girl for one night.[17] The majority of thieves suffer from venereal diseases, which do not worry them at all. Thieves generally do not live long anyway: they tend to die in their twenties or thirties.

Homosexuality is not banned by their laws, and in fact all thieves know this practice.[18] But passive homosexuality is entirely forbidden; passive homosexuals are not even considered human beings. Men in the prison camps who have been raped are regarded as outcasts. They are not allowed to sit at the same table with the others, or to eat from the same plate or with the same spoon. They are called " roosters " (*petukhi*) and are permitted to keep company only with other prison-camp male prostitutes. A thief would consider it below his dignity to associate in any way with a " rooster." Should a thief himself be raped by his foes, honour dictates that he murder his rapers and then take his own life.

In spite of this contempt for relationships with women, the thief's feelings for the mother figure are extraordinarily strong.[19]

The mother-cult, very widespread, demands that each thief bear tattooed on his breast: " I won't forget my own mother! " The mother–cult among thieves is of foremost importance for understanding the nature of their society because of its obvious relation to the traditional Russian mother–cult and to the cult of the Mother Goddess of India (e.g. the South Indian war-goddess Kotravai, who danced among the slain on the battlefield and demanded that her worshippers rob and kill).[20] The mother–cult demands neither respect toward females generally nor the worshipping of one's own mother in particular. Nevertheless, in thieves' circles harsh words about anybody's mother are at once cut off and suppressed.

In the dark life of thieves the notion of the mother remains a bright spot. In their songs, functionally replacing prayer, they sing about mother not without feeling:

> Mammy worked hard to support our family.
> While I softly started stealing,

16 Varlam Shalamov, Woman of the Thieves' World, *Grani*, 1970, p. 32.

17 Shalamov, ibid. p. 34. In times of sexual emergency the criminals deprived of female society used to arrange what was known in the prison-camp as a " streetcar," (*tramvai*) a rape squad.

18 An outline of their sexual behaviour is given by A. Vardi, *Podkonvoinyi mir*, Possev Verlag, 1971, p. 31.

19 Ibid. p. 39; A. Solzhenitsyn, *Arkhipelag Gulag*, III–IV, p. 429.

20 A. L. Basham, *The Wonder that Was India*, New York, 1959, p. 312.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

"You will become a thief just like your daddy!"
Shedding tears mummy kept saying.[21]

This subject runs through numerous thieves' songs. In the above-quoted couplet the real meaning is probably that the thief's own mother had given her blessing, however painful and reluctant, to her dear son's professional début. The Mother who is praised so lovingly in these songs might be not the thief's own mother, but the reflection of a general cult of motherhood, so frequently found among primitive tribes.

THE thieves' knowledge about the life outside prison walls and prison-camp barbed wire is at best vague. The distance between prison-camp life and the so-called free life of Soviet Russia as viewed by the thieves is not much less than the distance between the Soviet "free world" and Western European or American life. It is only the camp life which is seen by the thieves as real and, perhaps, even natural. Their excursions beyond the prison areas never last for long. To the thieves, the life of the western world is even more fabulous. Stories about American gangsters are heard with incredulity. Those from the West who find themselves in Soviet prison camps are called simply "spies" and "westerners."

Various segments of the population, both outside the prison camps and within, originally received their names and nicknames from the thieves. Persons belonging to that outside world are "friers," from the German frei or free. The chiefs and guardians of the camps are called "vermin" (*gady*). Those thieves who become renegades are called "bitches" (*suki*). The bitches are the worst foes of the thieves. Common prisoners working under the vermin's supervision are called "workmen" (*rabotiagi*), which in Russian slang has the connotation of draught animals. Those of the camp population who occupy relatively easy and profitable positions are "fools" (*pridurki*). Thieves are considered to be the privileged layer of the population, and like patricians in ancient Rome or the aristocracy of mediaeval Europe, they set the standard of behaviour in the prison camps.[22]

A central concept in the thieves' philosophy is the sense of their own exclusive rights to being considered human. It is only "honest thieves" of their brotherhood who are "human beings" or "men." There have been frequent cases when if three thieves were sitting in a cell, inhabited by over a hundred other prisoners, they might exchange loud remarks with their fellow thieves in adjacent cells: "Hey, how many human beings have you got there? We are three!"[23] The thieves' self-confidence and strength are based on solidarity within the framework of their fraternity, shrewdness in matters of survival and endurance of the exhausting conditions around them.

[21] Shalamov, op. cit. p. 40.
[22] Alexandr Vardi, op. cit. p. 121.
[23] M. de Santerr, op. cit. p. 23.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

THEIR fearlessness and undisguised contempt for death is an important part of their self-discipline.[24] Except perhaps for a group of highly religious people who would often prefer torture and death to yielding to the authorities' pressure,[25] the thieves represent a rare group within the Soviet population who seem to have overcome all fear. And it is fear that has been exploited so succesfully by the organs of state security to "keep order." But a thief has nothing to lose; he has no property. He himself is the property of his own order. On pain of death he is forbidden to have any collaboration with officials and must avoid even minor infractions of the clear-cut prescriptions of the fraternity. A thief is allowed to leave his order (which is called "to tie the knot"), but under no conditions may the rules be transgressed while he is still a member.[26]

The thief's criminal career becomes progressively more involved in professional intricacies; the ups and downs of such an adventurous life and endless imprisonments mean the loss of almost all chances to get back to an ordinary life, in which with his poor education he could in any case play only a miserable and insignificant role. Yet within his community a thief has enormous importance and respect; his life is a great adventure, marked by extraordinary dangers and tests; and he finds deep satisfaction and pride in his ability to ignore pain and death. These and some other considerations can explain the phenomenon of almost unprecedented intrepidity shown by the thieves.

Under Stalin and for years after, hardly anybody had any security. The thieves had no difficulty observing in their prison life endless scenes of human degradation, which occurred not without their assistance. Moreover, their own dignity was contrasted to the willing and flattering servility of younger aides as well as to the obedience of many other prisoners living in fear and trembling. It was, therefore, their fearlessness as thieves which brought them to the seat of power and pleasure. Since only fellow thieves were human beings feelings of guilt and compassion for others were to be carefully avoided. The more scrupulously the thief took pains to strengthen his spirit, the less the likelihood of unworthy fears reappearing.[27]

[24] The nature of fear in Soviet Russia is still an unexplored subject, which however might explain important aspects of the human psychology in the country. Nadezhda Mandelstam treats this subject as a landslide disease in her second book of memoirs, *Vtoraia kniga*, Paris, 1972, p. 187 ff.

[25] E.g. a scene of the treatment of nuns in a Vorkuta prison-camp depicted by Erica Wallach, op. cit. p. 374–5.

[26] In an Inta prison-camp in the forties the thieves beheaded one of their fellows for the following misdeed: he had been seen eating fat just at the time when a few members of his fraternity were confined to a frozen lock-up and were not given either tobacco or rye bread for a few days by the guard. M. de Santerr, op. cit. p. 67.

[27] The thieves do not worry about either the next day or their future. Their rules demand that they not keep any food for the next day, but rather give it away to others. M. de Santerr, op. cit. p. 25. Words from *Matthew*, 6.25 may be recalled here in order. to understand better their style of life: "Therefore I tell you, do not be anxious about your life, what you shall eat or what you shall drink, nor about your body, what you shall put on." One should not much wonder at this. Traditions of flagellants and castrates in Russia offer many examples of rather peculiar interpretations of the Bible.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

While thieves' spirits are to be safeguarded with constant vigilance (amidst the daily feuds and knife fights), their bodies seem to be trifles which can be almost entirely neglected. Scars and burns cover each thief's body, and the thief's dignity increases in direct proportion to the number of wounds and burns. This capacity to endure physical pain is incredible. Severe frost tortures them no more than burning heat.[28] They are able to live many days without any food at all. To write a number of protesting words on a wooden log with his own blood is something that a thief does without a second's hesitation. In order to get around a chief's orders or just to be sent to a hospital (a place of relative leisure), a thief readily swallows a dozen pieces of broken glass or sharp metal sticks. Or he might swallow a fishing hook tied to a thin rope, the other end of which is stretched to the cell's door in such a way that opening the door causes the thief's stomach and throat to be ripped by the sharply pointed hook.[29] Nailing the scrotal sac to a wooden bench is commonplace protest among thieves and their tribesmen.[30] They can cut off a finger or all five at once without a second thought. Having lost all his money at cards, a thief may stake his finger, or an arm or even his own life. If he happens to lose, he quickly cuts off the finger and keeps playing.[31] When he loses his stake, whatever it may be, the item must be redeemed immediately. There can be no reneging. Otherwise he will be proclaimed a bitch (*suka*) and knifed.[32] In the Northern forests, where prisoners were forced to saw wood, there were cases when thieves cut off their left hands and nailed them to a log which was then left to drift down the river to the south.[33] In a grave situation, a thief might publicly stab himself, much like the samurai ritual of harakiri; in these cases the thief makes strong and deep strokes upon his bare belly.[34] Thieves and their girlfriends view such ceremonies with the understanding that such an action proved the thief's high spirit and courage.

The communal spirit of thieves' life means that even food and tobacco are not personal property. A thief must not only give away the leftovers of his daily meals to those who serve him, but also, if he receives any food packet, he must put it on the table and say: "Come up and take, whoever is entitled to!" For concealing cigarettes from his friends, he

[28] A naked thief is able to sit for hours in frosty weather just on snow to express his indignation or protest regarding the chief's order. Viacheslav P. Artemyev, *Rezhim i Okhrana Ispavitelnotrudovych ragere i MVD.* Institute for the Study of the USSR, Munich, 1956, p. 96. Solonevich tells a well-known story about a young thief who having been put into a stove with consuming flame shouts angrily at those outside who forgot to shut the stove's door and thus had hurt him with a chilling draft. Ivan Solonevich, Rossiya v kontslageriakh / "Golos Rossii," 1938, p. 53.

[29] Anatoly Marchenko, *Moi pokazania*, Paris, 1969, p. 129.

[30] Dimitrii, Panin, "*Zapiski Sologdina*," Possev Verlag, Frankfurt/Main, 1973, p. 245.

[31] Am Marchenko, *My Testimony*, London, 1969, p. 141. Artemyev, op. cit. p. 97.

[32] Viacheslav Artemyev brings into his book a story about a thief who, having played away his left hand, tried to escape to another prison-camp, but ultimately was stabbed. Artemyev, op. cit. p. 97.

[33] M. de Santerr, op. cit. pp. 94, 97.

[34] Sergei Maximov, *Taiga* (New York, 1952), pp. 132–40.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

may be brought to trial and consequently deprived of his thief's privileges.[35] Thieves' abilities to endure starvation are equalled by their enormous ingenuity in making drugs, spirits, etc. Spirits are prepared out of practically anything, including tooth powder and brake fluid. Thieves often suffer from epilepsy and drug addiction. In the prison-camp drugstores they get ether, luminal, drugs mixed with cocaine, morphine and opium.[36] A two-ounce tea packet boiled in a cup of water produces a hard drug called "chifir."

Their instinct for survival, paradoxically, rivals their utter contempt for death. If there is no limit to a thief's self-mutilation in the defence of his dignity, there is also no limit to his mutilation of others when his survival is actually endangered. In this case, thieves' laws extend their freedom of action even to cannibalism. In order to survive the escape from a prison-camp located in Siberia or Northern Russia, which involves running across thousands of miles of "tayga" forests without food or villages, they bring along "meat" or "walking cans."[37] These are common prisoners who must accompany the thieves in their escape and who may be stabbed by them and eaten in case of starvation. The thieves' laws demand at the same time that a murder can be committed only in emergency, and should be justified later by the person who did it.

IN a country whose first rule runs, "He who does not work, neither shall he eat," and in the prison-camp institutions called "correctional labour camps," the thieves obey a rigid rule of their own constitution: not to work for the state. Work of any form, if enforced by state officials, means collaboration with the authorities, which is forbidden by the thieves' own rules. Whatever the punishment inflicted for non-working: beating, starvation, a freezing cell, the thieves are ready to endure it. They are usually well-informed about the state and prison-camp laws, particularly the one which prescribes the death penalty for a prisoner who has refused work three times. A thief will never reject three demands to work in a row. Finding himself under the menace of the third order to work, he will provoke a fight, perhaps wound or kill somebody, or hurt himelf and wind up in a punishment cell or hospital for a week or two.

Thieves' philosophy of manual labour seems simple, as in their proverb-like sayings: "Working makes horses kick the bucket," "Work is not a wolf—it won't escape to the forest," "Keep your lousy porridge, and keep your job too!," "Do not do today what you can put off until

[35] M. de Santerr, op. cit. pp. 92–93.

[36] Solzhenitsyn, op. cit. p. 429.

[37] Varlam Shalamov writes about this phenomenon in his stories about Kolyma. The author of this paper read this story while in Russia in one of the *samizdat* editions. Among those of his stories which had already been published outside Russia, this one has not yet been found, as well as other stories depicting the thieves' world with a scholarly accuracy. M. de Santerr brings these facts of cannibalism up in his matter-of-fact notes. M. de Santerr, op. cit. p. 65.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

tomorrow," "Do not save for tomorrow what you can eat today," "One day rest—one year of life." If summoned to work by their chiefs, the thieves try to avoid blunt and harsh negative answers, but will speak in a manner reminiscent of Zen wisdom or Sufis: "Boss, I have two left hands," "We'll go down to the coal mine when they cut windows through there," "I didn't put the coal there—why should I dig it out?," "You, dear boss, will not be able to heat the hut with this coal—you had better dig it out yourself." [38]

The fact that they do not want to work, or in their terms "to plough," does not mean that they are unable to work. In rare cases, when common prisoners show their inability to cope with a difficult assignment or to finish it on time, thieves might agree to try their hands at manual work, although usually after delicate negotiations through a go-between trustworthy to the robbers' brotherhood. Their agreement to work is usually conditional upon the fulfilment of their several demands, such as the release of one of their fellows from a punishment cell. As soon as the job has been started, 20 or 30 thieves can do in one or two days what a 100 other prisoners could not do in a week or more.[39]

While the thieves are behind barbed wire, they are supposed to coexist with the authorities. The thieves must never serve the state security officials who govern the prison-camp empire from without. They lose their status if they participate in building a prison-camp or installing barbed-wire around the prison. They treat the prison-camp heads with a certain contempt. They "thou" their chiefs, while the latter generally address them in a very polite manner, using their first names and patronymics. Relations with the prison-camp authorities make the thieves always vigilant. They jeopardize status not only by "leaving for a corridor," which includes not just washing the floor or stoking the prison stove, but even by doing a minor favour for a chief. So if a thief even holds the guards' keys for a single moment, he may be put on trial for moral turpitude.[40] Among the thieves' proverbs, one says: "There are only two varieties of Chekist, those who are bad and those who are very bad." [41]

[38] Thieves are masters of short succint speech. See M. de Santerr, pp. 64, 111. The list of examples might be very long, e.g.: "Whether you work or not, you will not be praised." "It's me who does not work and it's myself who is not praised." "This forest was not planted by me—I am not entitled to saw it." "Everybody knows on Saturday we don't go to work, but for us any day is a Saturday." Eugenia Ginzburg, *Journey through the Whirlwind* (New York, 1967), p. 402.

[39] V. Artemyev, op. cit. p. 96. The author does not go into detail about the conditions under which the thieves would agree to work without becoming bitches.

[40] M. de Santerr, op. cit. pp. 64, 77. In the forties the thief Agayev, called Gypsy, while arguing with an officer of the State Security Police outside the prison-camp wire, kicked the officer, whose military cap fell to the ground. Facing the officer's gun and repeated command to pick up the cap, the thief did not and paid on the spot with his life. M. de Santerr, op. cit. p. 64.

[41] In secret instructions of the Gulag authorities was the following: "Criminals—socially akin to the Soviet power, and they should be paid attention in the struggle with the prison-camp counter-revolution." V. Artemyev, op. cit. p. 98.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

UNTIL the late 1930s, the thieves' domination of the prison-camp empire had no serious limitations. The authorities did not worry much about the thieves' spreading throughout the country. Indeed, once they had uprooted the entire life of the country, the authorities began to consider the thieves' establishment to be rather useful. To be sure, the thieves were the products of all the years of revolution, industrialization and collectivization. But they also served an important function in making the population more dependent on the authorities. The mere presence of thieves in large numbers aroused in the population feelings of almost sacred fear towards prison-camp life, and discouraged any thought of opposing authority. Moreover, the thieves took special care to punish those persons who tried to rescue their friends in time of danger.[42] Prisoners often found themselves helpless facing the thieves and their well-organized power under something close to official approval.

The authorities tried to tame the thieves instead of liquidating them. Gradually they succeeded in creating a new layer among the thieves, persons harshly described as " bitches." The wolf-like strength of the thieves could be defeated and disorganized only with the help of the specially trained and state-supported army of bitches, former thieves cooperating with the state.[43] The authorities tried to re-orient some of the thieves, and Anton Makarenko's much-praised autobiographical book *Educational Epic* describes his painful efforts to turn young thieves into bitches.[44] A good number of young thieves yielded to the shrewd and intelligent pressure. However, until 1941 when the Soviet Union was led into the second world war, the bitches had no serious impact on the thieves' society and they lived under the constant menace of being stabbed by their own former brethren.[45]

The war, especially its second half, brought deep changes in the thieves' position. On pain of execution, they were drafted into the army at the beginning of the war; but they knew the tricks for being arrested and returned to their " native house " before they ever reached the front lines.[46] When the Soviet Army entered the Eastern European countries, the thieves saw their chance and joined the army, creating the Fifth

[42] A. Solzhenitsyn, *Arkhipelag Gulag*, III–IV, Paris, 1974, p. 418.

[43] Leonid Leonov wrote about " bitches " in 1926 in his *The Thief*. Cf. Leonov, *Sobranie Sochinennii*, Vol. 3, 1970, p. 585, " ssuchilsia paren', pravda tvoia. . . ." One of the interpretations of the " bitch " etymology was connected with a habit of hunters who train special she-wolves (bitches) to bring a wolf over to the hunters. M. de Santerr, op. cit. p. 77.

[44] Anton S. Makarenko, *Pedagogicheskaya poema*, Moscow, 1935; Peter Yakir in his " Childhood in Prison " shows some of the difficulties of such a reduction, Pyotr Yakir, *Detstvo v tiurme*, London, 1972, p. 108.

[45] Solzhenitsyn writes about execution of the top thieves in 1937, op. cit. p. 428. M. de Santerr writes about the supremacy of the thieves before World War Two, op. cit. p. 108. Panin writes about non-execution of criminals in the early forties: " they were used to coping with counter-revolutionaries," Zapiski Sologdina, p. 250.

[46] Solzhenitsyn, op. cit. p. 430.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Ukrainian Front.[47] Having robbed and murdered and having been praised for it by their officers, they returned home after the war to practise their professional occupation, which again led to quick arrest and camps.

But the thieves who remained behind considered these former colleagues to have broken the laws of the brotherhood by their participation in the war on the side of the authorities, which was seen as collaboration with the state security forces. The victorious newcomers still boasting of their war adventures were greeted as "bitches" by those "honest thieves" who had remained confined, subject to starvation and unbelievable hardships. In 1946–48 in the Soviet prison-camps another war took place, "a war of thieves and bitches, which shook down the Archipelago in the post-war years."[48] This was a war of life and death, a ruthless battle or "chopping" (*rubka*) in which thousands of criminals participated on both sides.

Before the "Great Fatherland War" of 1941–1945, the thieves seemed to enjoy a rather privileged position; they had been given free rein with the political prisoners ("incorrigible enemies of the people"), while for the most part the "bitches" were planted outside the prison-camp area at that time. In the post-war period prison-camp policy was directed to increase the bitches' role. In the prison-camp thieves and bitches had now acquired separate spheres of influence. The prison-camp authorities, time and again, were recruited from the bitches; they would set thousands of bitches against the thieves, men whose mutual solidarity had been tested by the fire and dangers of the recent war.[49]

The phenomenon of bitches is not new in Russia. There has been a tradition of recruiting criminals by the Tsarist police and the Tsarist authorities, at least since Ivan Cain of the seventeenth century and continuing up to the last days of the Romanov dynasty, as exemplified by figures like Malinovsky, Father Gapon and Azev.[50] One of the earliest post-revolutionary examples of "bitch-making" might be ascribed to the development of the Russian Orthodox Church headed by the stubborn Patriarch Tikhon. In the early twenties the authorities sponsored the creation of the Russian Living Church (which lasted for two decades).

The laws of the thieves and the bitches were directly opposed. According to the former, bitches could not be rehabilitated; they must be exterminated. By contrast, the bitches wanted not so much the death of

[47] Ibid. pp. 430–31. A common citizen in Russia knew of four Ukrainian Fronts.

[48] Solzhenitsyn, op. cit. p. 412. In 1948 in Inta "Shargolino summer house" 150 armed bitches were mixed together—naturally, as the result of a special decision of the authorities—with about 100 thieves. A battle immediately took place, and almost 90 thieves were killed in battle, while about 10 thieves made up their minds to yield and agreed to become bitches. De Santerr, op. cit. pp. 59–60.

[49] The prison-camps of Mordovia-Pot'ma and Ust'-Vym were under the thieves' control, while the Vorkuta prison-camps fell under the dominion of the bitches. M. de Santerr, op. cit. p. 71. The top positions in prison-camps were kept now by former thieves. Wallach, op. cit. p. 229. Bitches could be used now as heads of working teams. Solzhenitsyn, op. cit. p. 427, And they usually showed the best examples of leadership over the prisoners.

[50] Adam Ulam, *Stalin*, pp. 66–67, 73, 125.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the thieves as their agreement to take the bitches' oath and join their reformed fraternity. As soon as a thief expressed a desire to join the bitches' ranks, he was immediately acknowledged a full-fledged member of the new fraternity. Transformation of the thieves into bitches was actually an adaptation of the thieves' community to a new social environment, which required a splitting of the personality. The supremacy of the ego gives way to the supremacy of state interests.

The process of bitch-making should be understood against the general social background. In the post-war period, the wars between thieves and bitches coincided with the party-sponsored campaigns of 1946–50 in the fields of literature, music, cinema, biology, arts and sciences. As a common rule, bitches treated prisoners even more harshly than the thieves had done. They were not bound by any laws. Their greed and lust had no limits. When the bitches transgressed all limits of " decent behaviour," the local camp authorities would " allow " the thieves to put an end to these extremes rather than resort to legal processes.[51] The late 40s and the 50s were a hard period in the history of Russian thieves. The first two years of bloody wars with the bitches were followed by prison-camp uprisings of Ukrainians. This became a general signal for a furious settling of accounts. Both thieves and bitches were ruthlessly murdered in what was called the " Massacres of St. Bartholomew." [52] In the 50s, a number of desperate uprisings of prisoners occurred from one end of the prison-camp empire to the other.[53]

THE state security brains-trust made a number of new attempts to stir up the criminals against the common prisoners and the Soviet population in general. After Stalin's death the Soviet Government announced the so-called Voroshilov Amnesty. The result was violent: " All the country was submerged by a wave of murderers, bandits and thieves, who had been caught not without difficulties soon after the War." [54] Robbery and stabbing, as well as violent " entertainment " took place daily in the streets and overcrowded trains. A month after Stalin's death the whole population of the country was terror-stricken, and the hidden intentions of the authorities to increase the dependence of the population on the government were perhaps realized. The thieves and bitches, having had their fun, could be sent back to their permanent prison residences.

[51] M. de Santerr, op. cit. pp. 72, 73, 76.

[52] Ibid. p. 182. The usual method of execution used on common prisoners—the thieves called them " angry friers belted with scrap-iron "—was to hold them by the legs and smash their brains on a rock or stone wall.

[53] Dimitry Panin, op. cit. p. 506.

[54] Solzhenitsyn, op. cit. p. 420. A description of what took place was given by Vardi, op. cit. pp. 248–50. A thief who tells about his adventures in the country in those days expressed his amazement that their coded language (*phenia*) was understood in many official places he had visited during his short-term vacations after years of being confined in his " native home."

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Since 1953 the thieves' attitude towards common prisoners "friers belted with scrap-iron" (*frier lomom podpoiasannyi*) has, however, undergone some shifts. Solzhenitsyn writes that it was during Stalin's time that the thieves were sent to isolated cells and even isolated prisons.[55] M. de Santerr and other authors do not talk about such changes in Stalin's camps. Radical changes in the situation of the thieves were made by the authorities, according to our information, only in the late 1950s, mainly under Khrushchev.[56] Prisoners who had resisted the thieves' attempts to rob them were sometimes left undisturbed.[57] Since 1953 the thieves have not done much to political prisoners. In the Norilsk and Dzhezkazgan uprisings against the authorities, which took place in 1954 and 1955, thieves participated side-by-side with political prisoners. Thieves began respecting "friers" who imitated their behaviour and language. In some cases, they welcomed them as fellows.[58]

Perhaps such an unexpected evolution of the thieves' psychology inspired the authorities to launch a more frightening campaign against them. In the second half of the 1950s, the prison-camp empire was gradually reduced to a fraction of its former size. It was at this time that these "stubborn recidivists," as they were called by the authorities, were given their last chance. Either they must "tie the knot" (*zaviazat*), put an end to their professional activities, or be isolated from the rest of the population and prisoners. Most were put in solitary confinement.[59]

SEVERAL aspects of the history of the thieves in post-revolutionary Russia are interesting. On the bottom of the ladder, there were a few other underground institutions which persisted in challenging the authorities and resisting their pressure. The thieves can be approached as a socio-religious sect within the mainstream of the Russian sectarian tradition. Indeed, their strict separation of spirit and body is reminiscent of the teaching of the Russian flagellants (*khlysty*).[60]

The sizeable membership of the thieves' society is living proof of the failure of the state ideology. While the common people react passively to that ideology, the thieves reject it root and branch. Scrupulous in their mutual relationships, the thieves looked upon the whole society as devilish and its common people as "devils" (*cherti*). Men who had been

55 Solzhenitsyn, ibid. p. 433.

56 Among persons to whom I acknowledge my gratitude for information about this matter, I should express my gratitude to Viktor Balashov, a post-graduate student from New York University at Albany.

57 Yu. B. Margolin, *Puteshestviie v stranu ze-ka* (New York, 1953), pp. 354–56.

58 M. de Santerr, op. cit. pp. 83–84.

59 It was about them that Marchenko wrote in *My Testimony*, p. 141 ff.

60 See K. Kutepov, *Sekty khlystov i skoptsov*, Kazan, 1882, p. 63. A number of features like separation of spirit and body, mortification of the body and freedom from the flesh, division of all people into us and them, non-marriage and non-caring about children, cult of the mother (among the Khlysts, of the god-mother), and general contempt towards women, night as a time for rituals, as well as other features tell us about the kinship of these systems.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

engaged in building the new society were "non-beings" (*néliudi*), who could be robbed, threatened, or stabbed without any remorse whatsoever. To associate with that official society in any way could involve loss of membership in the thieves' society or even death.

For at least three decades the Soviet authorities treated this tribe fairly mildly, and used the thieves' clan shrewdly in their dealings with real revolutionaries, with what remained of the Russian intelligentsia, and with millions of common people undergoing hardships in the course of wide-scale industrialization and collectivization. Paradoxically enough, the extremes of the new society produced a layer of people who, with all their wild nature and unbelievable cruelty, helped stabilize the new social structure. Moreover, the phenomenon of thieves gave support to the notion that honour and dignity can survive, albeit in peculiar forms, under the most horrible circumstances.

Without exterminating the thieves physically, the authorities did their best to develop the institution of bitches in order to cope ultimately with the thieves and more successfully tame the stubborn population of the prison-camp empire. Bitch-making exposes the methods used by the highest officials of Soviet Russia to liquidate or to re-educate the "thieves" in their own party, in the arts and sciences, as well as in various religious institutions of Soviet Russia. If the thieves' institutions are evidence of the depth of anarchist traits in the Russian mind, the phenomenon of bitches perhaps demonstrates the ultimate strength of the state which seems capable of gathering under its command all layers of the society, even the most stubborn and independent.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The Historiography of the Purges

Robert Conquest

THE general impression of the Purges is that they operated at two levels. First, there were the three great public "Moscow Trials" plus a few other trials held *in camera*, but publicly announced, such as that of the Tukhachevsky group and the Mdivani-Okudzhava case in Georgia. Apart from that, on the mass scale, people were simply tried, and shot or imprisoned, *seriatim*.

It is true that these individual victims were all said to be implicated in one way or another in one of the myriad branches of the vast Trotskyite-Rightist-Japanese-German-and so on conspiracy. But (though the later literature contained references to a variety of group cases, such as the "linguists' plot," the trial of the staff of the Hermitage Museum, and others), the impression was nevertheless certainly given that Party figures and military men not involved in the public or publicized trials were on the whole dealt with in a fairly random manner.

The death dates originally provided when some of these men began to be rehabilitated in the mid-1950s, tended on the whole to justify this notion. And it is true that, even now, in many cases this randomness still shows itself. For example, the rank and file members of the Ukrainian Politburo seem to have been dealt with at intervals of a few weeks over most of 1938. The same applies to prominent figures like Bubhov, Yakovlev, Blyukher, Antipov, Bauman, Vareikis, and many others. At the same time, it gradually began to appear that, by a quite different process, fair-sized groups went to the execution cellars on or about the same day: in particular there was a large scale massacre in the last days of July 1938, to which I was, I believe, the first to draw attention in 1968 and to which I shall be referring below.

In the past year or two it has become plain that that particular case was far broader in scope than first appeared; and that there were a number of other dates which marked the execution of considerable groups.

For some time the issue was confused by the fact that erroneous dates were put forward. As Nadezhda Mandelshtam says in her memoirs:

> The dates on the certificate issued by the Registry Office also proved nothing. The dates put on such documents were often arbitrary: vast numbers of deaths, for instance, were post-dated to wartime. This was a statistical device to conceal the number of people who died in camps by blurring the difference between them and the casualties of the war period. When the rehabilitations began in the days after Stalin's death, people were almost automatically put down as having died in 1941 or 1943.[1]

[1] *Hope Against Hope* (English edition, London, 1971), p. 389.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

To take a single such example, there are a number of references to Army Commander Fedko dying in 1943 rather than the established date of 26 February 1939.

This process, in fact, seems to apply rather more broadly than Mrs Mandelshtam suggests: it was even apparently thought suitable, as giving some faint possibility of natural death, to remove victims from 1937–38 to the slightly milder climate of 1939 or 1940. It was only at the end of 1975 that Postyshev was switched from 10 December 1940, which had served him ever since his rehabilitation nearly 20 years ago, to 26 February 1939. Army Commander Dybenko, now listed as 29.7.1938 seems for long to have had the situation improved by the simple addition of the figure 1 to the two last elements of the correct date, coming out in various reference books as 29.8.1939. And there are many other examples.

AS the result of recent, more accurate dating, we now find that in addition to the Moscow Trials with which we have been familiar, there was a second layer of clandestine Moscow Trials, on an even greater scale—some of them never yet registered in the literature. If we confine ourselves to instances which are, on the face of it, at least as massive in the involvement of political figures as the public Trials, we find five major cases—which I shall refer to, on the analogy of "the Zinoviev Trial," as the Kossior Trial, the Rudzutak Trial, the Beloborodov Trial, the Komarov Trial and the Yenukidze Trial.

In the three public trials and the Tukhachevsky case, 19 members or former members of the Central Committee were shot, including five members of the Politburo and one Secretary of the CC; in the five cases we are dealing with, 36 members or former members of the Central Committee were shot, including four members of the Politburo and one Secretary. In the Tukhachevsky case, one Marshal, three Army Commanders and four Corps Commanders were shot; in our case, the total was one Marshal, eight Army Commanders, four full Admirals, one Army Commissar and five Corps Commanders.

The total death roll in the "public" cases was 55, compared to a figure of 65 in the clandestine ones: but all those in the latter were of sufficient status to be found nowadays in various reference books, while a maximum of 30 of the "public" trial figures could be so regarded. Moreover, even some of the most prominent of the public victims do not in fact appear in these books, since they have not been rehabilitated —the total who do so appear is only 12, in comparison still with our 65. Or, to put it another way, it may well be that important oppositionists whose date is not registered, like Smilga, Preobrazhenski or Shlyapnikov, might have figured in these clandestine trials without the fact being known. Moreover, there are a number of figures yet to be dealt with in (for example) the *Large Soviet Encyclopaedia,* some of whom will almost certainly add to our list.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The Kossior Case

Those shot on 23–26 February 1939 were S. V. Kossior; V. Chubar; P. P. Postyshev; B. P. Pozern, a Leningrad Party Secretary, candidate member of the Central Committee and Party member since 1903; A. V. Kosarev, Secretary of the Komsomol, member of the CC; L. I. Mirzoyan, First Secretary in Kazakhstan, member of the CC; Marshal Yegorov; Army Commander I. F. Fedko; Corps Commander G. D. Khakanyan.

The Ukrainian affiliations of the three Politburo members is, of course, obvious enough. Fedko, at the time of his arrest Deputy People's Commissar for Defence, had previously commanded the Kiev military district in Kossior's trial. Marshal Blyukher, who had died under interrogation the previous November, facing charges of espionage for Japan, is reported as having been particularly concerned at Fedko's arrest; Khakanyan had served on Blyukher's staff in the Far East. We are also told that a previously arrested member of the Ukrainian Politburo, Sukhomlin, was shot as a Japanese spy, and also that he had incriminated other Ukrainian leaders. So we can probably assume a Japanese emphasis largely missing from the German orientated public trials. We are also told that Kossior, a Pole, was charged with being a Polish spy, and doubtless there are allegations of Ukrainian nationalism, such as those under which their former colleagues in Kiev had perished —Lyubchenko, Grinko, Balitsky, Zatonsky, Yakir and others had all supposedly belonged to a Ukrainian "National Fascist Organisation."

The Byeloborodov Case

Those shot on 9–10 February 1938 were A. G. Byeloborodov, former member of the CC, who as Chairman of the Ural Ispolkom had ordered the execution of the Royal Family; G. N. Kaminski, former Mayor of Moscow and Commissar for Health and candidate member of the CC; K. V. Ryndin, member of the CC; G. M. Musabekov, candidate member of the CC, former Premier and President of Azerbaidzhan; G. I. Blagonravov, candidate member of the CC, formerly a prominent Chekist; M. M. (N. N.) Popov, from 1933 to 1937 Secretary of the Ukrainian CC, candidate member of the CC; G. R. Ryskulov, President of Turkmenistan, former candidate member of the CC; and Admiral (Flagman First Rank) R. A. Muklevich, a former C-in-C of the Navy. In addition, M. I. Erbanov, First Secretary of Buryat Mongolia, was shot on 8 February: his main claim to interest is that it is his daughter who appears in a famous photograph showing Stalin as the friend of children; and that she continued to appear pictured in his arms after he had orphaned her.

The Rudzutak Case

Those shot on 27–29 July 1938, (together with three lesser characters who followed, after the weekend, on 1 August), constitute by far the largest group to perish together—and indeed may be considered as two

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

separate cases, a civilian one and a military one. The first time it was referred to in print, to the best of my knowledge was in an article of mine in *Encounter* in November 1968, when it had just become apparent that four leading political figures and 10 prominent officers had died then, together with a well-known playwright. In the meantime, the list has increased until it now includes no less than 11 politicals and 15 officers, as well as the playwright.

The politicals were Yan Rudzutak; V. I. Mezhlauk, Commissar for Heavy Industry; M. L. Rukhimovich, Commissar for the Defence Industry; I. S. Unshlikht, Secretary of the Central Executive Committee; V. P. Zatonsky, of the Ukrainian Politburo; I. A. Pyatnitsky and V. G. Knorin, representatives of the CPSU on the Executive Committee of the Comintern; E. K. Pramnek, also on the Ukrainian Politburo. These were all members or candidate members of the CC. In addition were the figures of the notorious N. V. Krylenko, Commissar for Justice; M. K. Ammosov, First Secretary of Kirgizia; and Ya. A. Popok, First Secretary of Turkmenistan. The playwright, V. M. Kirshon, was much involved in political circles, being one of the RAPP group condemned as associates of Yagoda.

The military men were Army Commanders Belov, Alksnis (Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force), Dubovoy, Dybenko, Khalepski (C-in-C Armoured Forces), Vatsetis (Former C-in-C of the Red Army), Velikanov; Corps Commanders Gryaznov, Kovtiukh, and Kuibyshev; Army Commissar Ya. K. Berzin (formerly effectively Commander-in-Chief of the Spanish Republican Army); former Tsarist Major-General and Red Army theorist A. A. Svechin; Corps Commissar Ozolin; and Admirals Orlov and Viktorov, successive Cs-in-C of the Red Navy.

Before any of this became known, there were rumours (reported by Avtorkhanov) that Yezhov had fallen into disfavour for having failed to set up a Second Rightist Case (and a Second Military Case). It is certainly true that the major operation reported above followed closely on the appointment of Beria as Yezhov's Deputy, and eventual successor, on 20 July 1938, and that it may well represent the winding up of an unsatisfactory project by the new management. Both Rudzutak and Mezhlauk are mentioned as leaders of a Parallel Rightist Centre, in connexion with one variant of which Rukhimovich's name also emerges. So it seems probable enough that the political figures accused were a group playing the same role vis-à-vis the Bukharin case as Pyatakov and Co—in the Trotskyite "Parallel Centre"—had done vis-à-vis the Zinoviev case.

The Komarov Case

On 26–27 November 1937 the victims were N. P. Komarov, former Chairman of the Leningrad Soviet, and member of the CC, Party member since 1909; T. S. Kviring, former Secretary of the Bolshevik faction in the Duma, and member of the CC: Ya. S. Hanecki, Party member

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

since 1896, member of the Russian Bureau of the Party 1908–10 and later of the Party's Bureau in Exile, who had secured Lenin's release from Austrian jail, (as recounted in Solzhenitsyn's *Lenin in Zurich*); I. P. Nosov, Ivanovo Party Secretary, Party member since 1905, and member of the CC: I. E. Lyubimov, Party member since 1902, delegate to the fifth congress, People's Commissar for Light Industry, and member of the CC; N. A. Kubyak, Party member since 1898, delegate to the 1907 congress, former Chairman of the Petrograd Ispolkom, former Secretary of the CC, and member of that body; N. M. Nemtsov, Party member since 1897, Deputy in the St Petersburg Soviet in 1905, and Secretary of the Society of Old Bolsheviks; A. M. Krasnoshchekov, in the Social-Democratic movement since 1896, and former Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the Far Eastern Republic; Admiral Ludri; and Corps Commander Levichev, Deputy Chief of General Staff.

The emphasis on Old Bolsheviks and on Nemtsov's Society, dissolved in 1935, is very notable, a point we shall take up in the next, rather similar case.

The Yenukidze Case

Those shot on 30 October 1937 were headed by A. S. Yenukidze, one of the most prominent of Old Bolsheviks, a Party member since 1898, member of the Petrograd Ispolkom in June 1917, and, from 1918 on, Secretary of the Central Executive Committee; a member of the CC. He played a major role in the demonology of the Bukharin Trial, and had been removed from his posts in 1935 under accusations of "rotten liberalism." Others were V. P. Milyutin, full member of the then very small CC at the seventh conference and the seventh congress, in 1917, and Lenin's Commissar for Agriculture; A. S. Kiselev, a Party member since 1898 co-opted on the CC in 1914, and a full member of that body at the time of his arrest; D. Z. Lebed, full member of the CC and Deputy Chairman of the RSFSR Council of People's Commissars; S. S. Lobov, a member of the Petrograd Committee of the Party in 1917 and since 1930 People's Commissar successively of Supplies, of the Timber Industry and of the Food Industry, full member of the CC; I. F. Kodatsky, a member of the Petrograd Soviet in 1917, and later Chairman of the Leningrad Soviet and full member of the CC; I. P. Rumyantsev, Obkom Secretary at Smolensk, full member of the CC; A. I. Krinitsky, Secretary of the Saratov Kraikom, full member of the CC; V. I. Polonsky, former head of the CC's Organization Dept. and then Deputy People's Commissar for Communications and candidate member of the CC; A. M. Nazaretyan, former Secretary of the Transcaucasian Kraikom; A. I. Muralov, with a most distinguished underground record, former People's Commissar for Agriculture of the RSFSR; while P. A. Semenov, another full member of the CC, was shot on 29 October. To the extent that the accused were associated with Yenukidze (and a number of them served

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

in the TsIK apparatus), it seems that this group were liable to the charge of Rightism-cum-Trotskyism which marked the phase, and in particular with Yenukidze's alleged plot to make a palace coup—for which he was denounced by Rykov, Bulanov and Yagoda at the March 1938 Trial.

But what is particularly interesting about the 30 October case is, of course, that the most prominent among these figures was Abel Yenukidze. I have already pointed out (in the introduction to the latest edition of *The Great Terror* and elsewhere) that this—and the date of 20 September 1937 now given for the death of Karakhan—provides an entirely new insight into at least one aspect of the purge. For, of course, the one great trial previously on the record as having been held in secret but publicly announced afterwards was that of Yenukidze, with Karakhan and various quite different accomplices. It was stated publicly on 20 December 1937 that this trial had taken place on 15 December 1937, with those concerned having confessed to espionage, terrorism and bourgeois nationalism, and having been shot the following day. The fact that both Yenukidze and Karakhan were dead some months before their supposed trial will perhaps give additional perspective to our ideas about the depth and nature of the falsification carried out in the Stalin epoch. (We now learn, too, that another of those allegedly sentenced on 15 December, M. Orakhelashvili, died on 11 December; but for an execution to take place only four days before sentence is practically bourgeois legalism.)

At any rate, it is quite plausible to suppose that those shot on 30 October 1937 and a few weeks later on 26–27 November 1937, were the men who came under attack in the summer of 1935, when the Society of Old Bolsheviks (in which Lobov, too, was prominent) and the Society of Former Political Prisoners were dissolved (on 25 May 1935 and 25 June 1935 respectively) with the public denunciation and expulsion from the Party of Yenukidze himself at the Plenum of 5–7 June 1935. There is no doubt that both societies, and Yenukidze himself, were in trouble for circulating petitions and protesting in other ways against the further trial of Old Bolsheviks. Yenukidze's post as Secretary of the Presidium of the Central Executive Committee included control over the Kremlin. It would be very much in Stalin's style to make those petitioning for clemency for Kamenev retrospectively his accomplices. It was, moreover, a particularly easy link to make, since the alleged assassination attempt is supposed to have taken place in the Kremlin itself, and Yenukidze's "negligence" in failing to prevent it would soon evolve into complicity, as a perfectly normal Stalinist procedure. (Among those removed from the Kremlin at this time was Peterson, the commandant of the Kremlin Guard. His name was mentioned several times at the Bukharin trial as a leading conspirator in the palace coup plot, which had by then developed from the earlier and less significant story. Peterson was not immediately purged in 1935, but was sent to a military position in the Ukraine. The only death date we have for him is 1937. It would be interesting to see whether he, too, was one of the 30 October group.)

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

One question which immediately arises from all these cases is whether there were, in fact, mass secret trials. Such trials certainly did take place, like that of the Tukhachevsky group which, there can no longer be any doubt, did come *en bloc* before a "court" chaired by Ulrikh. The Mdivani group in Georgia also seems, as far as we know, to have had a trial of this kind.

With the other cases, however, we are on uncertain ground. Those concerned do seem to have come before a court of the Military Collegium. In certain cases, we are explicitly told that this was so—as with Rudzutak, Eikhe and Koltsov. As to the military, we do at least know that officers who did not receive death sentences during this period (such as the future Marshal Rokossovsky and General Gorbatov) faced such tribunals. The rather disparate nature of the executed groups does not, on the face of it, carry much weight, for the same sort of thing could have been said of previous trials. On the other hand, we are specifically told in Khrushchev's Secret Speech that after Rudzutak had pleaded not guilty (withdrawing an earlier confession) before a session of the Military Collegium, "sentence was pronounced on him in 20 minutes." We are told, similarly, in Roy Medvedev's *Let History Judge* [2] that Kosarev's trial lasted 15 minutes. These are times clearly incompatible with a mass trial (the Tukhachevsky trial lasted four hours). One is certainly tempted to think that people as closely associated as Kossior, Chubar and (as former Military District Commander in Kiev) Army Commander Fedko, who were all sentenced on the same day, might have been processed together. And the fact that the July 1938 group contained Mezhlauk, and several noted in Khrushchev's Secret Speech as falsely accused of a joint Rightist plot, might seem to imply a distinct group, suitable for trial together. But, on the whole, the known facts must, in spite of their paucity, prevail over such mere deduction, and we are left to assume that by mid-1938 these mass operations were simply ordered from above from time to time and processed on an individual basis by courts of the Military Collegium even though the accused were there charged with membership of large conspiracies.

The victims of earlier trials, such as that of 30 October 1937, on the other hand, cannot automatically be assumed to have been dealt with in the same way. At least there is no other evidence that Stalin was using this method as early as this. However, our knowledge of the precise circumstances is nil, and the point is scarcely a major one.

We are left with the question of why the supposed "trial" of 15 December was announced. If we could answer that, we would have got deeper into the motivations of Stalin and his accomplices than we have yet managed to do. All one can suggest is that too long a time was passing between the Pyatakov and the Bukharin trials, and it was thought suitable to keep up public and Party interest by the announcement of the execution of a mixed bag of leading non-confessors.

[2] (English edition), p. 272.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

In summing up one should incidentally note that the fact that, in most of these cases, the executions did not all take place on the same day, is not significant. For the reference books equally show the executions in known cases taking place one or two days apart. For example, those of Krestinsky and Grinko, both sentenced in the Bukharin trial, are given as on 13 and 15 March 1938 respectively; while Voznesensky and A. A. Kuznetsov, both mentioned as victims of the post-war "Leningrad Case" are now shown as dying on consecutive days. The only case among those we have covered which has a spread great enough to arouse some doubts is that of February 1939. Kossior, Chubar, Postyshev, Fedko, Khakanyan and Mirzoyan, all shot on 26 February, present no difficulty; and Pozern, on 25, is near enough. But Kosarev and Marshal Yegorov, on 23 February, (without any intervening weekend), might seem on the borderline of establishing a prima facie case for a separate trial. On the other hand, Kosarev's case is associated with those of Kossior and Chubar in Khrushchev's Secret Speech; while the Marshal's close connexion in the Defence Commissariat with Army Commander Fedko is also to the point. And, more generally, in considering those cases spread over two days, we may note that apart from the ones we have recorded, we find no instances of groups even as large as those registered on the individual days within these pairs otherwise occurring. (26 and 27 November 1937, five and four victims respectively; 9 and 10 February 1938, four victims on each day.)

Knowledge of these clandestine cases gives us an improved perspective of the Purge period. And the extraordinary falsifications of the pseudo-trial of Yenukidze in December 1937 gives us a remarkable new insight into Stalinist methods. But what of the view they give us of the present day USSR? For it must be remembered that these facts, as damaging to the public image of the USSR as any revelations made by its enemies —as damaging, in principle at least, as the "anti-Soviet slanders" of Solzhenitsyn—have been printed in Brezhnev's Russia. Over the whole period since 1956 the false dates designed to make things look better have been gradually replaced by more accurate, but more damaging ones.

But these relocations of the date at their true points are the sign of some definite pressure within the machinery of the encyclopaedias and so forth, a definite thrust to improve the objectivity of the record. Nor need we suppose that this was not a matter taken seriously in the Central Committee apparat. The *Large Soviet Encyclopaedia* is regarded with the utmost solemnity, from the political point of view. We can recall such efforts as the removal of the pages on Beria, and the long delay before the article on Stalin in the second edition; and there are other similar examples. The political and historical "responsible editors" work in close contact with the relevant departments of the CC. It is hard not to see it all as reflecting, in a small but by no means negligible way, a struggle against the scandal of silence and falsification—which, all the same, still persists in the history of the open trials, and in the general history of the period.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The Gulag Archipelago, Vol 3: Outlines of the Future

Michael Heller

THE final volume of *The Gulag Archipelago* contains the last three parts of the book: "Penal servitude"; "Exile"; "Stalin has gone." The chronicle of the fearful Archipelago of death and slavery is complete. Solzhenitsyn, that most conscientious of historians, has tried to gather all the evidence, not to miss anything. The last page bears the dates: 27.4.58–22.2.67, indicating the time Solzhenitsyn spent working on the book. *The Gulag Archipelago* was completed in time for the fiftieth anniversary of the October revolution—as a memorial to it. "I am finishing this book," writes Solzhenitsyn in a "Postscript":

> in a significant year of a double anniversary (and the two anniversaries are linked): 50 years since the revolution which created the Archipelago, and 100 years since the invention of barbed wire. [*And he adds*:] The second anniversary they'll most probably ignore . . .

THE account of penal servitude which takes up the fifth part of the book enables the author to recall both these important dates. "Revolution," writes Solzhenitsyn, "is usually magnanimous in its haste. It hurries to renounce a great deal. For instance, the word *penal servitude* [*katorga*]—although this is a fine, ponderous word . . ." The revolution did indeed hurry to renounce many "fine" words: penal servitude, prison, execution, even guilt. In their place new, empty, lightweight words appeared—DOPR (house of preliminary confinement) instead of prison; supreme measure of social protection instead of execution; and instead of guilt, the influence of the corrupt capitalist environment. Only one of these new words—concentration camp—was to prove weighty enough to last; all the others were to disappear and be replaced by the old, well-tried words again. Until the revolutionary leaders had destroyed everything in the conviction that if existence determined consciousness, it was sufficient to alter existence for a new consciousness, a New Man, to arise, it was possible to manage without the old, well-tried words, especially as it was only the words which had been repudiated, not the actual prisons, camps and executions. However, after it had been announced that socialism had been built, no-one could lay the blame any longer on environment, for existence had become ideal. Therefore, if a man failed for some reason to come up to the standards of this existence, the guilt (a word which made a triumphant return in the criminal code) lay solely within that person, and he had to be punished—as severely as possible, and best of all by penal servitude.

Penal servitude was introduced by decree on 17 April 1943, 26 years

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

after the revolution, and soon after the "Stalingrad national victory," when, as Solzhenitsyn puts it, "Stalin felt that the waggon seemed to have pulled him all the way up the hill."

The first penal labour camp was Vorkuta Mine No 17. Hardly any attempt was made, writes Solzhenitsyn, to hide its purpose. "The convicts were faced with the sure prospect of their own destruction." What was penal servitude like in Stalin's day? Solzhenitsyn describes it: the accommodation was in tents 7 by 12 metres, boarded on the outside with planks and strewn with sawdust (a laughable protection from the northern frosts); each tent contained 200 convicts; there was a 12-hour working day with a 10-minute break for warming up, and no days off; of the remaining 12 hours, eight were taken up with the journey to and from work, meals, checks, searches, leaving no more than four hours for sleep. The first "Vorkuta alphabet" (the convicts were given numbers, a letter and figures, from 1 to 1,000), 28,000 convicts, died within a year. "We may well marvel that they didn't die within one month," is the author's bitter comment, and he reminds us that the entire penal colony on the island of Sakhalin in Chekhov's time numbered a mere 5,905 convicts. Furthermore, before the revolution there was no penal servitude for women. The Soviet Union abolished discrimination against women and even instituted female penal labour with special penal camps for women.

Having described the living, or rather, the dying conditions in a penal labour colony, Solzhenitsyn goes on to give an account of its inhabitants. He is prepared in advance for reproaches:

> But I can already hear my compatriots and my contemporaries shouting angrily at me: stop! *Whom* are you daring to tell us about? Yes! They kept them to exterminate them—and rightly so! After all, they were traitors, policemen, burgomasters! They got what they deserved! Surely you don't feel sorry for them? (This, as we know, is *criticism* going beyond the bounds of literature and becoming the concern of the *organs*.) And the women there—why, they were *bedding* for the Germans!—I hear women's voices screaming at me.

Here, once again, as he did on several occasions in the preceding volumes, the writer links together the revolution, post-revolutionary reality and the Gulag in an indissoluble chain. He begins with the women. They were sentenced to hard labour for "associating with the occupiers." "But whose fault was that? Whose?" enquires the writer. "What must *we* have been like for our womenfolk to leave us and go after the occupiers? Is this not one of the innumerable prices we are paying and paying again and will go on paying for a long time to come for having taken a road that was chosen in haste and followed in confusion without a glance back at our losses or forward to see what lay ahead?"

The men, though, "the men, of course, must have been there for a

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

reason! They were traitors to their country and social traitors." Over and over again Solzhenitsyn asks the question that torments him:

> Russia [*Rus*] existed for eleven centuries; she knew many enemies and waged many wars. But were there many traitors in the land of Rus? Did *crowds* of traitors emerge from it? Apparently not ... And that under a system hostile to the working people. But then there came that most just of wars under that most just of social systems, and suddenly our people laid bare scores and hundreds of *traitors.*

Where did they come from? asks the writer. Why? and he repeats: What made them do it? ... Who were they?

Soviet historians assert that no such question exists, and that those who ask it must be taken care of by the organs. Western historians, or at least the majority of them, shy away from asking the question, so as not to offend their once-valiant ally in the war with Hitler's Germany. However, it is important that the question be voiced, and that an answer be sought, not only to achieve an understanding of the past, but also in order to understand the future. How did it happen that between 29 June and 7 July, at the battles of Belostok and Smolensk, the Germans captured 320,000 Soviet soldiers and officers; that on 16 July at Smolensk they captured 300,000; that between 5 and 8 August they took 103,000 at Uman; that on 24 September, 665,000 were captured at Kiev; and that another 665,000 were captured on 18 October at Bryansk and Vyazma? Solzhenitsyn cites Stalin's order (0019 of 16.7.41): "On all fronts there are numerous elements that are even running to meet the enemy and throwing down their arms at the first encounter with them." The author of *Gulag Archipelago* does not accept the official explanations: "they were taken unawares," or "they were outnumbered," emphasizing that as a matter of fact it was "the Red Army which had all the numerical superiority."

The explanation which Solzhenitsyn offers is simply this: the Soviet-German war began

> 10 years after the murderous collectivization, eight years after the mass deaths in the Ukraine (6,000,000 people died and neighbouring Europe didn't even notice), four years after the frenzied riot of the NKVD, only one year after the crippling production laws were passed, and all this in a country with a population of 15 million in the camps and an older generation that still had vivid memories of pre-revolutionary life ...

In the first instance the war awakened in the people the desire to "take a breather and liberate themselves," the desire to express their "loathing for their own regime." Until 1941, writes Solzhenitsyn, "the population of the USSR, naturally, saw the arrival of a foreign army as tantamount to the overthrow of the communist regime ..." However, the Soviet people, who "had rightly learned not to believe *anything at all* put out by Soviet

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

propaganda," could not possibly grasp the true nature of Nazism until they had experienced Hitler's intentions for themselves.

IN 1950 the author of *Gulag Archipelago* became personally acquainted with the inhabitants of the penal servitude colonies—which, admittedly, had come by that time to be called Special Camps. "Manpower was needed, and people were dying off for nothing in penal servitude," and this was why the Special Camps were created, "just a little more lax than the old penal servitude, but stricter than ordinary camps." Laxity and strictness are undoubtedly relative concepts. The 1,800 pages of *Gulag Archipelago* contain no small measure of horrors and atrocities, but the account of the Special Camp at Spassk occupies a prominent place among the most terrible episodes. Spassk gives us an excellent idea of what the Special Camps were like. Spassk was where invalids were sent (and, incidentally, this was where Doctor Kolesnikov, one of the "experts" who signed the "false conclusions of the Katyn commission," worked as a surgeon. Solzhenitsyn comments: "For that deed he was imprisoned here by a just Providence"). However, the head of Steplag, the complex of camps of which Spassk formed a part, Colonel Chechnev, did not recognize invalidhood. "He loved to say: 'I have only one invalid in the whole of Spassk, a man with both legs missing. But even he is on light work—he works as a messenger.'" It was Chechnev who thought up the idea of having four one-armed men carry stretchers: two with their right hand and two with their left. Even in the best, summer months of 1949, 60 to 70 men died each month, and in winter, the figure was 100 a month.[1]

Solzhenitsyn's acquaintance with the inmates of Special Camps begins while he is still in transit prisons on his way to the place of confinement designated for him. He scrutinizes the people amongst whom fate has thrown him, and tries to penetrate their thoughts. Most of the convicts are men from the Baltic states and the Western Ukraine. The author's reflections on the national question in the third volume of *Gulag Archipelago* deserve special attention. Probably he has never before set forth his views on the subject with such clarity and precision. "'I am ashamed to be a Russian!,' Herzen exclaimed, when we strangled Poland. I am doubly ashamed now before these peaceable, defenceless nations," writes Solzhenitsyn, referring to the Lithuanians and Estonians, and adding: "My attitude to the Latvians is more complicated. In their case fate had a hand of sorts. After all, they sowed the seeds of it themselves." Here the writer is speaking of the role of the Latvian riflemen during the October revolution and the civil war, clearly regarding all that the Latvians have suffered since 1940 as some sort of retribution.

When I referred to the particular clarity and precision with which Solzhenitsyn expounds his views on the nationality question, I had in

[1] Solzhenitsyn sets our minds at rest by reassuring us that Chechnev is now a retired general and lives in Karaganda.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

mind in the first instance his utterances about the Ukraine and the Ukrainians. He remarks that the words "Bandera-ites" and "Petlyura-ites" have become words of abuse in the Russian language, and no one thinks of analysing the real meaning of the words. But the "Bandera-ites," like the "Petlyura-ites," writes Solzhenitsyn, "are the same Ukrainians who do not want an alien regime ruling over them. When they discovered that Hitler was not bringing them the freedom they had been promised, they fought against Hitler too for the whole of the war, but we keep silent about that because it is just as disadvantageous to us as the Warsaw uprising of 1944." Solzhenitsyn asks: "Why are we so annoyed by Ukrainian nationalism, by the desire of our brothers to speak, bring up their children and put up street-signs in their own *mova* (tongue)? ... Why are we so annoyed by their desire to secede? Do we begrudge them the beaches of Odessa? Or the Cherkass fruits?" He admits:

> I find it painful to write about this: I have a combination of the Ukrainian and the Russian in my blood, and in my heart and my thoughts too. But my great experience of friendly contact with Ukrainians in the camps has revealed to me just *how* painful it has become for them. Our generation will not escape payment for the mistakes of our elders.

Solzhenitsyn concludes: "We are duty bound to leave the decision-making to them—to the federalists or the separatists, whoever manages to convince the others. Not to concede that to them is madness and cruelty."

THE *Gulag Archipelago* is a painstaking collection of facts, testimonies and documents. At the same time it is an analysis of the soul of a people which lived in the Gulag and with the Gulag. How could it have happened that a people allowed themselves to become enslaved, and why did they offer no resistance? was the writer's question in the first two volumes of his book. In the third volume he asks why the convicts tolerated their lot. His reply is: "But we *didn't* tolerate it!" This third volume, the final parts of the book, are an account of how the prisoners resisted, an account of the resistance. Solzhenitsyn tells us of the many forms this resistance took, from individual protest to mass action, from sharp words to sharp knives. He declares: "In the Special Camps we raised the banner of *political prisoners* and we became political prisoners!" In the Special Camps ... penal servitude, and then the Special Camps, were the highest point in the development of Stalin's system of camps and its most cruel manifestation. However, at the same time, the isolation of prisoners who realized that they had no future and nothing to lose created the conditions for a resistance. "The Breeze of Revolution" is the title Solzhenitsyn gives to a chapter in which he describes the stage from the "*sharashka*" at Marfino to the Camp in Ekibastuz: in the transit prisons and the convict trains the prisoners

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

talked more freely than so-called free Soviet citizens could conceivably have imagined—and by free citizens he means those who had not been arrested. Solzhenitsyn offers two reasons why the convicts suddenly realized that they could give free expression to their thoughts. Firstly, the majority of them had 25-year sentences and had lost all hope of being released. Secondly, their hopes for freedom were reawakened by the Korean war, which Soviet convicts regarded as the prelude to a world war. "That's how far they had exhausted us," writes Solzhenitsyn. "A world war could either precipitate our death . . ., or bring us freedom still. In both cases our deliverance would come far sooner than the end of our sentences in 1975."

A prisoner's resistance is first and foremost by means of inward liberation. Solzhenitsyn tells of poets in the camps who found inner freedom in words, in rhythm, in their striving to express in verse the strength of the human spirit. The author of *Gulag* was himself one of these camp poets; he developed an amazing technique for memorizing tens of thousands of lines of verse. He tells of Petya Kishkin, who used to play the part of *Ivan-durachok* [Ivan the Simpleton] from Russian fairy-tales. The convicts would say of Petya the idiot, "Kishkin is wiser than all of us." With a single sharp word he knew how to sting the most obtuse convict to the quick, or lay bare the mendacity of official slogans. The author devotes a great deal of space to the most courageous—though most hopeless—form of individual resistance—attempted escape from the camp. The figure of the "convinced escapee," Georgii Tenno, the naval officer and sportsman who valued freedom above all else in the world, is one of the most attractive characters in the book. "What can you do with your liberty, especially with things as they are now? Why try escaping?" Tenno's friends used to ask him. "What do you mean, why?" he would counter in amazement. "Freedom! To spend days and nights in the taiga and not be in shackles—that's freedom!"

From the memoirs of a camp friend of Tenno's, Alexander Dolgun, which were published in the USA [*An American in the Gulag*], we know that after Tenno had been released from camp, from "the small zone," and rehabilitated, he remained a "convinced escapee" and thought only of one thing—escape from the "big zone," the USSR.

The chapters in *Gulag Archipelago* concerned with escapes are not only accounts of the courage of men who threw down a challenge to the Special Camps by risking their lives—as Tenno said: "It's like this: are you ready to die? You are? Then you're ready to escape." They are tales of difficulties which only began when the escapee had crossed the barbed wire. He was at large in a hostile land, and not only could he not expect help—he had at all times to expect anyone he met to hand him over to the authorities. "The population of our country," writes Solzhenitsyn, "was *afraid* to help fugitives, and even sold them out, either with mercenary motives or on principle." And what a population it was—sometimes the fugitives it sold out were its own kith and kin.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

But still those in whom freedom yet lived, those who were ready to die, continued to escape and to resist. Even if they staged their escape in groups, it was still a form of individual resistance.

THE central and most important part of Volume 3 of *Gulag Archipelago* is taken up with a description of forms of mass resistance —strikes and mutinies. Camp literature already contains a good many testimonies to mass actions by convicts. In 1954 the German doctor Josef Scholmer published his book *Vorkute*. Translated into many languages, it was a detailed account of the strike by Vorkuta prisoners in July 1953; in 1973 Dimitrii Panin told in *Sologdin's Notes* of a strike at a camp in Ekibastuz; Alexander Dolgun cities testimonies to the rebellion in Kengir in May 1954; and Lyubov Bershadskaya, herself a participant in the rebellion, recalls the "40 days of Kengir" in her book *Trampled Lives* (1976).

Solzhenitsyn is the first to attempt a history of these mutinies and uprisings, in so far as this is possible, bearing in mind, as he himself writes, that "the people who took part in them have been exterminated, distant witnesses have been intimidated, and the reports of those who suppressed the revolts have been burned or hidden inside twenty-walled safes—that these uprisings have already become a myth . . ." The chronicler of the Archipelago gathers, grain by grain, the evidence of participants who survived, second-hand accounts, checking and double-checking the facts which reach him. His own experience is a tremendous help to him here. Solzhenitsyn participated in and witnessed for himself the actions of convicts in the camp of Ekibastuz.

Solzhenitsyn recalls the "very earliest outbreaks"—the revolt in January 1942 when a certain Retyunin (about whom nothing is known) led several hundred convicts off into the forests, and the legendary uprising in 1948 of convicts engaged on the construction of the far northern railway to Salekhard. All those who went off with Retyunin were killed, and the 1948 mutineers were shot from aeroplanes. The beginning of the 1950s was the start of a new epoch, when "the Stalinist camp system had reached a crisis. . ." The era of escapes had ended; an era of rebellions had begun. Solzhenitsyn recounts in detail the history of the hunger strike in Ekibastuz and the 40 day uprising in Kengir. A comparison of these two revolts reveals typical, characteristic features of an awakening of the will for freedom in the Stalin camps. In both Ekibastuz and Kengir events took an identical turn. The chief link in the chain to be broken is chosen spontaneously, instinctively: the destruction of informers and spies for the camp authorities: "Kill the informers!"—there's the link! "Stick a knife in the informer's chest! Make knives and slaughter the informers! That's it!" Sitting at his desk in his clean, warm room, the writer agrees that, in theory, violence breeds violence and that nothing in this world can be achieved by violence. But, he writes: "you have to get 25 years for nothing, to wear your four

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

numbers, to keep your hands always behind your back, to be searched morning and evening, to work until you drop with exhaustion, to be dragged into the BUR (intensified regime barrack) because someone has informed on you, to be trampled irrevocably into the ground, in order to look out of there, from your pit, and see all the speeches by great humanists as so much idle chatter by satiated free men." In the first volume of the *Gulag Archipelago* Solzhenitsyn had dreamed of resistance to "Stalin's accursed machine": "If, during periods of mass arrests . . . people had not simply sat there in their lairs, paling with terror at every bang of the downstairs door and at every step on the staircase, but had understood that they had nothing left to lose and had boldly set up in the downstairs hall an ambush of half a dozen people with axes, hammers, pokers, or whatever else was at hand? . . ." It was to take years of torture, degradation and suffering for people to realize that "they had nothing left to lose" and take up their knives.

Among five thousand prisoners only about a dozen informers were killed, but the result was stunning: "Outwardly, we appeared just as we had been before—arrested, and still in the camp zone, but in fact we had become *free,* free, because for the first time in our life, as far as we could remember, we had begun to say openly and aloud what we were thinking!" The writer adds: "Whoever has not experienced this transformation cannot possibly imagine what it was like!" The liquidation of the informers—the eyes and ears of the camp authorities—was the first stage of the resistance. The next was the setting up of organs of leadership: "National centres out of the reach of informers sprang up and became established—Ukrainian, united Moslem, Estonian, Lithuanian. No-one elected them; but they took shape with such justice by seniority, wisdom and suffering that their authority to represent their own nationality was never disputed." The next stage in the swelling movement within the camp was to put forward suggestions. "But the blood that flowed within us was still servile, the blood of slaves. For all of us to remove those cursed numbers from our backs seemed as bold, as impudent, as irrevocable a step as, say, taking to the streets with machine-guns. The word "strike" sounded so terrible to our ears that we sought support in a hunger-strike. . . After all, we did have some right, we thought, to go on a hunger-strike—but a real strike? Generation after generation has grown up in our country in the belief that the glaringly dangerous and, of course, counter-revolutionary word "strike" ranks equal with "Entente, Denikin, kulak sabotage, Hitler."

The convicts declare a hunger-strike and a work-stoppage after the camp authorities, in an attempt to crush the movement, open machine-gun fire on unarmed prisoners and then burst into the camp zone and shoot those who haven't managed to take refuge from the gunfire in their barracks.

The resistance by prisoners, the "breeze of revolution" which had begun to blow through the camp, was a complete surprise to the

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

authorities. They were utterly at a loss after some of their informers were killed and the rest had come running to them for protection. The authorities' reaction and the methods they used to try to smash the revolt are analysed by Solzhenitsyn as thoroughly as the behaviour of the convicts themselves. The first thing the authorities did was to try and divide the population of the camp by nationalities, to separate the Ukrainians, who had formed the main body of militants. False hopes were raised: a fictitious commission was created which summoned convicts and waved the mirage of an early discharge in front of them. Attempts were made to denounce the movement among the convicts as gangsterism. Finally, the camp authorities resorted to the simplest means: they used arms. In response, the convicts went on hunger-strike and refused to go out to work. The strike went on for three days. "Those three days of our life will never be forgotten by any of the participants. We didn't see our comrades in the other barracks, and we didn't see the corpses which lay unburied there. But all of us were united by a bond of steel across the deserted camp zone." The authorities were forced to come to the strikers and parley with them. It turned out that the prisoners' demands were timid and vague and did not go very far at all: those responsible for the shooting should be tried, the convicts' numbers should be removed from their backs, and the locks removed from their barracks. Solzhenitsyn remarks that they did not even ask for an eight-hour working day. "We had so lost the habit of freedom," he comments, "that we apparently no longer reached out for it . . ."

The strike ends. The convicts—and how could it be otherwise?—are defeated. They do not yet have sufficient strength and tenacity. Solzhenitsyn adds to his gallery of heroes of the Archipelago a portrait of a Polish engineer, Yury Vengerovsky, who refused to end his hunger-strike even when the rest of the brigade had surrendered. "It was then," writes Solzhenitsyn, "that I understood the meaning of Polish pride—and the reason for their selfless insurrections . . . If we had all been as proud and steadfast, what tyrant could have held out against us?"

EKIBASTUZ surrendered, but the "contagion of freedom" was transmitted further. The next stage in the struggle was the uprising at Kengir, the largest rebellion in the history of the Archipelago. This revolt, which flared up spontaneously, became the next stage in the history of the liberation movement: for 40 days the camp lived a free life. The camp authorities had been expelled and were admitted only for negotiations. "Eight thousand people," writes Solzhenitsyn, "had not so much stirred up a mutiny as *escaped* into freedom." The prisoners elected a *Commission* for the purposes of self-government and for negotiating with the authorities. For the first time in long, long years, Soviet citizens elected, absolutely freely, an organ of self-government. And this took place in a camp, surrounded on all sides by troops. The

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

camp was decorated with slogans: "Long live the Soviet Constitution," "Long live the Presidium of the Central Committee," "Long live the Soviet regime . . ." The leader of the rebellion was a former colonel in the Red Army, Kapiton Kuznetsov, who repeatedly insisted: "Our salvation lies in loyalty. We must talk with spokesmen from Moscow, *as befits Soviet citizens.*" Solzhenitsyn leaves it to some future historian of the Kengir revolt to "interpret this man." He himself writes: "Did he become leader of the movement because it carried him away? (I reject this explanation). Or, knowing his own capabilities as a commander, did he take over the leadership in order to restrain the movement, to channel it and lay it, like a tamed wave, under the jackboots of the authorities? (I think this the more likely explanation)." The second leader of the rebellion, a former senior lieutenant, Gleb Sluchenkov, who was unwilling to make any compromises and insisted on the need to fight to the death, in the knowledge that this was the only outcome there could be for him, is much more to the liking of the Archipelago's chronicler.

The amazing unity of all the prisoners in the camp—politicals, men and women, criminals who had been sent to the Special Camp in an attempt to avert any disturbances (and here Solzhenitsyn has for the first time some kind words to say about the criminals [*blatnye*], even if it is merely to claim that it was only after the politicals started killing informers that the criminals "suddenly began to respect them"—this amazing unity was the chief tower of strength of the Kengir uprising. The writer shows the authorities' horror in the face of this mutiny on a grand scale. Admittedly, it did take place after the overthrow of Beria, which had shaken the MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs] to its foundations. But the horror, the bewilderment, and the inability shown by top officials in the MVD to take a decision, are nonetheless patently obvious. Having invented tens of thousands of fictitious conspiracies and rebellions in the past, the MVD was utterly at a loss when it came up against a real revolt. For 40 whole days the authorities pondered on how to deal with the rebels and tried to neutralize them with talk of negotiations. The highest of top officials came from Moscow to conduct these negotiations, General Dolgikh, the head of Gulag and deputy Minister of Internal Affairs. The convicts requested that a member of the Central Committee's Presidium should also come. Their demands were almost the same as those made in Ekibastuz: the punishment of the people who had shot at convicts, the removal of prison numbers, an eight-hour working day, increased wages (but no mention was made of equal pay with free labour), free correspondence with relatives, and a review of their cases.

The authorities tried to prevail upon the prisoners over the camp radio, to persuade them to surrender; the wall surrounding the camp was broken open in several places and the convicts were invited to flee out of the den of mutiny. Only about a dozen or so actually escaped

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

beyond the camp zone. Solzhenitsyn explains: "The social temperature had risen so high on that little plot of land . . . that the laws according to which 'you only live once,' existence determines consciousness, and fear for his own skin drives a man to cowardice, were too far beneath them and did not operate for that brief time within the confines of that place."

In the early morning of 25 June 1954 the assault operation began: tanks entered the camp, followed by sub-machine-gunners. The tanks crushed everyone in their path, women included. Aircraft flew low over the camp, causing panic. As far as we can discover, the victims numbered over 700. Solzhenitsyn reminds us: "On 9 January 1905 about 100 people were killed. In 1912, 270 men were killed and 250 wounded in the notorious executions at the Lena mines, which stunned the whole of Russia." The historian of the Archipelago adds that in Moscow, on that very day, a monument was unveiled to Yury Dolgoruky: 'And so it turned out to be a kind of monument to Kengir."

THE chapters dealing with individual islands of the Archipelago are a convincing testimony to the fact that Soviet prisoners *did* resist. Solzhenitsyn has succeeded in filling in many of the blanks on the map of Soviet history. However, this is not the only significance of the three final parts of the book. If the first two volumes were a chronicle of the past, the recall of a memory without which the life of the nation is impossible, the third volume allows us a glimpse of the contours of the future.

What we have is a book which reveals for the first time the various forms of popular discontent with the regime, the various forms of resistance to it and struggle against it. The writer analyses them and points to the features they have in common: discontent, as a rule, arises spontaneously, in a disorganized fashion, and is usually directed not against the Soviet regime, but against the representatives of the regime. It has a peaceful character: during the camp revolts, it was the informers who were killed, not the representatives of authority. Solzhenitsyn demonstrates how, in circumstances where the individual is totally suppressed, the moment of liberation suddenly comes, the moment of explosion, when death ceases to be terrible and public opinion is born and rouses man to heroism.

It is therefore perfectly logical for Solzhenitsyn to include in *The Gulag Archipelago* a chapter dealing with the demonstration by Novocherkassk workers on 2 June 1962. It is the first description of what was the first open and spontaneous manifestation by workers of their indignation at actions taken by the authorities.

THE final chapter of the book, "Stalin has gone," holds out no hope. Stalin has gone, the rulers change, but the Archipelago remains. The Archipelago remains because the society which engendered it and

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

with which it has a blood relationship has remained immutable. The Archipelago remains, lawlessness remains. The Kengir workers were crushed by tanks under Malenkov, who had replaced Stalin. The Novocherkassk workers who protested at price rises, stopped working and came out onto the streets in a peaceful demonstration were shot under Khrushchev, who had replaced Malenkov. "A vast state towers on into its second half-century, strapped in hoops of steel; and the hoops are there, but there is no *law.*" These words mark the end of the Chronicle of the *Gulag Archipelago,* the history of a society in which terror and arbitrariness have taken the place of the law.

Hegel came to the conclusion that the only thing history teaches us is that it teaches no one anything. However, there are some historical parallels which might make us think. The peaceful "going to the people" by the Russian intelligentsia in the 1870s was succeeded by terror. The shots fired at the peaceful and loyal demonstration on 9 January 1905 were the first spark of the conflagration to come in October 1917.

The reason why the Soviet leaderhip was so horrified at the *Gulag Archipelago* was not so much because it told the truth about the past as because it foretold the future and revealed the outlines of that future. Measures of the gravest kind have been taken in the fight against the book. The most radical of these is the banishment of the word "archipelago" from the Russian language. Even geographers are obliged to substitute for it the expression "group of islands." It is not difficult for the powers-that-be to ban a word. It is far more difficult to halt the influence of the word and to halt the train of thought set in motion by this and other books by Alexander Solzhenitsyn.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

No. 2-1976:

Andrei Sakharov: Peace, Progress & Human Rights
The Nobel Lecture

Arthur Miller: After Helsinki . . .

Frederick Hunt: Russian Absurdist Poets

Margaret Johnson & Ann Vinograde: Censoring Böll in USSR

James Ivory, Věra Chytilová: Meddling with Films

Nadine Gordimer: A Writer's Freedom

Paul Goma: The Tanase Problem



UNOFFICIAL SOVIET ART: An Exhibition in London

In 1976 at the ICA there will be an exhibition of Unofficial Soviet Art. About 400 pictures will be on show by artists who do not represent socialist realism.

Editorial Office: 21 Russell St. London WC2B 5HP
Subscriptions: 1 year (4 issues) £5; US $14 (including. air-surface post)
USA and Canada: Bookstore distribution by Random House Inc. NY.
Subscription Office: Oxford University Press (Journals)
Press Road, London NW10 ODD

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The maze of current affairs has never been more complex. For the addicts of the esoteric art of Sovietology, we present a therapeutic alternative to provide light relief.

SURVEY Acrostic

William Petersen

Instructions

Decipher clues. Fill in answers on dashes over numbers alongside. Transfer letters to individually-numbered squares on diagram, where words form between black blanks to become a quotation. Letters printed in squares refer back to clues. First letters of answers over dashes become a vertical crostic giving author and source of quotation.
Answer in next issue.



PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Clues	Answers
A. Foreign minister of Weimar Germany, killed by an anti-Semitic assassin	141 187 104 55 11 90 116 27
B. Russian conservative party founded after the 1905 revolution	50 4 144 152 64 102 75 85
C. Russian political philosopher (1828–1904), a precursor of the Kadet party (initials and last name)	134 28 175 184 67 164 31 80 127 190
D. Author of the words of the *Internationale* (full name) . . .	24 49 118 132 23 174 70 51 3 10 193
E. Worldwide, one of the social issues underlying Communist agitation	120 163 91 40 180 12 95 138 129
F. The Khrushchev period	39 81 142 115
G. Former name of a Caucasian area, now part of the Karachai-Cherkess Autonomous Oblast	101 113 73 151 21 92 13 52 167
H. Composite term for anti-Lenin or anti-Stalin Bolsheviks . . .	72 94 47 8 130 107 86 57
I. Of the calendar, Gregorian, as adopted in the Soviet Union on February 14, 1918 (2 wds.)	26 159 32 125 166 53 93 176 6 109
J. In the US, one-time head of the Transport Workers Union, a prominent fellow-traveller .	36 122 103 17 65
K. A small northern tribe of the USSR	37 171 106 83 18
L. Capital of the Kalmyk ASSR .	178 29 62 189 126 162
M. Prominent émigré Russian writer	96 181 188 108 2 56 133 147 124 43 74 173

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

N. One of the oldest of European heads of state (Party name) . . 155 172 54 14

O. ——— Alatau, a mountain range in the Kirghiz SSR . . . 19 140 88 183 117

P. Political pseudonym of William Joyce (comp.) 139 60 98 161 38 77

Q. The administrative bureau of Word V (acronym) 35 143 44 79

R. Donation; bent 71 46 153 177

S. Communists (slang) 146 84 34 131

T. Revises 66 41 123 160 100

U. In the US, the professional society of Slavic scholars (acronym) 33 87 16 168 114

V. Organization of Communist parties founded in 1919 (2 wds.) 149 112 25 179 194 89 58 1

42 169 76 136 82 105 119

15 68 157

W. Russian writer (1875–1952), long resident in Paris: *Little Town; The Witch* 69 128 186 9 150

X. Of the three elements of the French revolutionary slogan, presently the dominant one . . 145 121 5 63 137 158 111 30

Y. Russian philosopher and poet (1749–1802), one of the first to advocate a revolutionary transformation of Russia . . . 45 99 185 135 148 191 22 78

165 59

Z. Wretched, mean (slang) 61 156 7 97 20

YY. Of Berlin, the Communist sector 192 154 48

ZZ. Moldavian Party leader and government official, rapidly promoted under Stalin 182 170 110

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Minerva

A REVIEW OF SCIENCE, LEARNING & POLICY

Editor: Edward Shils

VOLUME XIII NUMBER 4 **WINTER 1975**

ARTICLES

Scientific Research as an Occupation in Eighteenth-Century Paris *Roger Hahn*

Department and Discipline: The Department of Sociology at the University of Chicago, 1892–1920 *Steven J. Diner*

Controversy in Social Science: Soviet Rural Studies in the 1920s *Susan Gross Solomon*

The Origins of the University Grants Committee *Eric Hutchinson*

REPORTS AND DOCUMENTS

Learning and Libraries: Academic Economics as a Profession: Its Bearing on the Organisation and Retrieval of Economic Knowledge *Harry G. Johnson*

BOOK REVIEWS

Reviews by *A. E. Musson, Richard Nelson, Steven Shapin*

Annual Subscription: £5.00/$14.00. Single Copy: £1.50/$4.20

MINERVA, 59 St. Martin's Lane, London WC2N 4JS

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

EUROPAEISCHE RUNDSCHAU

The international quarterly journal (with an extensive English summary) on European politics, economics and contemporary history with special emphasis on East-West relations is published in Vienna by a non-profit-making association of distinguished Austrian personalities.

EDITOR — PAUL LENDVAI

FROM RECENT ISSUES:

Bruno Kreisky (Vienna)	Über Sozialdemokratie und Kommunismus
Vasile Gliga (Bucharest)	Rümanische Aussenpolitik
F. R. Alleman (Zürich)	Portugiesische Peripetien
Hansjacob Stehle (Rome)	Wohin steuert Italien?
Fritz Klenner (Vienna)	Renaissance des österreichischen Staatsbewusstseins
Ian Davidson (London)	Britischer Europapolitik
Péter Rényi (Budapest)	Breschnew und die Westpresse
P. E. Hegge (Oslo)	Richtungskämpfe der nordischen Kommunisten
Zagorka Golubović (Belgrade)	Sociologie in Jugoslawien
Jürg Meyer (Berne)	UNO—Beitritt der Schweiz?
Friedrich Levcik (Vienna)	Ausländerbeschäftigung in Osteuropa
Peter Coulmas (Cologne)	Der europaische-arabische Dialog

Annual subscription: £5 or US$12 post free
(Airmail extra US$8)

£1·25 (US$3) per single copy

Subscripition Agents:

EUROPAVERLAG, ALTMANNSDORFERSTRASSE 154
A-1232 VIENNA, AUSTRIA

SPECIMEN COPY ON REQUEST

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

LO SPETTATORE INTERNAZIONALE

A quarterly review of international politics published in English by the Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI) of Rome. Each issue contains articles by Italian and foreign authors and a regular survey of Italy's position in international politics and commerce.

Among the articles published in the last issue of 1975 were the following:

Cesare Merlini—*Italy's Role in the International Scenario*

Stefano Silvestri—*The International Political System*

Roberto Aliboni—*Economic Policies and International Cooperation*

Gianni Bonvicini—*The Foreign Relations of the European Community and Political Cooperation*

Gianluca Devoto—*Italy's Armaments Program and Nuclear Proliferation*

Vincenzo Russo—*Italy's Monetary Policy*

Maria Valeria Agostini—*Italy's Regional Policy*

Bona Pozzoli—*Italy's Bilateral Policy*

In forthcoming issues of 1976 articles on the EEC's Mediterranean policy, arms standardization, the changing situation in southern Europe, investment and labor in the Mediterranean, and Italy's place in the international scene will be featured.

Editor-in-chief: Cesare Merlini
Editorial Offices: Istituto Affari Internazionali
Viale Mazzini 88 (Rome) 00195

Subscription Rates for 1976:

Italy	Lit. 5000
Europe	Lit. 6000 or $9.50
Other Countries	Lit. 7000 or $11.00

Orders should be sent directly to the publisher:

Società editrice il Mulino
Via S. Stefano 6 — P.O. Box 119
40100 (Bologna) Italy

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Détente

Edited by GEORGE URBAN

This book consists of thirteen dialogues and a three-cornered conversation on the topical question of East-West détente. The four ' baskets ' discussed at the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe are analysed, but the scope of the book goes far beyond these, giving this symposium a depth and durability entirely its own.

Contents: Bruno Pittermann, *The moral factor in the conduct of foreign affairs*; Sir William Hayter, *Sovereignty, appeasement and détente*; François Bondy, *Cultural exchange and the prospects of change in the Soviet Union*; Robert F. Byrnes, *Can culture survive cultural agreements?*; Claus D. Kernig, *Why world stability requires the stability of the Soviet system*; Johan Jørgen Holst, *Security as mutual education*; Wolf H. Halsti, *Finlandization*; Richard Pipes, *Détente and reciprocity*; Alfred Grosser, *The French paradox*; Adam Ulam, *Why the status quo in Eastern Europe is a threat to Soviet security*; George W. Ball, *Europe without a unifying adversary*; Dean Rusk, *Co-existence without sanctimony*; Zbigniew Brzezinski, *From Cold War to cold peace*; François Duchêne & Leopold Labedz, *Rival perspectives.*

temple smith £8

SOVIET ANALYST

Editorial Board

Robert Conquest
Brian Crozier
Iain Elliot (Editor)

A fortnightly newsletter informing subscribers about the latest events in the USSR and Eastern Europe and providing up-to-date analysis of Soviet foreign policy, *Soviet Analyst* forms a bridge between academic studies and journalism.

Subscriptions: Overseas $70, U.K. £28 per annum, including postage. For academic institutions and individual students of the USSR: $35 (£17) per annum. Further information from:

Research Publications Services Ltd.
Victoria Hall, Fingal Street,
East Greenwich, London SE10 0RF

Printed in Great Britain by The Eastern Press, Ltd., London and Reading

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED